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ABSTRACT 
 
Courts established over a century ago that a corporation, like an indi-
vidual, should be held criminally responsible for its misconduct. Neverthe-
less, the practice still faces steep resistance rooted in skeptical worries about 
both the possibility of, and the purpose behind, holding collectives account-
able. My dissertation refutes both skeptical worries—and, in doing so, 
brings together diametrically opposed approaches to corporate regulation. 
Chapter I situates the project in its historical context. Regulation of 
commercial activity originally occurred through corporate law: states looked 
inside the corporation to oversee its structure, purpose, and even day-to-day 
managerial decisions. The development of corporate-criminal liability re-
flects first corporate law’s inability to regulate sophisticated commercial en-
tities and second the inadequacy of the conception of personhood this strat-
egy presupposed. Chapter II draws on contemporary scholarship to offer a 
pragmatic conception of personhood, one consistent with the nascent con-
ception courts developed to justify the expansion of criminal liability to cor-
porations. On this account, corporations can satisfy stringent prerequisites 
for legal personhood—in particular, criminal law’s mens rea requirements.  
The second half of the dissertation reimagines corporate law as a tool 
for improving criminal punishment, rather than as a standalone, alternative 
approach to corporate regulation. Chapter III defends the use of criminal 
fines against complaints that fines merely harm innocent individuals, and 
further demonstrates that the State could better deter corporations while 
minimizing harm to innocents through corporate-law reforms that encour-
age those inside the corporation to voluntarily shift the distribution of harm
 towards culpable members. Chapter IV goes further to use corporate-law 
reform as punishment in and of itself. Among other things, standard objec-
tions to reform fall away when relocated from the ordinary commercial
 ix 
context to the rarefied space of criminal punishment. Meanwhile, corporate-
reform-as-punishment expresses penological justifications traditionally in-
applicable to corporations because of the lack of suitable alternatives to pun-
ishments like imprisonment. Incorporating corporate-law reform into our 
criminal practices thus expands the range of justifications for punishing cor-
porations. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOW, WHEN, AND WHY CORPORATIONS BECAME PERSONS 
UNDER THE CRIMINAL LAW: RECONSIDERING 
THE BIRTH OF CORPORATE-CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
1! Preface 
Consider the following, prevailing myth explaining how and why corpo-
rate-criminal liability developed. Courts long refused to hold corporations 
criminally responsible for good reason: corporations cannot satisfy the re-
quirements of criminal law. In particular, a corporation is incapable of pro-
ducing intentional attitudes. Thus, insofar as a corporation can never satisfy 
criminal law’s mens rea requirement, the notion of corporate-criminal liabil-
ity is conceptually confused. Nevertheless, the myth continues, at the turn 
of the twentieth century courts traded theoretical coherence for practical 
expedience. Legislatures sought to deter corporate harm by amending crim-
inal law; courts obliged by substituting tort law’s vicarious liability for genu-
ine corporate mental states (which, according to the myth, are impossible).  
This historical just-so story otherwise might not matter, except that it 
has considerable impact and durability today. Several scholars argue that the 
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practice of holding corporations criminally responsible remains as conceptu-
ally incoherent today as the myth claims it was in the 1800s. Other scholars 
rely on the myth to argue that corporate-criminal liability is a practice whose 
time has past. On this view, perhaps the need to deter corporations once 
outweighed the loss of theoretical consistency; however, with regulatory 
alternatives to criminal law now available, corporate-criminal liability has 
outlived its usefulness. In short, critics today suggest that corporate-
criminal liability was and remains unjustified, while deterrence arguments 
no longer excuse our historical tolerance of conceptual incoherence.  
The myth of corporate-criminal liability’s development gets the history, 
and its consequences, entirely backwards. Corporate-criminal liability is not 
a conceptually confused practice created to fill a now-irrelevant regulatory 
need. Rather, the practice of holding corporate criminally responsible has in 
its history solid conceptual and moral foundations. Indeed, our current prac-
tice of corporate-criminal liability would stand on firmer footing than it now 
does if we were to pay closer attention to the judicial reasoning of those 
courts first grappling with the challenge of holding corporations responsible 
for tortious and criminal conduct.  
As to how the development occurred, critics of corporate-criminal lia-
bility’s development rely on a contestable theory for attributing intentional 
attitudes, which stems from a longstanding view about the grounding rela-
tionship between personhood and attribution. As it turns out, courts largely 
abandoned this conception of personhood at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury and, in doing so, articulated justifiable methods for attributing inten-
tional attitudes to corporations. Thus, today’s critics rely on a conception of 
personhood that the law abandoned over a century ago. 
As to why corporate-criminal liability developed when it did, appealing 
to deterrence cannot alone explain criminal law’s expansion to corporations. 
For one, absent from virtually every discussion of corporate-criminal liabil-
ity’s development is a simultaneous transformation in the content and pur-
pose of corporate law. Corporate and criminal law embody diametrically op-
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posed approaches towards corporate regulation; the rise of the latter cannot 
be understood in isolation from the decline of the former. The timing of the 
expansion reflects the fact that commercial corporations were then becom-
ing sophisticated-enough collective agents to be, for the first time, eligible 
for criminal liability. In other words, corporate-criminal liability arose just at 
a time when, owing largely to the liberalization of corporate law, corpora-
tions became reliably capable of satisfying the requirements of criminal law.  
Having established corporations’ newfound eligibility, I consider the ra-
tionales courts actually gave for beginning to hold corporations criminally 
responsible. Contemporary judicial opinions reveal that courts were over-
whelmingly preoccupied by a cluster of fairness considerations as justifica-
tion for expanding corporate liability. These fairness considerations reflect a 
procedural heuristic, according to which courts endeavored to treat all per-
sons equally, but at a minimum sought not to discriminate against individual 
persons1 in favor of corporate persons.2 Thus, with respect to criminal liabil-
ity, courts refused to favor corporations over individuals by exposing the 
latter, but not the former, to the harsh sanction of criminal responsibility. 
Commitment to this qualified antidiscrimination sentiment applies at least 
as powerfully today as it did a century ago: Far from being a once-excusable, 
now-superfluous practice, corporate-criminal liability has as much reason to 
exist today than as it did upon inception. 
                                                        
1 For wont of a better term, I use the term “individual persons.” The common 
practice is to refer to individuals (presumably humans) as “natural persons,” but 
this presentation loads the dice in favor of the skeptic on precisely the issue of the 
nature of personhood, which I take to be up for grabs. Thanks are due to Peter Rail-
ton for pressing me to abandon the standard term. 
2 Relatedly, although scholars refer interchangeably to “corporate persons” 
and “artificial persons,” the latter invites troubling (and avoidable) ambiguity. See 
Saul Kripke, Unrestricted Exportation and Some Morals for the Philosophy of Lan-
guage, in Philosophical Troubles, 322–50 (2011). Accordingly, I restrict 
myself to the term “corporate person.” My thanks to Dan Jacobson for this point. 
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2! The Myth of How and Why Corporate-
Criminal Liability Developed (and Why It 
Matters) 
2.1! How Did Courts Hold Corporations Criminally Responsible? 
How did corporate-criminal liability first develop? For the purposes of 
this Chapter, I focus on the expansion of corporate-criminal liability to gen-
eral- and specific-intent crimes—or, more generally, crimes for which some 
type of intentional attitude is an essential element.3 With that in mind, how 
did courts overcome then-prevalent skepticism about a corporation’s ability 
to satisfy criminal law’s mens rea requirement?  
Start with the conceptual challenge that courts had to overcome. Until 
the turn of the twentieth century, courts routinely held that it was impossi-
ble to attribute to the corporation an intentional attitude.4 This conclusion 
followed from a strain of reasoning then common in corporate law. Courts 
routinely invoked, as reason to deny corporations’ legal rights and responsi-
bilities, the absence of some feature common to individual persons. For ex-
ample, Lord Coke is credited, perhaps ungenerously, with denying a corpo-
ration’s liability because “corporations have no souls.”5 Chief Justice Mar-
                                                        
3 I limit my attention to crimes for which an intentional attitude—understood 
broadly to include at least states of knowledge, maliciousness, or recklessness—is a 
required element. Unless otherwise specified, I understand the term “corporate-
criminal liability” to exclude strict criminal liability. 
4 E.g., Owsley v. Montgomery & W. Point R.R. Co., 37 Ala. 560, 563 (Ala. 
1861) (“[I]nasmuch as a malicious motive and criminal intent cannot be attributed 
to a corporation, in its corporate capacity, it is not indictable for those crimes, of 
which malice, or some specific criminal intent, is an essential ingredient.”); Com-
monwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339, 345 (1854) (“Cor-
porations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil 
intention.”); State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 364 (1852) (“[A] corpo-
ration cannot, from its nature, be guilty of treason, felony, or other crime involving 
malus animus in its commission.”). 
5 Sutton’s Hop. Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612) (Coke, J.). But see 
Murfreesboro & Woodbury Turnpike Co. v. Barrett, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 508, 510–
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shall argued in dissent that a corporation, being “destitute of the natural or-
gans of man,” should be prohibited from entering into a contract except 
through writing.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri gave the follow-
ing reason for denying that a corporation could be liable for intentional torts: 
The bank is a corporation—it cannot utter words—it has no tongue—no 
hands to commit an assault and battery with—no mind, heart or soul to be 
put into motion by malice; therefore, if it was an action for an assault and 
battery, or for a malicious prosecution, or for slander, we should at once 
say, that such could not be maintained.7 
Part 3 confirms that similar reasoning featured prominently in discus-
sions of the expansion of corporate liability for both torts and crimes; it met 
with judicial approval, particularly with respect to proscribing corporate-
criminal liability, until well into the nineteenth century. 
These sorts of impossibility claims, at their most general, posit a limit-
ing relationship between the concepts of personhood and attribution. Ad-
herents argue, or sometimes assume, that certain classes of attribution be 
applied only to individual persons—that is, to humans. For example, attrib-
uting speech to a person presupposes that the person has a mouth with 
which to speak; attributing action to the person presupposes that it has a 
body with which to act, etc. As a result, determining the range of available 
attributions requires first determining whether the entity is an individual 
person. Call this limiting relationship the Individual-person prem-
ise. 
How did the individual-person premise constrain the expansion of crim-
inal law to corporations? Although the law treats corporations as persons 
under various constitutional and statutory schemes,8 for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                                            
11 (Tenn. 1865) (interpreting Coke’s quotation to mean that corporations diffuse 
responsibility across individuals in a manner that produces malicious outcomes). 
6 Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J. 
dissenting). 
7 Childs v. Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213, 215 (Mo. 1852).  
8 E.g., Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (Fourteenth 
Amendment); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (jurisdic-
  6 
criminal liability courts limited the term “person” to entities for which it is 
possible to attribute intentional attitudes. This limitation derived from the 
ordinary requirements of criminal law, which holds a person accountable for 
the commission of a proscribed act (actus reus) performed concurrently 
with a proscribed attitude (mens rea). Per the individual-person premise, an 
entity must possess a single, natural mind in order to have attributed to it 
intentional attitudes. However, as courts had long noted, a corporation does 
not possess a mind distinct from its members. Accordingly, courts reasoned, 
corporations are ineligible for attributions of intentional attitudes, and there-
fore cannot be persons for purposes of the criminal law.  
How did courts resolve conceptual obstacles to the possibility of genu-
ine corporate attitudes? According to the myth of corporate-criminal liabil-
ity, there was no resolution. Instead, courts avoided the conceptual chal-
lenge by importing vicarious liability—specifically, the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior—from tort law into criminal law.9 Under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, “a master is subject to liability for the torts of his serv-
ants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”10 Analogiz-
ing respondeat superior to the corporate context, a court could impute to 
the corporation the actions and intentional attitudes of an employee acting 
in the scope of his or her employment. Crucially, a court thereby would not 
have needed to consider the corporation’s capacity to possess its own inten-
                                                                                                                                            
tion, Privileges and Immunities Clause); Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 64, 70 (1827) (contract law); cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., —
  U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) (“[T]he term ‘person’ sometimes encom-
passes artificial persons, . . . and it sometimes is limited to natural persons.” (citing 
the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
9 Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an 
Observation, 60 Wash. U. L.Q. 393, 416–21 (1982) (discussing vicarious liabil-
ity’s development and importation into criminal law); accord Sarah Sun Beale, The 
Development and Evolution of the U.S. Law of Corporate Criminal Liability (draft). 
10 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958). 
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tional attitudes; under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the only atti-
tudes of interest are those of the individual servant.11 
There is a kernel of truth in the myth. Some courts did in fact hold cor-
porations vicariously liable for the criminal misconduct of their employees. 
Most prominently, in New York Central & Hudson River Railway v. United 
States, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed Congress’s power 
to create a general-intent criminal statute that applies to corporations.12 In 
doing so, the Supreme Court expressly incorporate tort doctrine into the 
criminal law to hold that a corporation could be “charged with the 
knowledge and purpose of their agents.”13 Eventually, it would become 
standard practice for federal courts to hold corporations “guilty of ‘know-
ing’ or ‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of re-
spondent superior.”14 
Where the myth goes astray is in casting too narrow a gaze on judicial 
practice. Although the Supreme Court is the law of the land, its role during 
this period in shaping corporate and criminal law—both traditionally state 
doctrines—was comparatively minor. State courts, especially state supreme 
courts, were the true source of innovation. And state supreme courts 
throughout the 1800s rejected the individual-person premise—as invoked in 
criminal law, but also in tort law and corporate law. Moreover, many states, 
and some even federal courts, expanded corporate-criminal liability without 
appeal to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Section 2.3 illustrates this his-
torical oversight affects our current practice. First, however, let me place 
the other half of the myth on the table. 
                                                        
11 As Gerhard Mueller derided the development of corporate mens rea, “by ig-
noring the problem, they have solved it.” Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the 
Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 39 (1957). 
12 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
13 Id. at 495. 
14 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958). 
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2.2! Why Did Courts Hold Corporations Criminally Responsible? 
Assume the myth is correct in describing how courts avoided the con-
ceptual obstacle to holding corporations criminally responsible. It still stands 
to be explained why courts changed their position in the first place. Here, the 
myth invokes deterrence: states suddenly needed some method for discour-
aging corporations from doing harm.  
On this point, Kathleen Brickey argues that early criminal prosecutions 
of corporations reflect the fact that “corporate criminal accountability con-
stituted a more effective response to problems created by corporate business 
activities than did existing private remedies.”15 Going further, V.S. Khanna 
argues that criminal law provided the only forum through which the State, 
as opposed to private individuals, could deter corporate misconduct: 
For activities causing public harm, public enforcement was essential. Hold-
ing individuals liable through public enforcement was, of course, one op-
tion for addressing public harms. However, when the culpable individual 
within the corporate hierarchy was judgment-proof or not easily identifia-
ble, maintaining optimal deterrence necessitated imposing liability on the 
corporation. Given the absence of widespread public civil enforcement pri-
or to the early 1900s, corporate criminal liability appears to have been the 
only available option that met both the need for public enforcement and the 
need for corporate liability. At that time, corporate criminal liability may 
indeed have served a useful purpose.16 
In other words, corporate-criminal liability developed because criminal 
law provided the best, and potentially the only, forum for the State to incen-
tivize corporations to avoid acts of misconduct. On this view, there is noth-
ing special about the fact that courts began to hold corporations criminally 
liable; had another legal forum been available, corporate-criminal liability 
may never have been necessary. 
Again, there is a kernel of truth here. To return to Hudson River, the 
Supreme Court notes that to give corporations “immunity from all punish-
                                                        
15 Brickey, supra note 9, at 423. 
16 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 
Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1486 (1995); accord Brickey, supra note 9, at 422. 
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ment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot 
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually con-
trolling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”17 More gen-
erally, Part 3 demonstrates that states embraced corporate-criminal liability 
directly in response to the failure of corporate law to serve as a viable regula-
tory mechanism. 
Nevertheless, again the myth fails to tell the whole story. Courts ex-
panding criminal liability were especially preoccupied by a constellation of 
fairness considerations, which I put off enumerating until Part 5. Suffice to 
say, courts proved uncomfortable maintaining a system of criminal law that, 
by immunizing corporations from liability, discriminated against individual 
persons and in favor of corporations. 
2.3! The Pernicious Effect of Historical Myth on Modern Practice 
Up to this point, all I have suggested is that there is a myth that tells the 
truth, but not the whole truth, about how we came to hold corporations 
criminally responsible. Putting aside an interest in historical fastidiousness 
for its own sake, why should we bother to care? 
As it turns out, the historical myth behind the development of corpo-
rate-criminal liability is employed to offer a purportedly devastating critique 
of the modern practice of holding corporations criminally responsible. Put 
simply, the myth suggests that corporate-criminal liability is a conceptually 
unjustifiable practice whose development was excused by the lack of regula-
tory alternatives. Inasmuch as those excusing conditions no longer obtain, 
there is no longer any reason to hold corporations criminally responsible. 
Begin with the conceptual challenge posed by the possibility of corpo-
rate attitudes. Federal doctrine continues to impute attitudes to a corpora-
tion through respondeat superior, for which the federal courts have been 
roundly criticized. I focus my attention on one strain of modern criticism. 
                                                        
17 Hudson River Ry., 212 U.S. at 496. 
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Several scholars echo the individual-person premise: they argue that a cor-
poration lacks a distinct mind, that a mind is required to attribute intentions, 
and that thereby a corporation is incapable of being held criminally liable. 
So, for example, Jeffrey Parker derides the development of corporate-
criminal liability as “brush[ing] aside concerns about the lack of mens rea at 
the corporate level,” which occurred when “[t]he corporate entity was 
treated as a person and endowed with a corporate ‘mind’ that could be 
found guilty.”18 Similarly, Richard Epstein argues that “[o]n first principles, 
the law should reject corporate criminal liability on the widely acknowledged 
ground that corporations do not have the state of mind to authorize actions, 
to turn a blind eye to their occurrence, or to display callous indifference to 
their effects.”19 Likewise, Professors Fischel and Sykes claim that 
“[c]orporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit criminal 
acts. Nor can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind. Only people can 
act and only people can have a guilty state of mind.”20 Nor is this reasoning 
limited to the legal scholars; philosophers like Marion Smiley, for example, 
note that “collectives do not appear to have minds and hence do not appear 
to be capable of formulating intentions.”21 
The myth behind corporate-criminal liability’s development bolsters 
the view that genuine corporate attitudes are impossible. The proffered ex-
                                                        
18 Jeffrey S. Parker, Corporate Crime, Overcriminalization, and the Failure of 
American Public Morality, in The American Illness: Essays on the 
Rule of Law (F.H. Buckley ed., 2013). 
19 Richard Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial, in Prosecu-
tors in the Boardroom 45 (2011). 
20 Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal Studs. 
319, 320 (1996).  
21 Marion Smiley, From Moral Agency To Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collec-
tive Moral Responsibility, 19 J.L. & Pol. 171, 185 (2010); accord Michael McKen-
na, Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 Midwest Studs. 
Phil. 16, 31 (2006); see also Larry May, The Morality of Groups 65 
(1987) (arguing that “collective intentions proper, that is, to say that the group can 
intend in just the same way that the individual persons can intend, is a fiction”). 
  11 
planation for how corporate-criminal liability developed—through re-
spondeat superior, rather than through identification of genuine corporate 
attitudes—reaffirms the longstanding belief that there is no principled way 
that corporations can satisfy the requirement of criminal law. In short, ar-
gues the critic, courts avoided giving a principled method for extending 
criminal liability to corporations because no such principled method exists. 
Turn now to why corporate-criminal liability developed. The myth—
the practice arose to deter corporations—takes for granted that no other ra-
tionales could apply. Thus, Brickey’s and Khanna’s analysis “treat[s] deter-
rence, not retribution, as the aim of both corporate criminal liability and 
corporate civil liability.”22 This approach is clearly the majority view. In 
support, Regina Robson demonstrates that there has occurred a “virtual 
elimination of retribution as an acknowledged goal of [corporate-]criminal 
sanctioning,” with only deterrence left standing to explain why the State 
should hold corporations criminally responsible.23 
Deterrence alone is a weak foundation upon which to rest a practice of 
corporate-criminal responsibility.24 To be sure, there are those who argue 
that criminal liability deters in a manner unique from civil liability.25 Never-
theless, once we accept the myth, it becomes much harder to maintain the 
practice. In particular, argues the critic, the historical circumstances that 
once excused corporate-criminal liability no longer obtain. Civil and regula-
tory avenues now exist through which the State can regulate corporate activ-
                                                        
22 Khanna, supra note 16, at 1494 & n.91 (collecting citations). 
23 Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Jus-
tification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 109, 121 (2010). 
24 Cf. Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 
Hasting L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (“Criminal liability for corporations exists in large part 
to deter undesirable corporate conduct and to encourage desirable corporate prac-
tices, but carrots and sticks are not sufficient justification for the imposition of criminal 
liability on corporations.” (emphasis added)). 
25 E.g., Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 
Ind. L.J. 473 (2006). 
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ity. Plausibly, these avenues offer more effective methods of regulation than 
criminal law: the State can prevail on lower standards of proof, corporations 
lack constitutional protections otherwise available in the criminal context, 
etc. Thus, Khanna concludes that the practice of holding corporations crim-
inally responsible should be abandoned: 
[T]he circumstances in which substantially all of the traits of corporate 
criminal liability are socially desirable are nearly nonexistent. . . . [S]ome 
justification for corporate criminal liability may have existed in the past, 
when civil enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a de-
terrence perspective, very little now supports the continued imposition of 
criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.26 
This conclusion encapsulates how the historical myth purports to at 
once explain and undermine our current practice. The development of cor-
porate-criminal liability was an excusable, but conceptually unjustifiable, 
historical aberration. Given its questionable deterrent value, the longstand-
ing theoretical challenges that still plague the practice, and the real harm 
that individuals experience in its service, the practice should be confined to 
the dustbin of history. 
3! The Historical Interplay between Corporate 
Law and Criminal Liability 
The myth gets things backwards. Corporate-criminal liability was justi-
fied at its inception—not because corporations have always been eligible for 
criminal liability, but because they became eligible late in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The liberalization of corporate law during and immediately following 
the nineteenth century enabled the creation and proliferation of corporate 
persons sophisticated enough to satisfy criminal law’s mens rea require-
ment. Appreciating the development of corporate-criminal liability requires 
situating it alongside the corporate-law backdrop against which it occurred. 
Accordingly, Part 3 connects the development of corporate-criminal liability 
                                                        
26 Khanna, supra note 16, at 1532, 1534. 
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at the turn of the twentieth century to the liberalization of corporate law in 
the preceding decades.  
3.1! Special Charters and Corporate Nuisance 
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the private commercial corpora-
tion was rare, small, and intertwined with the State. Fewer than four hun-
dred commercial corporations existed nationwide in 1800; most commercial 
activity occurred instead through partnerships and sole proprietorships.27 
For many, the benefits of the corporate form—legal status as an independ-
ent entity, and to a lesser extent limited liability28—simply did not outweigh 
the inconvenience of incorporating. This is because, at the time, incorpora-
tion was a power exercised on a case-by-case basis by state legislatures.29 An 
entity seeking the benefits of the corporate form had to petition the legisla-
ture, which would then draft the entity its own special charter.  
                                                        
27 Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Personhood, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1135, 1145 (2012). Brickey 
claims that 225 private charters existed in 1800, of which less than a third were 
commercial in nature. Brickey, supra note 9, at 404. Hurst identifies 317 business 
corporations chartered before 1801. James Willard Hurst, The Legiti-
macy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United 
States 1780–1970 at 14 (1970). 
28 Status as a single agent allowed a corporation to own property and to con-
tract for itself—that is, separate from its members. See 1 William Black-
stone, Commentaries *465–66; cf. Head & Armory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804) (acknowledging a state’s ability to vest contracting 
powers in a corporation). Status as a single entity was likely the most attractive fea-
ture of the corporation early in its history. Limited liability would not matter until 
later. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 
U. Ill. Rev. 785, 794 (2013); accord Hurst, supra note 27, at 28. 
29 The constitutionality of federal incorporation would not be settled until 1819. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); accord Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 
153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894). The political unpopularity of federal incorporation en-
sured that the practice remained rare. Kyle Noonan, Note, The Case for a Federal 
Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 602, 608–09 (2012). 
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Compounding the inconvenience of obtaining legislative approval was a 
strong norm, albeit not an explicit requirement, that incorporation should 
serve a public purpose.30 As Chief Justice Marshall put the point: “The ob-
jects for which a corporation is created are universally such as the govern-
ment wishes to promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and 
this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole con-
sideration of the grant.”31 Thus, Virginia’s Supreme Court of Appeals 
would describe incorporation at the time as follows: 
With respect to acts of incorporation, they ought never to be passed, but in 
consideration of services to be rendered to the public. . . . It may be often 
convenient for a set of associated individuals, to have the privileges of a 
corporation bestowed upon them; but if their object is merely private or 
selfish; if it is detrimental to, or not promotive of, the public good, they 
have no adequate claim upon the legislature for the privilege.32 
Legislatures construed this public-purpose norm narrowly, which is re-
flected in the fact that most early commercial corporations existed to per-
form a quasi-governmental function. Nearly two-thirds of the early com-
mercial corporations built or maintained a bridge, turnpike, or highway; of 
the remaining commercial corporations, a plurality operated state-chartered 
                                                        
30 See Johnson, supra note 27, at 1145 (“[T]his public-service dimension seems 
not to have been an express legal prerequisite to corporate formation but instead 
reflected in practice a shared belief about the proper focus of corporate activity.”); 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 207 (1990) (“At 
least through the mid-19th century, incorporation primarily for private business 
objectives was relatively unusual. Instead, the typical corporation was chartered to 
pursue some sort of public function.”). 
31 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 637 (1819). As 
to why a state employed private corporations to perform public functions, Hurst 
identifies the “need to promote a volunteer muster of capital for sizable ventures at 
a time when fluid capital was scarce and there were severe practical limits on gov-
ernment’s ability to tax in order to support direct intervention in the economy.” 
Hurst, supra note 27, at 23 (1970); accord Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical 
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 Geo. L.J. 1593, 1609 (1988). 
32 Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Henry & M.) 315, 347–
48 (Va. 1809). 
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banks.33 Meanwhile, although incorporation did not guarantee a state grant 
of monopoly power, many early charters had the effect, explicitly or implic-
itly, of thwarting unincorporated commercial competition.34  
Corporate liability, in either tort or crime, played at best a negligible 
role during this period. As Dodd concludes, “the cases in which the courts 
had occasion to consider corporate liability in tort were surprisingly few.”35 
Where liability did occur, it frequently involved nuisance suits, and reflected 
the idea that corporations implicitly owed a reciprocal duty to perform the 
specialized power chartered to them by the State.36 Meanwhile, criminal 
liability remained extremely circumscribed, though courts occasionally en-
forced the aforementioned duties through criminal suits.37 That said, these 
infrequent suits involved strict criminal liability. The old rule, attributed to 
Coke and stating that corporations were incapable of committing any crime 
requiring an intentional attitude, provided the background against which 
corporate liability would develop over the coming decades. 
                                                        
33 Hurst, supra note 27, at 22, 37–41; Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privi-
lege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 
Am. U. L. Rev. 81, 93 (1999) (“As . . . the early decades of the nineteenth centu-
ry unfolded, state legislatures began to issue significant numbers of corporate char-
ters for banks and transportation projects.”). 
34 Hovenkamp argues that subsequent corporate-law jurisprudence—in partic-
ular, the Supreme Court under the guidance of Chief Justice Taney—sought to 
construe special corporate charters narrowly in order to avoid vesting in a corpo-
rate entity any monopolistic privilege. Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 1601–25. 
35 Edwin Merrick Dodd, American Business Corporations 
Until 1860 at 113 (1954); id. at 114 (“[T]he volume of corporate tort litigation 
had not become substantial by 1830.”). 
36 See, e.g., Murfreesboro & Woodbury Turnpike Co. v. Barrett, 42 Tenn. (2 
Cold.) 508 (Tenn. 1865); Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 
(1 Gray) 58 (Mass. 1854); Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 
68 Mass. 339, 345 (Mass. 1854); People v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 542–43 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
37 See Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. at 543; accord Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 
Mass. at 67; New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. at 345–46. 
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3.2! General Incorporation and Corporate-Tort Liability 
During the middle of the nineteenth century, populist distrust set in 
concerning the tight relationship between the State and private, commercial 
corporations.38 More mundanely, the task of responding to special-charter 
petitions consumed an inordinate amount of legislative resources, while the 
practice of crafting bespoke charters prevented uniformity in corporate 
law.39 States responded by standardizing and democratizing corporate law. 
Most states adopted a general-incorporation statute by the 1850s, while a 
majority went further and prohibited the creation of special charters by the 
1880s.40  
A general-incorporation statute permits any enterprise to incorporate 
upon satisfying minimal administrative requirements. In exchange for the 
benefits of incorporation—again, primarily independent-entity status and 
the possibility of limited liability—an entity received a generic charter speci-
fying the entity’s new structure, including “powers of directors and officers, 
amendment of articles, share structure, capital requirements, and sources of 
dividends.”41  
The creation of general-incorporation statutes enabled a dramatic in-
crease in the number of commercial corporations. Without ex ante legislative 
inquiry into an entity’s public-serving purpose, businesses were free to in-
                                                        
38 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A 
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 767, 
792 (2005); Johnson, supra note 27, at 1146. 
39 See Or. Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1, 21 (1889) (identi-
fying “the desire to fix some more uniform rule by which the rights and powers of 
private corporations, or those for pecuniary profit, should come into exist-
ence....”); Hurst, supra note 27, at 29. 
40 See Hamill, supra note 33, at 178–79 (tabulating all general-incorporation and 
special-incorporation statutes).  
41 Hurst, supra note 27, at 56. 
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corporate for any commercial purpose they saw fit.42 It would be reductive 
to conclude that the general-incorporation statute singlehandedly accounts 
for the tremendous economic growth of the nineteenth century. Neverthe-
less, it is fair to say that the regime change opened the floodgates to exploi-
tation of the corporate form. As Blair explains, the corporate form enabled 
speculative, large-scale commercial projects that would come to dominate 
the latter half of the nineteenth century.43 It should not surprise, at least, 
that the general-incorporation era coincides with a marked expansion of the 
commercial corporation’s presence in the American economy. Indeed, as 
early as 1868 the Supreme Court remarked that “[t]here is scarcely a busi-
ness pursued requiring the expenditure of large capital, or the union of large 
numbers, that is not carried on by corporations. It is not too much to say 
that the wealth and business of the country are to a great extent controlled 
by them.”44 
Notwithstanding the shift to general-incorporation statutes, states con-
tinued to exercise tight control over commercial corporations. However, 
instead of regulating corporations by limiting access to the corporate form, 
states now specified in detail the corporation’s structure, size, duration, and 
permissible activities. For example, legislatures capped the length of a cor-
porate lifespan to twenty, thirty, or fifty years.45 Legislatures implemented 
industry-specific capitalization limits.46 Courts likewise prohibited one cor-
                                                        
42 Although states required that a charter contain a corporate purpose, incorpo-
rators were left to identify their own purpose without legislative consultation. Id. at 
44; cf. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. at 26–27 (noting that the articles of a corporation 
“do not take place under the supervision of any official authority whatever”). 
43 Margaret Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business 
Organizers During the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 387 (2003). 
44 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181–82 (1868). 
45 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 n.22 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(citing Report of the Committee on Corporation Laws of Massachusetts (1903)). 
46 Id. at 550–54 & nn. 5–26 (collecting statutes). 
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poration from owning shares in another corporation.47 Federal courts gave 
legislatures broad authority to discriminate, to the point of exclusion, 
against out-of-state corporations.48 Courts hampered managers’ and direc-
tors’ decisionmaking capacities by prohibiting any fundamental changes to 
the corporation without unanimous shareholder approval.49 Legislatures re-
stricted limited personal liability,50 which courts further constrained.51  
The ultra vires doctrine best exemplified the pitfalls of using corporate 
law as a regulatory tool. Over time, the ultra vires doctrine proved a hope-
less tool for regulating economic activity with any sophistication. No incor-
porator could reasonably anticipate the varieties of business decisions that 
the doctrine required to be covered in a charter’s stated purpose. Nor was 
interpreting a charter like interpreting either a statute or a contract. Courts 
depended on the corporate purpose, provided at the time of incorporation, 
                                                        
47 E.g., De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst., 175 U.S. 
40, 54 (1899) (“[I]t is not within the general powers of a corporation to purchase 
the stock of other corporations for the purpose of controlling their management.”); 
People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401, 408 (1889); see Hurst, supra 
note 27, at 43. 
48 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (denying corporations 
protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and deeming corporate ac-
cess to out-of-state markets a matter of interstate comity); see Pembina Consol. Sil-
ver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187 (1888) (“The absolute 
power of exclusion includes the right to allow a conditional and restricted exercise 
of its corporate powers within the State.”). A state’s ability to condition entry by a 
foreign corporation was subsequently constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 21 (1910). 
49 Courts adopted unanimity requirements from partnership law. As seen in the 
next section, the comparison of the corporation to a general partnership proved 
increasingly untenable. See infra notes 64–68. 
50 New York made shareholders personally liable for twice their capital contri-
bution. Act of Feb. 17, 1848, ch. 40, 1848 N.Y. Laws 54; Morton J. Horwitz, Santa 
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 208 
(1985) (describing New York’s approach as “[t]he most typical provision”).  
51 Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873) (establishing the trust-fund 
doctrine), affirmed in Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891). For detailed discussion 
of the trust-fund doctrine and its decline, see Horwitz, supra note 50, at 207–14. 
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to identify the scope of a venture. Yet, a corporation’s chartered purpose 
was a self-serving statement drafted by incorporators without any sort of 
adversarial review.52 Meanwhile, the remedy for ultra vires conduct was 
harsh; action taken beyond the corporation’s charter could be voided in its 
entirety. Although the doctrine may have been capable of carving out broad 
domains where corporations could not participate—the doctrine survived 
for a while as a tool for keeping corporations out of the political sphere53—it 
was always more hatchet than scalpel. In response, courts, and state courts 
in particular, developed countless exemptions and modifications meant to 
ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine.54 
The harsh outcomes predicted by strict application of the ultra vires 
doctrine encouraged courts to instead expand corporate-tort liability. Cor-
porate defendants during this period routinely argued that the logic under-
writing the ultra vires doctrine established a comprehensive bar on corpo-
rate liability in both tort and crime. After all, a corporate charter could never 
authorize the corporation to commit tortious or criminal misconduct. Ac-
cordingly, the ultra vires doctrine would preclude attributing any tortious or 
criminal act to the corporation; by its nature, a corporation was incapable of 
performing such an action.  
This reasoning highlights the absurdity of the ultra vires doctrine. That 
the State would not recognize as legally enforceable a corporate action does 
not mean that the action did not occur. Thankfully, courts largely dismissed 
appeals to this “technical” reasoning,55 particularly when embracing it 
                                                        
52 Or. Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1889). 
53 Daniel Lipton, Note, Corporate Capacity for Crime and Politics: Defining Cor-
porate Personhood at the Turn of the Twentieth Century, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1912 (2010). 
54 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 802. 
55 For courts deriding the ultra vires argument against corporate liability as a 
“technical” argument, see Jordan v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 74 Ala. 85, 88 (Ala. 
1883); Wheless v. Second Nat’l Bank, 60 Tenn. 469, 475 (Tenn. 1872); Goodspeed 
v. E. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530, 537 (Conn. 1853). 
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would have worked to the disadvantage of injured parties.56 Accordingly, 
courts steadily expanded corporate liability in tort. Just as courts upheld 
corporate actions beyond the scope of a charter’s purpose, so too courts 
held corporations responsible for actions beyond the narrow confines of the 
corporate charter.57 Importantly for the subsequent development of corpo-
rate-criminal liability, courts even held corporations liable for intentional 
torts like libel and malicious prosecution. 
3.3! Enabling Acts and Corporate-Criminal Liability 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, “drastic change set in toward 
removing regulatory emphasis from the general incorporation acts, with a 
high premium on giving the greatest freedom and vigor to central manage-
ment.”58 This enabling-act era marks a shift towards using criminal law, in-
stead of corporate law, as a means for regulating corporate activity.  
Two considerations inform the sudden liberalization of corporate law. 
First, corporate law and its enforcing judicial doctrines had proven incapa-
ble of keeping pace with the large-scale economic activity conducted by so-
phisticated commercial corporations.59 Bear in mind that corporations were 
becoming more than just commonplace. An infrastructure of railroads pro-
vided previously local businesses access to national markets, as well as a 
                                                        
56 Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 209 (1858) (re-
jecting petitioner’s claim that corporate libel is impossible); Boogher v. Life Ass’n 
of Am., 75 Mo. 319, 323 (Mo. 1882) (citing Cooley on Torts); Scofield Rolling Mill 
Co. v. Georgia, 52 Ga. 635, 638 (Ga. 1875); Goodspeed, 22 Conn. at 542; State v. 
Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 369 (N.J. 1852). But see State v. Great Works 
Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44–45 (Me. 1841) (“A corporation is created by law 
for certain beneficial purposes. They can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor, 
by any positive or affirmative act, or incite others to do so, as a corporation.”). 
57 Cf. Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, 28 U.S. 398, 409 (1830) 
(“[T]hat money corporations . . . are liable for torts, is well settled.”). 
58 Hurst, supra note 27, at 57. 
59 See supra notes 52–57; see also Hurst, supra note 27, at 109–110. 
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prominent example of the power of the corporate form to aggregate capi-
tal.60 Whole industries previously thought not to need large amounts of capi-
tal suddenly saw a reason to incorporate, and burgeoning equity markets 
supplied them capital.61 A corporation could thereby become broader and 
more geographically diverse in its shareholder base. As ownership further 
separated from control, the corporation looked increasingly dissimilar to 
other commercial organizations like the general partnership.62 On top of all 
of this, the increasingly national reach of corporations incentivized corpora-
tions to develop for themselves singular, coherent corporate personas.63 As 
the twentieth century grew near, scholars began to develop and advocate for 
a real-entity conception of corporate personhood, one that understood the 
corporation to exist as a single agent distinct and independent from both its 
membership and the State.64 
                                                        
60 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 703 (“This state of affairs began to change 
with the advent of the railroads, followed by the steel and oil companies. With the 
rise of large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of capital were required, and 
between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded, non-owner managed 
enterprises gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities.”). 
61 See generally Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for 
Industrial Securities, 1887–1902, 29 Bus. Hist. Rev. 105 (1955). 
62 Blair, supra note 28, at 805 (“[T]he railroads had been financed by selling 
equity and debt securities to thousands of small investors, and by the early 1890s, 
other industrial organizations were beginning to finance themselves the same way. 
It was no longer credible, then, to think of the great railroad corporations, or the big 
trusts that dominated oil, steel, tobacco, and sugar, as just some sort of partnership 
of shareholders.”). 
63 Id. at 798, 810 (arguing that development of a singular corporate identity re-
flects a conscious market strategy to both consumers and employers). 
64 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 797–98  (arguing that “the period be-
tween 1890 and 1906 marked the height of the debate” about corporate person-
hood, which ended with the triumph of the real-entity view); Horwitz, supra note 
50, at 180–85 (tracing the intellectual history of the real-entity view in German so-
cial thought, arguing that it first emerged in the United States during the 1890s, 
and concluding that “by 1900, the ‘entity’ theory had largely triumphed and cor-
poration and partnership law had moved in radically different directions”); Millon, 
supra note 30, at 213 (“The triumph of the new [real-entity] theory therefore sig-
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Second, the general-incorporation regime existed in a state of perpetu-
ally unstable equilibrium. That equilibrium broke when New Jersey passed a 
series of acts liberalizing corporate law.65 New Jersey’s revamped corporate 
law allowed incorporation for “any lawful act or activity,” thereby removing 
the textual hook for the ultra vires doctrine.66 Perhaps more importantly, 
New Jersey became the first state to allow its commercial corporations to 
own shares in any other corporation. At the time, corporations had already 
tried a variety of methods to skirt size limits, with limited success. Business 
trusts were initially thought to avoid the strictures of corporate law. Howev-
er, two spectacular decisions—one in Ohio against Standard Oil in Ohio, the 
other in New York against the sugar-manufacturing industry—rejected 
trusts as a non-corporate strategy for aggregation.67 Outright purchase of 
another corporation’s assets was permissible in theory, but impossible in 
practice. This is because courts, analogizing from partnership law, conclud-
ed that such a fundamental change to a corporation could occur only with 
unanimous consent by the shareholders.68 Through New Jersey’s reformed 
corporate code, corporations for the first time could easily merge. 
The effect of reform was drastic. Corporations quickly abandoned their 
home states to reincorporate in New Jersey—so many that an estimated 95% 
                                                                                                                                            
naled a willingness to dispense with the use of corporate law as a regulatory tool 
designed to address the special social and economic problems that Americans saw 
as stemming from the rise of the business corporation.”). 
65 Act of Apr. 4, 1888, ch. 269, § 1, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 7, 1888, ch. 
295, §1, 1888 N.J. Laws 445; Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, § 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412, 
414; Act of Mar. 14, 1893, ch. 171, §2, 1893 N.J. Laws 301. 
66 Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 802 (“The ultimate demise of the [ultra vires] 
doctrine resulted not from a court decision but from the competition among states 
to attract corporate charters, which was begun by New Jersey in 1890 and contin-
ued by Delaware in the 1900s.”). New Jersey was not the first state to relax the 
corporate-purpose requirement. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 14, 1874, ch. 165, § 1, 1874 
Mass. Acts 109; Act of June 21, 1875, ch. 611, § 1, 1875 N.Y. Laws 755. 
67 People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401 (1889); State v. Standard Oil 
Co., 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892). 
68 See Millon, supra note 30, at 215. 
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of major corporations were New Jersey entities by 1901.69 Thus, when 
American Sugar Company’s home state of New York busted its attempt to 
form a trust consisting of every sugar manufacturer nationwide,70 the corpo-
ration immediately reincorporated in New Jersey and did directly what New 
York prevented it from doing indirectly.71 By 1902, filing fees and franchise 
taxes generated so much revenue that New Jersey not only retired the en-
tirety of its debt, but also abolished its property tax.72  
Other states responded, initiating a race to the bottom to attract corpo-
rations and their fees. The concentration of corporations in a few jurisdic-
tions means that the race’s effects were quickly felt.73 “Any lawful act” re-
quirements neutered the ultra vires doctrine. Legislative creation of no-par 
stock circumvented judicial limitations on limited liability.74 States removed 
limits on capitalization size, corporate lifespan, and ownership restrictions. 
Legislatures facilitated a corporation’s ability to make fundamental changes 
by requiring only majority, rather than unanimous, shareholder approval to 
implement the change. Courts further inoculated corporations from judicial 
inquiry into the corporate structure through the development of the Busi-
                                                        
69 Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2008) (citing 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 160, 164 (1982)). 
70 People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401 (1889). 
71 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Supreme Court 
declined to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act on the basis that the Commerce 
Clause did not extend to manufacturing. Id. 
72 Crane, supra note 69, at 13. 
73 For example, although the Supreme Court would enforce the ultra vires doc-
trine as late as the 1930s, enforcement had no effect on New Jersey corporations. 
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 803. 
74 Horwitz, supra note 50, at 213. Previously, violations of the trust-fund doc-
trine resulted in damages calculated as the difference between a share’s par value 
and the price a shareholder actually paid to acquire the share. Once corporations 
could set the par value of shares at zero, recoverable damages disappeared. 
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ness Judgment Rule, which prohibited a court from second-guessing a broad 
swath of decisions made internal to the corporation.75 
Corporate-criminal liability developed alongside this dramatic liberali-
zation of corporate law. Several reasons make it implausible to dismiss the 
timing as mere coincidence. First, the same legislatures turning corporate 
law over to private negotiation simultaneously passed criminal statutes ap-
plicable to all persons, including corporations.76 Second, regulation via crim-
inal law sidesteps the race-to-the-bottom dynamic then weakening regula-
tion through corporate law. While a state’s corporate law applies to only 
corporations incorporated in the State, criminal law applies to all persons 
whose misconduct falls within the State’s jurisdiction, be they in-state or 
out-of-state corporations. Third, criminal law is a better tool for regulating 
corporate activity.77 For one, tinkering with the corporation’s internal struc-
ture is a clunky process; it is easier to regulate corporate activity directly, as 
tort and criminal law do. For another, criminal law aligns regulatory strategy 
with institutional competence, as neither courts nor legislatures are experts 
when it comes to commercial decisionmaking. 
Courts could have refused to expand corporate-criminal liability, hold-
ing to old doctrines that mostly excluded corporations from liability. They 
did not do so. Most famously, the Supreme Court blessed Congress’ deci-
                                                        
75 Although the first statement of the doctrine occurred in 1888, Avi-Yonah es-
tablishes that within fifteen years the Business Judgment Rule had become a settled 
feature of corporate law. Avi-Yonah, supra note 38, at 799–800 (citing Leslie v. Lo-
rillard, 18 N.E. 363 (N.Y. 1888)). 
76 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 69, at 15 (noting that the Sherman Act “goes out 
of its way to make clear that corporations and associations are covered as well”); cf. 
Ohio v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Co., 20 Ohio Dec. 240, 245 (Ohio. Ct. Common Pl. 
1910) (“It is hardly to be presumed that the general assembly of Ohio . . . could 
have intended to relieve the corporation, doing 99 per cent of the mischief, from 
punishment by penalty of law, and legislate against only the individual doing 1 per 
cent of the mischief.”). 
77 But see Crane, supra note 69, at 27–50 (discussing the problems of applying a 
tort-crime model, rather than a regulatory model, to antitrust law). 
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sion to expose corporations to liability for a general-intent crime.78 The Su-
preme Court was hardly at the vanguard of innovation; several state su-
preme courts had already held corporations criminally responsible for gen-
eral-intent crimes, and courts soon extended these holdings to include spe-
cific-intent crimes.79 Granted, courts did not expand corporate-criminal lia-
bility indiscriminately. For example, courts were slow to recognize that a 
corporation could commit manslaughter because no one had previously sus-
pected longstanding manslaughter statutes referring to “persons” to cover 
corporations.80 Similarly, courts recognized that certain crimes were beyond 
the purview of a corporation.81 Nevertheless, the enabling-act era set the 
stage for both the modern corporation and the practice of holding corpora-
tions criminally responsible as if they were individual persons. 
4! Reevaluating How and When Courts Began 
to Hold Corporations Criminally Responsi-
ble 
I now return to the myth of corporate-criminal liability—specifically, 
how courts overcome longstanding skeptical challenges to the possibility of 
attributing intentional attitudes to a corporation. Recall that, according to 
the myth, courts expanded corporate-criminal liability by importing tort 
                                                        
78 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
79 E.g., Grant Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States, 114 P. 955, 957 (Ariz. 
1911); State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 P. 474, 476 (Kan. 1910); State v. 
Rowland Lumber Co., 69 S.E. 58, 58–59 (N.C. 1910); People v. Rochester Ry. & 
Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909); State v. Eastern Coal Co. v. Warren, 70 A. 1, 7 
(R.I. 1908); S. Express Co. v. State, 58 S.E. 67, 69 (Ga. 1907); People v. Palermo 
Land & Water Co., 89 P. 723, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907); United States v. Alaska 
Packers’ Ass’n, 1 Alaska 217, 222–23 (1901); Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 1899); State v. First Nat’l Bank, 51 N.W. 587, 
587 (S.D. 1892); State v. Passaic Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, 23 A. 680, 680 (N.J. 1892). 
80 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 153 S.W. 459 (Ky. 1913); 
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22. 
81 United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (listing crimes). 
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law’s doctrine of respondeat superior into criminal law. Implicit in the myth 
is an assumption that genuine corporate attitudes are impossible; because 
corporations do not have a mind, they cannot produce intentions. I identi-
fied this claim as a species of the individual-person premise. In general, the 
individual-person premise constrains attributions according to whether the 
underlying entity is an individual person. 
4.1! An Alternative Approach to Attitudinal Attribution 
Here I preview an account of legal personhood that reverses the rela-
tionship between personhood and attribution from that articulated by the 
individual-person premise. This account of legal personhood makes space 
for the possibility of attributing intentional attitudes to a corporate person. 
A full treatment of this conception will have to wait for Chapter II, but a 
quick sketch is invaluable to understanding the intellectual development of 
judicial thinking about personhood as it evolved during the nineteenth cen-
tury. In particular, those courts expanding corporate liability rejected the 
individual-person premise in a manner consistent with the account of legal 
personhood developed here. 
What is it to be a legal person subject to the criminal law? Following 
Professors List and Pettit, I argue that “[t]o be a person is to have the capac-
ity to perform as a person.” 82 The term “person” picks out a narrow class 
of agent: one who “can perform effectively in the space of obligations” in 
which it relates with other agents.83 Legal personhood thus describes an 
agent that can perform effectively in the space of legal obligations. Crucially, 
nothing in this performative approach to personhood presupposes the exist-
ence of a single, physical body or mind. Assessment of personhood turns on 
whether an entity has demonstrated its capacity to satisfy admittedly strin-
                                                        
82 Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possi-
bility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents 173 (2011). 
83 Id. 
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gent conditions of effective performance—not on whether the agent is made 
of flesh and blood.84  
This framework reverses the relationship between personhood and at-
tribution. Recall that the individual-person premise limits attributions to 
individual persons; thus, it inquires into the inner features of an entity to 
determine what attributions are (im)permissible. By contrast, I assess per-
sonhood according to an entity’s observable performance. Attribution, on 
this picture, is an interpretive practice. As Professors Anderson and Pildes 
put the point:  
To interpret what an action means, we try to identify what the agent is do-
ing. Deeds are identified, not by mere physical descriptions of bodily 
movement, but by the intentions that they express and that give them 
meaning. Interpretation is a matter of making sense of the speech or action 
in its context.85 
On this view, whether an entity is capable of expressing attitudes—and 
the content of those attitudes—is a matter of public interpretation of the 
entity’s actions, whereby expressions of intentional attitudes through words 
or action embody and make recognizable those attitudes.86  
My preferred approach to attribution and personhood draws from a 
long pedigree. Worth mentioning is John Dewey’s seminal contribution to 
debates over corporate personhood, offered shortly after corporate-criminal 
liability had developed: 
The postulate, which has been a controlling principle although usually 
made unconsciously, leading to the merging of popular and philosophical 
notions of the person with the legal notion, is the conception that before 
                                                        
84 See List & Pettit, supra note 82, at 173 (mapping “the distinction be-
tween persons and non-persons onto the divide between agents who can be incor-
porated in a conventional system of mutual obligation and agents . . . that do not 
have this capacity.”); cf. Thomas M. Powers, On the Moral Agency of Computers, 
32 Topoi Int’l Rev. Phil. 227 (2013) (offering a broadly similar approach). 
85 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 Penn. L. Rev., 1503, 1507 (2000). 
86 Id. at 1513 (noting that “[e]xpressive theories of action hold people account-
able for the public meanings of their actions.”). 
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anything can be a jural person it must intrinsically possess certain properties, 
the existence of which is necessary to constitute anything a person. 87 
Here Dewey plainly describes the individual-person premise, which he 
explains “reflect[s] a definite metaphysical connection regarding the nature 
of things” and “proceeds in terms of an essential and universal inhering na-
ture.”88 After cataloguing the legal confusion generated by the individual-
person premise, Dewey suggests instead that “person” should instead be 
defined pragmatically—that is, that personhood should be assessed accord-
ing to whether the entity in question is capable of “display[ing] the specified 
consequences” of personhood.89 Particularly relevant for our purposes is 
Dewey’s suggestion for how courts should attribute intentional attitudes to 
individual and corporate persons alike: they should “determine the absence 
or presence of ‘intent’, and the kind of ‘intent’, by discrimination among 
concrete consequences, precisely as we determine ‘neglect.’”90 
How does this alternative view of attribution inform the development of 
corporate-criminal liability? In reviewing the early development of corpo-
rate-criminal liability, it is clear that state courts rejected the individual-
person premise in a variety of legal contexts. For example, when asked to 
preserve the longstanding prohibition on attributing intentional attitudes to 
corporations in the criminal context, many courts noted that they already 
rejected the individual-person premise with respect to a corporation’s liabil-
ity for intentional torts. Accordingly, these courts reasoned, it would be dis-
ingenuous to maintain in the criminal context that corporations, by their 
                                                        
87 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale 
L.J. 655, 658 (1925) (emphasis added); see Blair, supra note 28, at 807 (noting that 
enduring effect of Dewey’s contribution). 
88 Dewey, supra note 87, at 660. 
89 Id. at 661. Dewey traces his conception of personhood to a pronouncement 
by Pope Innocent IV in 1246 CE. Id. at 665. List and Pettit identify similar strains in 
the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke. List & Pettit, supra note 82, at 170–73. 
90 Dewey, supra note 87, at 663. 
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very nature, could not have attributed to them intentional attitudes. As New 
Jersey’s Supreme Court put the point: 
The very basis of the action for libel or for malicious prosecution is the evil 
intent, the malice of the party defendant. It is difficult, therefore, to see 
how a corporation may be amenable to civil suit for libel and malicious 
prosecution and private nuisance, and mulcted in exemplary damages, and 
at the same time not be indicted for like offenses where the injury falls up-
on the public.91 
Supreme courts in Alaska,92 Georgia,93 Massachusetts,94 New York,95 
and Rhode Island,96 as well as federal courts across the country,97 offered 
identical rationales. Other courts reached the same conclusion via contract 
law. For example, noted one federal court, “it seems to me as easy and logi-
cal to ascribe to a corporation an evil mind as it is to impute to it a sense of 
                                                        
91 State v. Passaic Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, 23 A. 680, 681 (N.J. 1892).  
92 Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 1 Alaska at 219 (“[W]here life is taken by a corpora-
tion in pursuing its business, and it is compelled to answer civilly because of such 
wrongful death, there is no good reason why it may not be required to answer crim-
inally for the same act done in the line of its business, if the law so provides.”). 
93 Cf. Scofield Rolling Mill Co. v. Georgia, 52 Ga. 635, 640–41 (Ga. 1875) (dis-
cussing corporate-criminal liability in a civil action to recover state funds). 
94 Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 1899) 
(“There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation a specific intent in crim-
inal proceedings than in civil.”). 
95 People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22, 23 (N.Y. 1909). 
96 State v. Eastern Coal Co. v. Warren, 70 A. 1, 7 (R.I. 1908) (“If corporations 
have the capacity to engage in actionable conspiracy [in tort], they have the power 
to criminally conspire.”). 
97 See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Herald Co., 159 F. 296, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1907) 
(“To fasten this species of knowledge upon a corporation requires no other or dif-
ferent kind of legal inference than has long been used to justify punitive damages in 
cases of tort against an incorporated defendant.”); United States v. MacAndrews 
& Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (“[T]here is no more intellec-
tual difficulty in considering [a corporation] capable of homicide or larceny than in 
thinking of it as devising a plan to obtain usurious interest.”); United States v. John 
Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (“[T]he same evidence which in a civil 
case would be sufficient to prove a specific or malicious intention upon the part of a 
corporation defendant would be sufficient to show a like intention upon the part of 
a corporation charged criminally with the doing of an act prohibited by the law.”). 
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contractual obligation.”98 More generally, concluded the Supreme Court of 
Alaska, “[i]f . . . the invisible, intangible essence of air which we term a cor-
poration can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run 
railroad cars on them, it can also intend to do those acts, and can act therein 
as well viciously as virtuously.”99 Joel Bishop’s then-influential treatise on 
the law of corporations reflected a similar sentiment, concluding “the pow-
ers of these artificial beings are limited; but, since the capacity to act is given 
them by law, no good reason appears why they may not intend to act in a 
criminal manner.”100 
To be sure, appealing to prior tort and contract cases pushes the theo-
retical question back one step; for what reason did courts reject the individ-
ual-person premise in civil cases? Reviewing these earlier cases reveals that 
courts rejected the individual-person premise on its merits. Courts expand-
ing corporate-tort liability took the fact of deliberate activity as circumstan-
tial evidence sufficient to prove that corporations are apt for attitudinal at-
tributions. Consider the following from the Supreme Court of Connecticut: 
To say that a corporation can not have motives, and act from motives, is to 
deny the evidence of our senses, when we see them thus acting, and effect-
ing thereby results of the greatest importance, every day. And if they can 
have any motive, they can have a bad one—they can intend to do evil, as 
well as to do good. If the act done is a corporate one, so must the motive 
and intention be.101 
The New Jersey Supreme Court embraced a similar approach, conclud-
ing that “[n]o technical difficulties” prevented a jury from inferring that a 
                                                        
98 United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1906); accord McDermott v. Evening Journal Ass’n, 43 N.J.L. 488, 491–92 (N.J. 
1881) (“But it is obvious that mind, in its legal sense, means only the ability to will, 
to direct, to permit, or assent. A corporation exerts its mind each time that it as-
sents to the terms of the contract.”).  
99 United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 1 Alaska 217, 220 (1901).  
100 Joel Prentiss Bishop, New Commentaries of the Crimi-
nal Law Upon a New System of Legal Exposition at § 418 (1892). 
101 Goodspeed v. E. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530, 542 (Conn. 1853). 
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corporation committed a “wrongful act intentionally done.”102 Supreme 
courts in Alabama,103 Georgia,104 Indiana,105 and Kentucky,106 similarly re-
jected the individual-person premise. They trusted, and sometimes express-
ly stated, that a jury was capable of ascertaining a corporation’s intentional 
attitudes, and did not bother to develop some special method for ascertain-
ing corporate attitudes. In this respect, these courts treated the process of 
attributing attitudes to corporate persons the same as they did the process of 
attributing attitudes to individual persons. In doing so, courts appreciated 
that attribution is an interpretative practice, deriving intentional attitudes 
from observable actions. In summary, in criminal cases across a variety of 
jurisdictions we see courts rejecting the individual-person premise either on 
its merits or on the basis that the premise had already been debunked in ei-
ther tort law or contract law.  
4.2! Respondeat Superior vs. Genuine Corporate Attitudes 
Courts expanding the scope of corporate liability did more than simply 
reject the individual-person premise. Several courts articulated principled 
methods for attributing intentional attitudes to corporations. In other words, 
courts did not uniformly rely on respondeat superior as a substitute for gen-
uine corporate mental states.  
From the moment they began expanding corporate liability for inten-
tional torts, courts sought to standardize how to attribute intentional atti-
tudes to a corporation. They did so, in part, by inquiring into the source of 
corporate intentions. In doing so, they appropriated the rhetoric of the indi-
vidual-person premise while identifying structural counterparts capable of 
                                                        
102 Vance v. Erie Ry. Co., 32 N.J.L. 334, 337 (N.J. 1867) (emphasis added); ac-
cord McDermott, 43 N.J.L. at 493. 
103 Jordan v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 74 Ala. 85, 88–89 (Ala. 1883). 
104 Scofield Rolling Mill Co. v. Georgia, 52 Ga. 635, 638–39 (Ga. 1875). 
105 Jefferson R.R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, 6–7 (Ind. 1867). 
106 Lyne v. Bank of Kentucky, 28 Ky. (5 J.J. Marsh.) 545, 559 (Ky. 1831). 
  32 
producing corporate intentional attitudes. For example, early tort cases 
identify as the corporate “mind” the set of interactions between directors or 
managers.107 Consider this reasoning by a district court—reasoning eventu-
ally endorsed by the Supreme Court—with respect to a corporation’s capac-
ity to satisfy the elements of malicious prosecution: 
[Petitioner argues] that a corporation is incapable of malice, and technically 
that may be true; but is it really and practically so? There must be a con-
trolling and governing power in every corporation. This is usually found in 
a board of directors who are chosen by the members or stockholders, and 
this board in some way selects the officers and employés of the corpora-
tion. It is not true that a corporation has no mind. Its mind is the joint product of 
the minds of its officers and directory in a united organization, and in point of 
fact corporations bring into their service the highest order of ability and the 
best executive talent in the country.108 
Contra appeals to respondeat superior, this analysis does not conflate 
the attitudes of a director, manager, or employee with the attitudes of the 
corporation. Rather, it recognizes that the attitudes of directors and manag-
ers, mediated through the corporate structure through which these individ-
uals interact, produce genuine corporate intentional attitudes. As I suggest 
in the following section, this account describes genuine corporate attitudes. 
Return now to the myth’s reliance on respondeat superior. Many courts 
eschewed straightforward applications of vicarious liability in favor of com-
paratively sophisticated approaches to corporate intentional attitudes. For 
example, California and Missouri limited attribution of corporate intentions 
to those attitudes held by corporate directors, provided further that the atti-
tudes concerned actions taken “within the scope of the objects and purpos-
es of the corporation.”109 Arizona adopted a similar rule, albeit focusing on 
                                                        
107 Maynard v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 34 Cal. 48, 55 (Cal. 1867); Lyne v. 
Bank of Kentucky, 28 Ky. (5 J.J. Marsh.) 545, 559 (Ky. 1831). 
108 Copey v. Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co., 6 F. Cas. 517, 519 (C.C.S.D. 
Ala. 1875), cited with approval in City of Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 U.S. 256, 
262 (1886). 
109 Maynard, 34 Cal. at 57, cited with approval in Gillett v. Mo. Valley R.R. Co., 
55 Mo. 315 (Mo. 1874). 
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the personal intentions of corporate officers rather than directors.110 Other 
courts focused on the type of conduct that might merit attribution. For ex-
ample, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that “[n]ot every misfeasance 
which would be indictable in an individual is so in a corporation. It must be 
within, or not too far outside of, the corporate duty.”111 Separately, Mary-
land limited attribution of an intentional attitude to only those cases where 
an employee, committing the underlying misconduct, acted with express 
authority.112 These historical approaches resonate today. For example, the 
attributive framework advocated by Arizona foreshadows the Model Penal 
Code’s method of attributing to a corporation only those intentional atti-
tudes demonstrated by “high managerial agents.”113 That is not to say that 
any of these approaches is ideal; for example, they all run the risk of conflat-
ing individual attitudes with corporate ones. Nevertheless, they represent 
efforts to standardize corporate attribution in a more principled manner 
than the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
Of all such efforts, the Supreme Court of Michigan articulated perhaps 
the most sophisticated approach to attribution of its day. Faced with a plain-
tiff seeking exemplary damages against a newspaper corporation for libel, 
the court affirmed that a corporation could be so held liable.114 However, the 
court explained that “no amount of express malice in his employees” would 
suffice to expose a corporation to exemplary damages where the corporation 
implemented “the establishment and habitual enforcement of such rules as 
                                                        
110 Grant Brothers Constr. Co. v. United States, 114 P. 955, 957 (Ariz. 1911) 
(“[A] corporation, as well as an individual, is capable of forming a guilty intent and 
capable of having the knowledge necessary, provided the officers of the corporation 
capable of voicing the will of the corporation have such knowledge or intent.”). 
111 United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 1 Alaska 217, 222 (1901). 
112 Carter v. Howe Mach. Co., 51 Md. 290 (Md. 1879). 
113 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962). Twelve states still substantially 
follow this approach. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Les-
sons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution,43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 107 app. B (2006). 
114 Detroit Daily Post Co. v. MacArthur, 16 Mich. 447, 454–55 (1868). 
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would probably exclude [libelous] items” of publication.115 On the other 
hand, a poorly managed publication—for example, one with a “frequent re-
currence of similar libels”—risked exemplary damages. In other words, a 
malicious act of liable should not be attributed to a corporation when the 
corporate structure implies that libel occurred because of a rouge employee. 
By contrast, malice should be attributed to a corporation when the corporate 
structure creates a libelous environment. As Part 5 explores further, this ap-
proach does a good job of distinguishing between attitudes properly at-
tributed to a corporation and attitudes that should be attributed instead to 
an individual inside the corporation. Indeed, inasmuch as federal courts still 
rely on respondeat superior, adopting this approach articulated by the Mich-
igan Supreme Court would vastly improve the extent to which legal doctrine 
picks out genuine corporate attitudes.116  
4.3! When and How the Criminal Law Saw Corporations as Persons 
I return now to the broader question of a corporation’s eligibility for 
criminal responsibility. Even without the constraints of the individual-
person premise, it is difficult for an entity—particularly a collective entity—
to satisfy the requirements necessary for legal personhood. In this Section, I 
briefly sketch the requirements of legal personhood necessary for criminal 
liability.117 Corporations can satisfy the high bar set by these requirements. 
More importantly, the expanded availability of the corporate form, the re-
laxing of corporate-purpose requirements, and the general liberalization of 
corporate law created the conditions that made it possible for corporations 
to meet this high bar. In short, courts began holding corporations criminally 
                                                        
115 Id.  
116 Chapter II demonstrates that the current federal practice, but not the cur-
rent federal doctrine, approximates this approach to attitudinal attribution with 
respect to corporate-criminal liability.  
117 Again, all of this is spelled out comprehensively in Chapter II.  
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liable just at a time when corporations themselves became capable of quali-
fying for criminal responsibility. 
What do I mean in claiming that legal personhood is limited to agents 
capable of effective participation in the space of legal obligations? Stephen 
Darwall’s concept of second-personal competence elucidates the relevant 
idea. According to Darwall, our making a claim or demand on another “pre-
supposes a common competence, authority, and therefore, responsibil-
ity.”118 This requires a capacity to offer and respond to reasons whose “va-
lidity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations be-
tween persons.”119 Thus, a person who can participate effectively in the 
space of obligations can make claims on other persons, have claims made 
against it, hold accountable those who fail to honor legitimate claims, and be 
held accountable for likewise failing to honor legitimate claims. 
Making, and being subject to, claims of accountability presuppose a so-
phisticated degree of agency. As a starting point, all agents possess, at a min-
imum, both intentional attitudes and a capacity to act on those attitudes. On 
the first requirement, an intentional attitude might describe the way things 
are—these attitudes include beliefs, knowledge, etc.—or it might identify 
the way things ought to be from the agent’s perspective (e.g., desires, pref-
erences).120 On the second requirement, even a simple agent can attempt to 
bring its environment into alignment with its attitudes concerning how the 
environment ought to be.121 Going further, agency of any sophistication re-
quires an ability to learn from one’s mistakes. More carefully put, perfor-
mance in the space of obligations requires that the agent be capable of self-
regulating its rational processes, where rationality refers to standards of per-
                                                        
118 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Mo-
rality, Respect, and Accountability 21 (2006). 
119 Id. at 8. 
120 List & Pettit, supra note 82, at 21. 
121 Id. at 20. 
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formance regarding an agent’s attitudes and actions.122 Such an agent rec-
ognizes the benefit of improving its rational performance and can develop 
and impose checks to do so. This suggests that a sophisticated agent can 
recognize failures of rationality in itself and others. Put another way, a so-
phisticated agent is sensitive to criticism; it is able to learn from past mis-
takes by taking action designed to avoid repeating irrational missteps in the 
future. More would be required of, say, a full-fledged moral agent—perhaps, 
for example, a capacity for emotional reactivity.123 Nevertheless, these con-
ditions suffice to satisfy legal personhood.  
Can a collective agent satisfy these requirements? I follow Margaret 
Gilbert’s work on group agency, which is largely sympathetic to my ap-
proach to attribution and personhood.124 Briefly, Gilbert’s account requires 
three features to establish a collective agent. First, there must a delimited 
population of individuals, who I refer to as the membership. Second, 
there must a joint commitment amongst those members to act “to-
gether to constitute, as far as is possible, a single body that intends [or be-
lieves, accepts, values, hates, etc.] to do that thing.”125 Third, there must be 
                                                        
122 To describe an agent as rational is to observe that the agent succeeds in one 
or several contexts: in matching attitudes to facts about its environment; in holding 
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an internal structure; this structure describes the formal and infor-
mal mechanisms through which members interact to coordinate activities 
and responsibilities as a body. 
The internal structure is the most important consideration in my ac-
count, which focuses on complex, sophisticated agents.126 Participation in 
the space of legal obligations, in particular, requires a sophisticated structure 
that allows for flexible, responsive, and dynamic decisionmaking. For these 
collectives—often characterized by large memberships or multiple, open-
ended joint commitments—a developed structure is essential. Modern 
commercial corporations possess such a sophisticated structure, which Pe-
ter French describes as the Corporate Internal Decision (“CID”) Structure. 
The CID Structure’s “primary function is to draw experience from various 
levels of the corporation into a decision-making and ratification process.”127 
Specifically, a CID Structure “accomplishes a subordination and synthesis 
of the intentions and acts of various biological persons into a corporate deci-
sion.”128 A corporation’s CID structure allows it to be an effective partici-
pant in the space of legal obligations—for example, by participating mean-
ingfully in the obligation-laden practice of contracting. 
Finally, I come to the issue of when corporations became legal persons. 
On the account sketched above, a corporation is eligible for legal person-
hood if it can participate effectively in the space of legal obligations. In par-
ticular, the corporation must possess an internal structure that accomplishes 
the following: allowing the corporation to act and express attitudes as a sin-
gle agent; acknowledging its ability to enforce legal claims and have legal 
claims enforced against it; and identifying failures of the corporation’s ra-
                                                        
126 For methodological reasons, Gilbert focuses on simple plural subjects. But 
see, e.g., Margaret Gilbert, Collective Wrongdoing: Moral and Legal Responses, 30 
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tional processes and improving those processes. When did corporations reli-
ably begin to adopt such complicated internal structures? 
The first lesson of Part 3 is that commercial corporations were not al-
ways sophisticated collective agents. To recap, corporations in the early 
1800s did have members. Moreover, those members were united by a joint 
commitment—albeit, a narrowly proscribed commitment chosen for them 
by the legislature who drafted their charter. Corporations started out with-
out much in the way of uniform structures, and courts liberally borrowed 
from partnership law to fill in gaps in corporate law. Although the legal ben-
efits obtained through the corporate form—independent-entity status, lim-
ited liability, and separation of ownership from control—existed in principle 
at this time, these advantages had not yet been widely exploited. 
The second lesson of Part 3 is that the steady liberalization of corporate 
law over the nineteenth century—driving and in turn being driven by ex-
panding, increasingly national economic opportunities—created the need 
for sophisticated corporate agency. To track the language of collective agen-
cy, the rapid increase in a corporation’s membership, coupled with the ex-
panding scope of a corporation’s joint commitment, necessitated the devel-
opment of sophisticated internal structures. Development of these struc-
tures made corporations, for the first time, legal persons eligible for criminal 
liability. 
Start with joint commitment. Courts and legislatures repeatedly ex-
panded the permissible scope of a corporation’s joint commitment through-
out the nineteenth century. First, general incorporation democratized ac-
cess to the corporate form, thereby allowing entities committed to purely 
private commercial interests to incorporate; as a result, commercial corpo-
rations arose outside of a narrow class of quasi-public industries. Second, 
judicial liberalization of the ultra vires doctrine allowed corporations to push 
the limits of their chartered purpose. Third, the creation of “any lawful act” 
statutes made it easier still for corporations to pursue multiple related com-
mitments. Fourth, the removal of caps on a corporation’s lifespan meant 
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that corporations could pursue open-ended commitments. The cumulative 
effect of these reforms was to remove legal impediments on corporation ac-
tion. This allowed corporations to expand beyond single-purpose ventures, 
to change strategies or industries in response to market demands, and to 
plan long-term commercial projects. 
At the same time, corporations expanded dramatically with respect to 
membership. In the early 1800s, corporations were small enterprises with a 
local base of shareholders and strong overlap between ownership and con-
trol. However, the ability to separate capital contributions from corporate 
decision-making made corporations the preferred enterprise vehicle for pur-
suing large commercial projects. The development of a countrywide infra-
structure and financial markets allowed corporations to pursue business, and 
to attract capital, from a national market. Geographic dispersion accelerated 
the separation of ownership from control. Increased size in turn allowed for 
larger ventures, which itself fueled growth and further expanded the geo-
graphical base of shareholders. This cycle was exacerbated initially by the 
use of trusts to aggregate corporate wealth, and later by changes in corporate 
law allowing corporations to own shares in each other.  
How did these changes influence corporate structures? From the 
State’s perspective, the nineteenth century saw a sea change in regulatory 
attitudes towards corporations, which influenced the development of corpo-
rate structures that realized the corporation’s status as single legal entity. 
General-incorporation statutes provided a template structure for corpora-
tions. During this period, courts’ increasing disregard for the ultra vires 
rule—in corporate law as well as in tort law—illustrated courts’ growing 
unwillingness to intervene in the internal negotiations of corporate mem-
bers; instead, the court would deal with a corporation as a single agent for 
purposes of both legal powers and responsibilities. The creation of the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule reinforced this judicial commitment to stay out of the 
process of internal decision-making. Meanwhile, legislative transition to-
wards enabling acts signaled that the State would withdraw from the prac-
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tice of regulating a corporation’s internal structure. At the same time, the 
legislative removal of, for example, shareholder-unanimity requirements 
strengthened the hierarchical nature of corporate decision-making. 
From the commercial perspective, particularly in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, strong economic incentives pushed corporations to or-
ganize themselves in a manner that embraced their legal status as a single 
entity. Changes in size and national focus created a need for internal struc-
tures that were flexible and responsive to increasingly competitive markets. 
The need to win over from local businesses customers in an increasingly na-
tional marketplace meant that developing a single branded identity became a 
good business practice. Likewise, as corporate employees spread over a wid-
er community, a single corporate identity could substitute for physical pres-
ence as a means of inspiring loyalty. In short, corporations faced economic 
incentives to organize themselves to resemble and respond like they were a 
single entity. 
To summarize, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, it be-
came in the commercial corporation’s interest to develop for themselves 
internal structures that allowed them to act and respond as the single enti-
ties corporate law treated them as. At the same time, courts and legislatures 
increasingly signaled their willingness to interact with corporations as single 
agents, rather than interfere with a corporation’s internal structure. The 
cumulative effect resulted in sophisticated internal structures, which were 
capable not only of corporate attitudes and actions, but further of effective 
participation in the space of legal obligations. In short, economic and corpo-
rate-law innovations in the latter part of the nineteenth century created the 
conditions of corporate eligibility for criminal responsibility.  
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5! Reevaluating Why Courts Began to Hold 
Corporations Criminally Responsible 
Up to this point, I have demonstrated how corporations became eligible 
for criminal liability in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Part 5 now 
explains why liability developed.  
5.1! The Insufficiency of Deterrence as an Explanation 
Deterrence might seem an odd final target to take on. As I noted in Part 
2, some courts appealed to deterrence rationales when expanding criminal 
liability to corporations. Most notably, the Supreme Court blessed the prac-
tice on the rationale that a combination of private civil suits against a corpo-
ration and criminal indictments of corporate employees would not adequate-
ly deter corporate misconduct.129 Moreover, Part 3 demonstrated the shift to 
criminal law coincided with the abandonment of corporate law as a regulato-
ry strategy. In doing so, I made explicit that criminal law could better serve 
as a regulatory tool than could corporate law. So why I am criticizing the 
standard myth that corporate-criminal liability developed in order to deter 
corporate misconduct? 
Appeals to deterrence alone cannot explain the development of corpo-
rate-criminal liability. Two problems arise. To begin, the use of criminal law 
as a means to control corporate activity was not new. As Part 3 demonstrat-
ed, a species of strict criminal liability had existed for corporations since at 
least the early 1800s.130 Moreover, these early courts provided an identical 
rationale as that advanced by the Supreme Court in 1909—namely, that 
“[a]n indictment and an information are the only remedies to which the 
public can resort for a redress of their grievances.”131 Thus, more needs to 
                                                        
129 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). 
130 See supra note 36–37 and accompanying text. 
131 People v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 542–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (em-
phasis omitted). 
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be said to explain why corporate-criminal liability expanded not just to in-
clude crimes, but further to include crimes involving intentional attitudes. 
Separately, even if a need to deter corporate misconduct explains the 
development of some method for the State to hold corporations accountable, 
this fact alone does not suffice to explain the development of corporate-
criminal liability. For example, why didn’t states rely on civil suits or regula-
tions, rather than criminal statutes, to minimize corporate misconduct? In 
response, Brickey and Khanna suggest that, at the time, it was not possible 
for the State to bring a civil suit.132 However, under the circumstances, the 
suggestion that corporate-criminal liability arose because other methods of 
regulation were not available rings hollow. Lest it be overlooked, centuries 
of legal precedent affirmed and reaffirmed the impossibility of finding a cor-
poration guilty of a general-intent crime. What led states to abandon one 
impossibility instead of the other? In short, although deterrence can help to 
explain the development of corporate-criminal liability, it is at best a partial 
explanation that stands to be augmented.  
5.2! The Cluster of Fairness Norms Driving Corporate-Criminal Lia-
bility 
Courts developed corporate-criminal liability in the face of longstanding 
legal and conceptual obstacles. Integral to this development was a commit-
ment to a cluster of fairness norms; courts, in expanding corporate-criminal 
liability, were not solely or even predominantly concerned with deterring 
corporations. In particular, courts reiterated the position that the law should 
not discriminate against individual persons in favor of corporate persons. 
Implicit, and sometimes explicit, to this rationale is a view that corporate 
personhood exists to serve the interest of individual within society; failing to 
hold corporations legally responsible, in a similar manner to the ways that 
we hold individual persons legally responsible, is unfair to individuals. 
                                                        
132 See supra Section 2.2. 
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5.2.1! Fairness as Fittingness 
Part 4 furthered the explanation for corporate-criminal liability’s devel-
opment by establishing that corporations became eligible for criminal liabil-
ity. It is a prerequisite for extending criminal liability to an entity that the 
entity be capable of satisfying criminal law’s requirements. However, 
though eligibility is necessary, it is not sufficient. We need some further rea-
son to consider why the practice of criminal liability should be extended to 
corporations. Now I shift attention from a corporation’s eligibility for crimi-
nal liability to considering the appropriateness of doing so. Courts develop-
ing corporate-criminal liability recognized that corporations had become fit-
ting targets of criminal responsibility.  
I take fittingness to be subtly, but importantly, different from mere eli-
gibility. In discussing eligibility, the focus was on whether an action or atti-
tude could be attributed to a corporation. Fittingness concerns whether an 
action or attitude should be attributed to a corporation. Particularly relevant 
in the corporate context is whether an action or attitude is better attributed 
to the corporation, or whether instead it should be attributed to an individu-
al within the corporation. Fittingness, in other words, concerns finding the 
right interpretation. This interpretive practice is not unique to the criminal 
context. For example, courts had long understood “[w]henever a corpora-
tion makes a contract, it is the contract of the legal entity . . . and not the 
contract of the individual members,” notwithstanding the fact that execut-
ing the contract may require a physical act to be performed by one of the in-
dividual members.133  
The same interpretive challenge arises with respect to criminal respon-
sibility. It became difficult to maintain a prohibition with respect to corpo-
rate responsibility on the same sorts of attribution common in contract law. 
Consider, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court’s response to the sug-
                                                        
133 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839). 
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gestion that employees operating a corporation’s train, rather than the cor-
poration itself, deserved to be the target of criminal liability: 
It is well known that freight trains are frequently run on the Sabbath day; 
the physical operation being the charge of the conduct and engineer and 
their assistants, but the actual running of the train being ordered and di-
rected by those higher in authority and having the company’s business di-
rectly in charge. The servants who operate the train might greatly prefer to 
observe the Sabbath as a day of rest, but to retain their situation and the 
good will of their employers they have no option but to obey their orders.134  
Again, the timing of these observations match the history provided in 
Part 3. When corporations were small organizations similar to general part-
nerships, the idea that the entity itself might be better suited than any given 
set of individuals held less sway. However, as corporations grew and became 
more sophisticated, it became less plausible to reduce an act of misconduct 
to the contributions of an individual or set of individuals. Meanwhile, the 
individuals causally involved in misconduct became more removed from the 
decisionmaking process, making them less apt targets for enforcement.  
To say that corporations may be fitting for criminal liability is not to 
disregard the individual; courts proved willing to hold individual members 
criminally responsible alongside corporations.135 What fittingness seeks to 
rule out is a categorical prohibition on attributing responsibility to a corpora-
tion. Among other things, one court noted, to reduce accountability to indi-
vidual contributions would be to expose unfairly individuals to the conse-
quences of corporate commands: “The individual today, as a natural person 
. . . is simply the officer, agent, employé or servant of the corporation; and if 
the corporation is not amenable and responsible to and punishable by the 
state and nation for the doing of such mischief, the individual will, in addi-
                                                        
134 S. Express Co. v. State, 58 S.E. 67, 69 (Ga. 1907) (crime of furnishing alco-
hol to minors); see also List & Pettit, supra note 89, at 161–63 (discussing con-
ditions under which a group agent is fit to be held responsible for the actions of an 
individual member). 
135 E.g., State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 P. 474, 477 (Kan. 1910) (not-
ing that both a corporation and an individual can be held criminally responsible). 
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tion thereto, become merely the slave of such corporation.”136 Melodrama 
aside, a regime without corporate-criminal liability forced individuals to 
choose between criminal punishment and unemployment, while simultane-
ously inoculating the corporation from answering for its role in creating this 
situation. A categorical prohibition on corporate-criminal liability might well 
have resulted in criminally punishing individuals for actions that should be 
properly understood to be those of the corporation.  
5.2.2! Fairness as Reciprocity 
The second dimension of fairness responded to the growing powers and 
opportunities available to corporations. Courts explained that a corpora-
tion’s exposure to legal liability served to complement the expansion of its 
legal rights and powers. Reciprocity is on display in the Supreme Court’s 
early recognition that a corporation could commit libel, which has as an es-
sential component an intentional attitude. In response to the observation 
that corporations had once been immune to liability, the Court noted that “a 
necessary correlative to the principle of the exercise of corporate powers 
and faculties by legal representatives[] is the recognition of a corporate re-
sponsibility for the acts of those representatives.”137 Decades later, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court would enforce the same lesson when it recognized that 
a corporation could commit a tort of malicious prosecution:  
That a corporation, in all cases within the scope of its legitimate functions, 
may act as a natural person may act, and the rule of corporate responsibility 
has kept even pace with the growth of their powers, and the enlargement of 
their spheres of action, not only in regard to the enforcement of contracts, 
but also in making them amenable to personal actions for their torts, and 
                                                        
136 Ohio v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Co., 20 Ohio Dec. 240, 244–45 (Ohio. Ct. 
Common Pl. 1910) (crime of antitrust). 
137 Phila., Wilmington, & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210 (1858). 
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holding them to the same measure of responsibility in these respects to 
which natural persons are held.138 
The reciprocal relationship between legal powers and legal responsibili-
ties has long been a feature of corporate law. We saw it articulated, for ex-
ample, during the special-charter era, where corporate authority to perform 
quasi-state functions entailed an implied duty to perform said functions.139 
Admittedly, a commitment to reciprocity will not uniquely predict corpo-
rate-criminal liability; there is no one legal power whose reciprocal counter-
part is criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, the steady expansion of corpo-
rate liability, including the development of corporate-criminal liability, mir-
rors the steady increase in the corporation’s legal powers. 
5.2.3! Fairness as Parity  
If reciprocity motivated the expansion of corporate responsibility, then 
parity gave that expansion content. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
courts repeatedly stated that the treatment of corporate persons should re-
semble, as nearly as possible, the treatment of individual persons. With re-
spect to corporate liability, that meant exposing corporations whenever pos-
sible to the same tort and criminal responsibilities that individuals faced. In-
deed, well before the Supreme Court ostensibly extended the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to corporate persons we see several 
state supreme courts articulating a norm of parity as reason to expand inten-
tional-tort liability to corporations.140 The sentiment stretches back to the 
                                                        
138 Boogher v. Life Ass’n of Am., 75 Mo. 319, 324–25 (Mo. 1882) (purporting to 
quote Cumberland Valley R.R. Co. v. Baab, 9 Watts 458, but actually quoting Fen-
ton v. Wilton Sewing Mach. Co., (see Philadelphia Reports)]; see also Bushel v. 
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 15 Serg. & Rawle 173, 176 (Pa. 1827). 
139 E.g., People v. Corp. of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 542–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
140 E.g., S. & N. Ala. R.R. Co. v. Chappell, 61 Ala. 527 (Ala. 1878) (negligence); 
Wheless v. Second Nat’l Bank, 60 Tenn. 469, 473 (Tenn. 1872) (malicious prose-
cution); Jefferson R.R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, 7 (Ind. 1867) (exemplary damages); 
Murfreesboro & Woodbury Turnpike Co. v. Barrett, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 508, 510 
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early history of criminal nuisance cases.141 Courts offered the same rhetoric 
when developing corporate-criminal liability.142  
Courts enforcing equal treatment of corporate and individual persons—
in particular, by expanding corporate liability to be commensurate with indi-
vidual liability—appealed explicitly to the interests of individuals. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to exempt corporations from 
exemplary damages on the basis that “whatever rule of damages would ap-
ply in a suit against a natural person, ought to apply in a suit against a corpo-
ration. Any discrimination in that regard would shock the public’s sense of impar-
tial justice.”143 Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court specified that hold-
ing corporations criminally responsible the same as individuals was neces-
sary to secure the interests of individuals: 
By our Code, natural persons and corporations are entitled to like benefits 
in resorting to the ordinary and extraordinary process provided for the en-
forcement of their rights. . . . It results from [the exemption of corporations 
from liability] that the law secures rights and exemptions to corporations 
which are withheld from natural persons. This is wholly inconsistent with 
the genius and spirit of our State Constitution, which was intended to se-
cure equal and exact justice to all.144 
                                                                                                                                            
(Tenn. 1865) (negligence); Penn. R.R. Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. 365, 370 (Pa. 1862) 
(trespass to person); Owsley v. Montgomery & W. Point R.R. Co., 37 Ala. 560, 
562–63 (Ala. 1861) (false imprisonment); Goodspeed v. E. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 
530, 538 (Conn. 1853) (malicious prosecution). The Supreme Court first suggested 
that corporations are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s in 
1886. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
141 E.g., Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339, 
345 (1854) (crime of public nuisance) (“[T]he tendency of the more recent cases in 
courts of the highest authority has been to extend the application of all legal reme-
dies to corporations, and assimilate them, as far as possible, in their legal duties and 
responsibilities, to individuals.”). 
142 E.g., State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 P. 474, 477 (Kan. 1910) (crime 
of mislabeling butter); State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 69 S.E. 58, 58–59 (N.C. 1910) 
(identifying a host of specific-intent crimes).  
143 Jefferson R.R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 Ind. 1, 7 (Ind. 1867). 
144 Wheless v. Second Nat’l Bank, 60 Tenn. 469, 473 (Tenn. 1872); accord 
Murfreesboro & Woodbury Turnpike Co. v. Barrett, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 508, 510 
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Again, the timing of corporate-criminal liability’s expansion reflected 
the proliferation and increasing sophistication of the commercial corpora-
tion. Thus, explained New Jersey’s Supreme Court:  
In early days, when corporate bodies were few, it was a matter of compara-
tively small consequence whether such an action could be maintained. In 
these days, however, when the great concerns of business are carried on 
chiefly through these artificial persons, it would be most oppressive to hold 
that they are not amenable to answer for such wrongs as subject natural 
persons to prosecution.145 
Of course, it would be a mistake to conclude that courts treated corpo-
rate persons as identical to individual persons for purposes of the criminal 
law. On the one hand, corporate persons did not receive all the same crimi-
nal-procedure protections. For example, in Hale v. Henkel, the Supreme 
Court extended limited Fourth Amendment protections, but not Fifth 
Amendment protections, to corporations.146 On the other hand, corpora-
tions were not exposed to the full gamut of crimes.147 Similarly, corporations 
                                                                                                                                            
(Tenn. 1865) (“Corporations are becoming so numerous, it is the policy of the 
state to attach to them the same liabilities, to which natural persons are subject and 
liable. This principle must be enforced; the rights of the citizen require it.” (emphasis 
added)); see also State v. Belle Springs Creamery Co., 111 P. 474, 477 (Kan. 1910) 
(crime of mislabeling butter) (“That the individual who, after the passage of the act 
. . . should be guilty of a crime, and that a corporation might conduct the practice 
with impunity, seems revolting to all ideas of justice.”). 
145 State v. Passaic Cnty. Agric. Soc’y, 23 A. 680, 681 (N.J. 1892) (crime of pri-
vate nuisance); cf. Hussey v. King, 3 S.E. 923, 926 (N.C. 1887) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (malicious prosecution) (“The rights, the powers, and the duties of 
corporate bodies have been so enlarged in modern times, and these ‘artificial per-
sons’ have become so numerous, and entered so largely into the everyday transac-
tions of life, that it has become the policy of the law to subject them, as far as prac-
ticable, to the same civil liability for wrongful acts as attach to natural persons.”). 
146 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). It should be noted that the Court has 
since abandoned for all persons the Fourth Amendment doctrine it initially de-
clined to extend to corporations. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304–06 
(1967) (renouncing the mere evidence rule). 
147 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 
(1909) (noting, without enumeration, “that there are some crimes, which in their 
nature cannot be committed by corporations”); United States v. John Kelso Co., 
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were not exposed to all the same punishments as were individual persons—
in particular, corporations were not imprisoned—although the unavailability 
of prison terms did not preclude criminal liability.148 
5.3! Situating Fairness into Our Modern Practice 
What are the upshots of this historical analysis? First, deterrence is not 
the only rationale—perhaps not even the central rationale—motivating the 
expansion of corporate-criminal liability. Accordingly, even if we were to 
concede that there now exist other legal forums that better deter corporate 
misconduct than the criminal law, it may still be the case that there is a prin-
cipled reason to maintain our current practice. 
Specifically, the cluster of fairness norms provides an independent basis 
for justifying a practice of holding corporations criminally responsible. This 
does not amount to arguing that corporations are full-fledged moral agents 
capable of shame and eligible for retribution; my account does not appeal to 
retributive rationales to defend corporate-criminal liability. But neither is 
the practice capricious or without normative foundation. I have identified 
reasons for the State to hold corporations criminally responsible, consistent 
with principled limits and constraints on the corporate criminal liability. In 
particular, corporations, like any other criminal defendant, should be held 
responsible when there exist genuine corporate attitudes sufficient to satisfy 
a criminal statute’s specific mens rea requirements. 
                                                                                                                                            
86 F. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (identifying bigamy, rape, and murder); People v. 
Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22, 23 (N.Y. 1909) (recognizing that a corpora-
tion can commit a crime involving intent, but suggesting that “there are many 
crimes so involving personal, malicious intent and acts so ultra vires that a corpora-
tion manifestly could not commit them”). 
148 E.g., State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 (N.C. 1914) (“The corporation 
should not be wholly exempted from punishment because it cannot be impris-
oned.”); accord United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (discussing corporate imprisonment); Ohio v. Gen. Fire Ex-
tinguisher Co., 20 Ohio Dec. 240, 247 (Ohio. Ct. Common Pl. 1910) (same). 
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What does this mean for our current practice? For starters, we should 
amend our practice so that corporate-criminal liability applies only where it 
is fitting to attribute the requisite mens rea to a corporation. This means, in 
particular, abandoning the practice of federal courts to employ respondeat 
superior in the criminal context. Ideally, we would adopt instead an inter-
pretive approach similar to that articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court. 
Indeed, Chapter II argues that such an approach has recently sprung up, in-
formally, in the shadow of New York Central’s respondeat superior regime.  
Contrary to the myth, the State’s motivation for holding corporations 
criminally responsible is stronger today than ever before. All three fairness 
considerations—fittingness, reciprocity, and parity—apply today. As to fit-
tingness, the likelihood of tracing a corporate action or attitude back to the 
causal contribution of its individual participants has become vanishingly 
small.149 In our multinational economic environment, corporations have de-
veloped exponentially more sophisticated internal structures; for example, 
today an internal compliance system meant to detect and prevent criminal 
misconduct is a virtual necessity for any major corporation.150 With respect 
to reciprocity, corporate rights have only expanded since the early 1900s—
most prominently, in recent years, with respect to protecting a corpora-
tion’s rights of participation in non-commercial spheres.151 Finally, im-
proved methods of investigation and punishment improve the feasibility of 
holding corporations criminally responsible in a manner suggesting parity 
                                                        
149 List & Pettit, supra note 82, at 76–78 (identifying reasons why an “easy 
reduction,” if possible even in theory, could not be executed in practice). 
150 U.S.S.G §§ 8B2.1, 8D1.4(b) (establishing as a requirement of probation the 
establishment of an internal compliance program). The presence (or absence) of an 
effective compliance program also affects the magnitude of a convicted corpora-
tion’s fine. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f). 
151 E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., —  U.S. —, 82 U.S.L.W. 4636, 
*15 (2014) (“Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are incapable of exercising 
religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern 
corporate law.”); Citizens United v. FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (strik-
ing down restrictions on political expenditures by corporations). 
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with individuals. In short, there is no reason to think that the same overrid-
ing commitment to fairness at the core of corporate-criminal liability’s de-
velopment has lost its applicability today. If anything, debunking the myth of 
corporate-criminal liability’s development has opened the door to new rea-
sons—or at least resurrected old reasons—for why the State ought to hold 
corporations criminally responsible. 
6! Conclusion 
There is a prevailing story about how and why corporations came to be 
held criminally responsible. This just-so story is mostly wrong, or at least 
seriously incomplete. The purpose of overturning this myth is not historical 
accuracy for its own sake. By reconsidering how and why corporate-criminal 
liability developed, we can improve the conceptual and normative founda-
tions of our modern practice of holding corporations criminally responsible. 
Courts expanding corporate-criminal liability did so along principled 
lines and out of a commitment to a cluster of fairness norms—one that re-
fuses to favor corporate persons over individual persons. Whereas modern 
regulatory strategies may challenge corporate-criminal liability’s usefulness 
for deterring wrongdoing, commitment to these fairness norms is as relevant 
in our modern experience with corporations as it was at the turn of the 
twentieth century. At the very least, we should resist the myth behind the 
development of corporate-criminal liability, and appreciate both the theoret-
ical coherence and continued desirability of a practice of holding corpora-
tions criminally responsible. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WE CAN, SHOULD, AND ( VERY NEARLY ) DO HOLD  
CORPORATIONS CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE 
 
1! Preface 
The State can hold commercial corporations criminally responsible, and 
it should. Nevertheless, there is a sense that the State has failed in this duty 
notwithstanding the longstanding existence of a federal doctrine that per-
mits holding corporations criminally responsible separate from their mem-
bers.1 Meanwhile, the mere possibility of corporate-criminal liability contin-
ually faces robust criticism. Federal doctrine specifically is derided as bereft 
of any rational foundation, but this complaint reflects a larger critique that 
                                                        
1 I use the term member generically to identify a participant in a collective. I 
do not use member as it is understood in enterprise law to describe participants in 
a limited liability company (but not a corporation). Thus, on my account, corporate 
shareholders, directors, and managers all constitute members—albeit, members 
who play a clearly defined role in a peculiar class of organizational structures. 
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the very idea of extending criminal law to corporations is conceptually con-
fused and morally pernicious. 
The foundational criticisms are wrong. First, corporations can sensibly 
be held criminal responsible. In particular, corporations are eligible candi-
dates for legal personhood as that concept is understood by the criminal law. 
Second, the State has a variety of reasons for holding corporations criminal-
ly responsible, all of which trace to the State’s duty to use criminal law to 
protect individuals within society: victims of the corporation, citizens ex-
pecting the State to uphold the rule of law, and even individuals inside the 
corporation who would otherwise unfairly bear the consequences of corpo-
rate misconduct. 
Although critics are wrong about the theory—corporate-criminal liabil-
ity is both fundamentally sound and socially desirable—they are right that 
the federal doctrine is seriously deficient. Under the status quo, the federal 
government rarely holds corporations responsible for their misconduct. 
Worse, it has recently embraced civil alternatives to criminal liability that 
allow corporations, but not individuals, to evade criminal responsibility. 
Meanwhile, when it does prosecute corporations, it does so under the guise 
of a doctrine that is entirely unmoored from any conceptual anchor.  
It might seem that the only solution is to sink a federal doctrine that has 
floated adrift for over a century. Thankfully, there is another option, one 
that has largely gone unnoticed by critics of corporate-criminal liability. In 
the shadow of this unsatisfying doctrine, prosecutors and sentencing courts 
have pieced together an alternative model for holding corporations criminal-
ly responsible. This practice diverges wildly from the doctrine. More to the 
point, courts and prosecutors have created an approach to corporate-
criminal liability that comes close to a morally and conceptually justifiable 
framework for the practice—one that approximates the account developed 
here. Accordingly, the State could achieve meaningful reform merely by ad-
justing the liability conditions currently enshrined in doctrine to reflect con-
siderations already employed by federal prosecutors and sentencing courts. 
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2! The State Can Hold Corporations Criminally 
Responsible 
Begin with a corporation’s eligibility for criminal liability. The typical 
criminal statute attaches liability to a person—specifically, a person who 
performs a proscribed act (actus reus) concurrently with a proscribed atti-
tude (mens rea).2 Thus, the question of eligibility can be understood as ask-
ing whether a corporation can qualify as a person as the concept is under-
stood in the context of criminal law. In particular, I focus for now on wheth-
er we can coherently attribute to a corporation the actions and attitudes 
necessary to satisfy the ordinary criminal statue’s actus reus and mens rea 
requirements. 
2.1! Pragmatic Approaches to Agency 
Attempts to define personhood traditionally approach the topic from 
one of two directions. The first direction assesses personhood “in terms of 
an essential and universal inhering nature,” which derives from the posses-
sion of some natural or intrinsic feature.3 The other direction, frequently 
associated with legal personhood, assesses personhood pragmatically. On 
this latter view, what it is to be a person is to manifest “the capacity to per-
form as a person.”4 I focus attention on what is necessary to demonstrate 
the capacity to perform as a person for purposes of criminal liability. As I 
explain later, this approach is consonant with our ordinary legal practice.5 
                                                        
2 Wayne R. LaFave, 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 1.2 (2d ed. 2014). 
3 See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
Yale L.J. 655, 660 (1925). 
4 Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possi-
bility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents 173 (2011); see 
generally Daniel C. Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in The Identities of 
Persons (Amélie O. Rorty ed. 1976). 
5 Moreover, pragmatic accounts of personhood have a long pedigree, both in 
and outside of the law. Dewey traces pragmatic theories of legal personhood back 
to a pronouncement by Pope Innocent IV in 1246 CE, Dewey, supra note 3, at 665, 
  55 
Demonstrating the capacity to perform as a person requires at least the 
ability to possess intentional states and a capacity for action. Intentional 
states consist of an attitude and a proposition towards which that attitude is 
held.6 An attitude might describe the way the world is—for example, I be-
lieve that the proposition ‘The water glass is full’ is false. Alternatively, an 
attitude might describe the way an agent wants its environment to be—so, I 
might desire that ‘The water glass is full’ be true. Meanwhile, a capacity for 
action refers specifically to an agent’s ability first to identify a divergence 
between the environment as it is and the environment as the agent wants it 
to be, and second to take suitable steps to reconcile this divergence. To wrap 
up the example, I am able to notice that ‘The water glass is full’ is false; that 
I desire ‘The water glass is full’ to be true; and that, by walking to the kitch-
en and turning on the tap, I can reconcile my diverging attitudes. 
I have described merely the simplest of agents. And although the con-
stituent elements necessary for criminal liability are beginning to emerge—
intentional states correspond to mens rea, capacity for action corresponds to 
actus reus—simple agency is insufficient to satisfy legal personhood. As 
Tim Scanlon puts the point, it is not enough to expect merely that a compe-
tent agent can respond to stimuli; we need an “expectation grounded in a 
supposed responsiveness to certain reasons.”7 What is needed is an agent 
that can conform to the requirements of criminal law, and further can take 
the fact of criminality as a reason to conform its practice. More generally, a 
legal person must be able to “perform effectively in the space of [legal] obli-
                                                                                                                                            
while List and Pettit identify similar strains in the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke. List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 170–73. 
6 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 20–21. 
7 T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Mean-
ing, and Blame 161 (2008); accord List & Pettit, supra note 67, at 178.  
The sort of responsiveness in mind here tracks what Scanlon elsewhere refers to as 
judgment-sensitive attitudes. T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each 
Other (2000). 
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gations,”8 which amounts to demonstrating what Stephen Darwall refers to 
as “second-personal competence.”9 A legal person must be capable of mak-
ing, and following through on, commitments to other persons.10 Effective 
performance in particular requires recognizing that the existence of an obli-
gation constitutes a reason to act, and that failing to satisfy an obligation 
constitutes grounds for criticism. Such recognition means the agent is sensi-
tive to criticism; it is capable of both of recognizing failures of rationality,11 
and learning from past mistakes by taking action designed to avoid repeating 
irrational missteps in the future.12 This assumes both a capacity for second-
order attitudes—that is, attitudes about the simple attitudes already de-
scribed—and specifically some motivation to improve to reform one’s con-
duct by imposing checks on one’s processing. 
2.2! Collective Agency 
Thus far, I have said nothing to preclude the possibility of a collective 
or group qualifying as a person; eligibility for legal personhood turns on 
whether an agent can reliably demonstrate it is appropriately “responsive to 
                                                        
8 Id. at 173. 
9 Stephen Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Moral-
ity, Respect, and Accountability 23 (2006) (observing that “genuine 
obligations can result only from an address that presupposes an addressee’s se-
cond-personal competence”). 
10 Id. at 59; accord List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 178. 
11 List and Pettit note that “if a reasoning agent fails to be rational, then the fact 
that it self-corrects, recognizing its failure in a manner open only to a reasoning 
agent, will provide a ground for continuing to view it as an agent.” Id. at 31; see also 
Darwall, supra note 9, at 21; Philip Pettit, Akrasia, Collective and Individual, in 
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (2003) (discussing 
failures of rationality).  
12 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 31 (“The sensitivity to the demands of ra-
tionality displayed in the acknowledgement of criticism is appropriate may be evi-
dence of agency.”). 
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reasons,” not on whether it has a single or organic body.13 Accordingly, col-
lective agents, the same as individual agents, are eligible in principle to 
count as legal persons for the purposes of criminal liability. That said, quali-
fying for legal personhood poses special challenges for collective agents. 
I largely follow the approach to collective agency articulated by Marga-
ret Gilbert, whose work on plural subjects is broadly consonant with the 
pragmatic approach to personhood articulated here.14 For Gilbert, a plural 
subject consists of some “population of persons who are jointly committed 
in a certain way.”15 Individual members of a collective enter into a joint 
commitment to act as a single body. What it would mean for a plural subject 
to intend to X is for its members to act “together to constitute, as far as is 
possible, a single body that intends” to X.16  
Acting as a single body does not require that each member further per-
sonally intend to X. Instead, what matters is that a member’s “behavior gen-
erally should be expressive of the [intention], in the appropriate contexts.”17 
For a non-corporate example, consider the U.S. Senate. The Senate acts and 
expresses attitudes through legislation and resolutions. Successful legisla-
tion ordinarily requires that a majority of senators communicate their sup-
port directly to the Senate clerk during a voting session. A Senator’s per-
                                                        
13 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 7, at 162 (defending an ac-
count according to which it is possible to hold collective agents responsible); accord 
Darwall, supra note 9, at 35; List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 178. 
14 See generally Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment: How We 
Make the Social World (2014). Indeed, Darwall argues that Gilbert’s ac-
count is a second-personal one. Darwall, supra note 9, at 198. 
15 Margaret Gilbert, Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its Im-
plications for Group Members, 30 Midwest Studs. Phil. 94, 99 (2006) [herein-
after Who’s to Blame]. 
16 Id. at 100. Gilbert’s schema applies to all intentional attitudes. See, e.g., id. at 
100 (desires); Margaret Gilbert, Shared Intention and Personal Intentions, 144 Phil. 
Studs. 167 (2009) (intentions); Margaret Gilbert, Collective Belief and Scientific 
Change, in Sociality and Responsibility 37 (2000) (beliefs). 
17 Margaret Gilbert, Corporate Misbehavior and Collective Values, 70 Brook. L. 
Rev. 1369, 1376 (2004) (emphasis omitted). 
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sonal attitudes about legislation, to the extent that they differ from the sup-
port she expresses to the clerk during a voting session, are irrelevant in de-
termining the Senate’s attitude towards legislation. At an extreme, we could 
imagine that no Senator privately holds an attitude that is nevertheless ap-
propriately attributed to the Senate. Conversely, a Senator’s expressing an 
attitude outside of a voting session is not attributable to the Senate. 
Although Gilbert’s work canvasses all plural subjects, I restrict my at-
tention to what is required for a sophisticated plural subject—one with a 
large membership, or a series of open-ended joint commitments—to act and 
hold attitudes to satisfy the requirements of legal personhood. Coordinating 
members in such a plural subject requires a complex internal structure, con-
stituted by interlocking rules, norms, and customs.18 Through this structure 
individual members are able to produce collective attitudes derived from, 
but independent of or autonomous from, the personal attitudes of any par-
ticular member.19 Likewise, a plural subject’s structure designates the con-
texts in which actions by a member should be attributed to the plural sub-
ject, as opposed to contexts where a member’s actions are attributable only 
to the individual.  
A plural subject’s internal structure may take a variety of shapes. The 
structure may be broadly egalitarian; more likely, it consists of interlocking 
hierarchies, delegations of authority, etc.20 To get a sense of this complexity, 
return to the Senate. The Senate’s majority voting rules create the impres-
sion of an egalitarian, deliberative internal structure. That impression is mis-
taken. The Senate limits members’ access to voting sessions through su-
permajority cloture requirements—sixty Senators must vote to open and 
                                                        
18 See Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 7, at 162–64 (discussing 
“procedures through which [a collective agent] can make institutional decisions”). 
19 Phillip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171, 184 (2007). 
20 See, e.g., Gilbert, Who’s to Blame, supra note 15, at 103–04 (discussing hierar-
chies); List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 72–77 (discussing groups with heteroge-
neous decisionmaking structures). 
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close debate on proposed legislation—alongside an evolving practice about 
when members will contest cloture.21 Hierarchies exist in rules (e.g., legisla-
tion ordinarily cannot reach the Senate floor without being approved by a 
committee), norms (e.g., the Senate Judiciary Committee will not approve a 
judicial nominee before receiving a “blue slip” from both home-state sena-
tors), and culture (e.g., party members usually defer to their respective lead-
er). Indeed, because a variety of ordinary procedures require the unanimous 
consent of the Senate to proceed, each Senator has peremptory authority to 
effectively close down the Senate—this power usually remains largely in 
check because of norms of decorum.22 Proper appreciation of the structure 
informs the attitudes expressed by the Senate. For example, Senate norms 
establish that the Senate adopts specific intentional attitudes towards legis-
lative acts—namely, those identified by the markup committee and, to a 
weaker extent, the sponsoring member of the legislation.23 
2.3! Corporations as Legal Persons 
The discussion thus far should make clear that qualifying for legal per-
sonhood is no easy task—particularly for collective agents. Nevertheless, 
modern commercial corporations are able to clear this high bar. Corpora-
                                                        
21 E.g., E.g., Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate 
Most Filibusters on Nominees, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-
party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-
52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html; see generally Thomas E. Mann & 
Norman J. Orstein, It’s Even Worse than It Looks 31–81 (2013) 
(describing the drastic increase in cloture motions). 
22 See Norm Ornstein, Why the Senate Can’t Resist Dysfunctional Obstruction, 
The Atlantic, July 18, 2013,  http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2013/07/why-the-senate-cant-resist-dysfunctional-obstruction/277912/. 
23 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 Penn. L. Rev., 1503, 1522–23 (2000); Stephen Breyer, 
On The Uses Of Legislative History In Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
845, 863–64 (1992). 
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tions are group agents that, by virtue of the nature of their sophisticated in-
ternal structures, are capable of satisfying the requirements of legal person-
hood. To be sure, this was not always the case. Chapter I details the conflu-
ence of regulatory and economic pressures that developed corporations into 
agents capable of satisfying the requirements of criminal law. For now, I fo-
cus on the role of corporate law in producing an internal structure that em-
powers corporations to qualify as legal persons. 
The corporation is organized around a sophisticated internal structure, 
which derives its foundation from corporate law. For example, corporate 
law creates classes of members within a corporation,24 divvies up deci-
sionmaking authority amongst classes,25 and specifies the scope and breadth 
of each class’s powers and obligations.26 Although, strictly speaking, corpo-
rate law consists largely of jurisdiction-specific default rules, the effect of 
these corporate default rules is to produce a broadly similar type of com-
mercial entity.27  
Specifically, corporate law encourages the adoption of a hierarchical 
structure—what Peter French refers to as the Corporate Internal Decision 
(“CID”) structure28—whose “primary function is to draw experience from 
various levels of the corporation into a decision-making and ratification pro-
                                                        
24 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (broad default powers of directors); 
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (same); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 142(a) 
(creation of officers); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.40(a) (same). 
25 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k) (allowing removal of directors via 
shareholder majority); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.08 (same); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (articulating business-judgment rule). 
26 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (limiting directors’ personal lia-
bility resulting from a breach of their duty of care). 
27 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L. Rev. 439 (2001). 
28 Bill Laufer has developed perhaps a more sophisticated, albeit more un-
wieldy, model of corporate agency. William S. Laufer, Corporate Bod-
ies and Guilty Minds (2006). With respect to corporate structures, the two 
accounts are sufficiently interchangeable for my purposes. Accordingly, for sim-
plicity’s sake, I refer to French’s characterization unless otherwise specified. 
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cess.”29 The CID structure consolidates much of the intra-member delibera-
tions within a corporation. Meanwhile, a corporation’s hierarchical CID 
structure creates both the fact and the perception of what social psycholo-
gists refer to as a “highly entitative group agent,” which is a “unified and 
coherent whole in which the members are tightly bound together.”30 This is 
bolstered by the fact that the corporation independently faces commercial 
incentives to foster its perception as a highly entitative group and a single 
entity—among other things, to develop brand loyalty with consumers and to 
engender employee loyalty to the enterprise.31 
A corporation’s hierarchical CID structure allows it to be an effective 
participant in the space of legal obligations. Corporations are sufficiently 
well organized to hold intentional attitudes and to take actions separate from 
their members. For example, corporations are capable of participating in the 
obligation-laden practice of contracting; corporations routinely manifest 
consent to enter into complicated contracts. And moreover, a corporation 
can take the fact of an obligation as reason to conform its conduct, and can 
work to improve its rational processes. Indeed, List and Pettit identify con-
ditions under which corporation decisionmaking may be more rational, in 
the sense of improving its ability to track the truth and learn from error, than 
individual decisionmaking.32 To continue the example, corporations recog-
nize that the existence of a contract constitutes a reason to conform corpo-
rate conduct to the contract’s terms; moreover, they can understand the 
violation of a contractual obligation as grounds for legal reproach. Similarly, 
corporations are capable of holding attitudes sufficient to satisfy mens rea, 
                                                        
29 Peter French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 Am. Phil. Quarter-
ly 207, 212 (1979). 
30 Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The Psychology Of Collective Responsibility: 
When And Why Collective Entities Are Likely To Be Held Responsible For The Misdeeds 
of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL. 137, 149 (2010). 
31 Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. 
Ill. Rev. 785, 798, 810 (2013). 
32 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 81–103. 
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are capable of conforming their conduct to the terms of criminal statutes, 
and capable of recognizing that misconduct’s status as criminally prohibited 
presents a reason to constrain corporate activity.  
2.4! Legal Personhood is Sufficient to License Criminal Liability 
Some critics argue that legal personhood by itself is insufficient to li-
cense criminal responsibility and punishment—some further element, not 
accessible by group agents, is required.33 Implicit to this position is an intui-
tion that some notion of moral responsibility is a necessary component of 
criminal responsibility, and that personhood by itself does not give rise to 
moral responsibility.  
The moral status and capacity of corporate agents is by itself a conten-
tious and somewhat unfocused topic. If all that critics have in mind is that 
corporations must be responsive to the sorts of normative considerations 
that arise in the criminal law, then I see no problem for my account.34 Noth-
ing I have described thus far constrains the sorts of attitudes attributable to a 
corporation. I have already noted that, through contract law, corporations 
routinely participate in a normative practice akin to promising. Practically 
speaking, insofar as corporate attitudes derive from the contributions of in-
dividuals who themselves are uncontroversially moral agents, it would be 
surprising that every emergent, autonomous corporate attitude would be 
stripped of normative content. 
                                                        
33 E.g., Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsi-
bility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 Hasting L.J. 411, 428–30 (2012) (articu-
lating the importance of emotional capacity to moral agency); Michael McKenna, 
Collective Responsibility and an Agent Meaning Theory, 30 Midwest Studs. 
Phil. 16, 23 (2006). 
34 At the other extreme, some require far less to qualify for moral personhood. 
E.g., Tracy Isaacs, Collective Moral Responsibility and Collective Intention, 30 Mid-
west Stud. Phil. 59, 61 (2006) (“To the extent that they have the capacity to 
act on the basis of intentions, corporations and other similarly structured organiza-
tions are moral persons.”). 
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However, if critics expect something more robust—Michael Moore and 
Amy Sepinwall suggest that personhood requires an emotional capacity akin 
to reactive attitudes35; Michael McKenna suggests that robust moral agency 
requires a free will in some deep Kantian sense36—then claims of corporate 
moral agency are more complicated. That is not to say that the possibility of 
robust moral agency is beyond reach. David Silver, as well as Gunnar 
Björnsson and Kendy Hess, argue that corporations are Strawsonian agents 
capable of reactive attitudes sufficient to give rise to moral agency.37 Marga-
ret Gilbert has extended her schema for collective attitudes to collective 
emotions.38 Bryce Hubener, relying on an account broadly similar to Gil-
bert’s, has offered a detailed account of what it would look like for a collec-
tive to experience fear.39 Peter French has done something of the same for 
corporate shame.40 For my part, I am inclined towards the position that cor-
porations are able to participate in at least broad swaths of our normative 
practices, but that they are not object of moral concern in and of them-
selves.41 
                                                        
35 Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of 
The Criminal Law 614–17 (1997); Sepinwall, supra note 33, at 428–30. 
36 McKenna, supra note 33, at 23–29. 
37 David Silver, A Strawsonian Defense of Corporate Moral Responsibility, 42 Am. 
Phil. Quarterly 279 (2005); Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy M. Hess, Corporate 
Crocodile Tears? On The Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents (work in progress). 
38 Gilbert, Who’s to Blame?, supra note 15. 
39 Bryce Hubener, Genuinely Collective Emotions, 1 Euro J. Phil Sci. 89 
(2011). 
40 Peter French, The Hester Prynne Sanction, 4 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 19, 
19–22 (1985). 
41 On this I agree with Dietmar Pfordten’s statement of normative individual-
ism, according to which “[o]nly individuals can be the ultimate point of reference 
of moral obligations and hence the justificatory source of morals and ethics. Collec-
tive entities such as nations, peoples, societies, communities, clans, families, or 
eco-systems, etc. cannot fulfill this function. Dietmar Pfordten, Five Elements of 
Normative Ethics - A General Theory of Normative Individualism, 15 Ethical 
Theory Moral Prac. 449, 452 (2011) (emphasis omitted). A future project 
on this point will seek to disconnect personhood from moral agency. 
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What does the controversy over corporations’ moral agency portend for 
criminal law? After all, criminal law is not co-extensive with morality, even 
if the latter ideally provides some loose grounding relationship for the for-
mer. Sepinwall takes the mere fact of admittedly deep-seated controversy 
over the corporation’s moral status as reason to reject the sort of account of 
corporate personhood I have been developing.42 I concede the controversy, 
but not the solution. Discussions of moral agency blur the line between eli-
gibility and aptness—between whether the state can hold corporations crim-
inally responsible and whether it should. The next Section enumerates a va-
riety of reasons why the State should hold corporations criminally responsi-
ble. As to whether robust moral agency is a requirement of eligibility for 
criminal liability, I am skeptical that criminal law enshrines such a require-
ment. At most, it may be the case that retributive justifications of punish-
ment fall short in their application to corporations. Yet this alone would not 
put corporations outside the bounds of our criminal practice. To that point, 
the law mitigates its treatment of minors and the mentally impaired on the 
basis of suspicion that these individuals lack the robust moral agency neces-
sary to license retributivist justifications.43 However, neither of these classes 
is immune from the criminal law; it would be surprising then to grant corpo-
rations such a luxury.  
More fundamentally, I disagree that legal personhood is insufficient to 
give rise to criminal liability and punishment. What it means to be a legal 
person is to be able to participate in the space of legal rights and obligations, 
which includes being held responsible for violating those legal obligations. 
One paradigmatic feature of that space is criminal law and punishment. 
                                                        
42 Sepinwall, supra note 33, at 430. 
43 E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (concluding that certain 
mental disabilities render an individual less morally culpable, such that retributive 
rationales apply less strongly with respect to the death penalty); see also Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (extending Atkins’s rationale to children); accord 
Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. — , 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–66  (2012) (discussing chil-
dren’s moral development). 
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Corporations are capable of effectively participating in the space of legal ob-
ligations. In particular, the pragmatic account provided here demonstrates 
that they are capable of satisfying the criminal law’s essential features of 
mens rea and actus reus. They can and do commit most, if not every, crime: 
corporations produce serious harm that in ways that society deems crimi-
nal.44 Nothing further should be necessary to establish a corporation’s 
standing to accept criminal liability and punishment. 
In short, corporations are legal persons sufficient to recognize and re-
spond to the demands and consequences of the criminal law. Accordingly, 
they are eligible to qualify as persons for purposes of criminal liability. 
Whether they should in fact be deemed persons for purposes of the criminal 
law is the subject of the next section. 
3! The State Should Hold Corporations Criminal-
ly Responsible 
From here out I take it to be the case that, if the State were to extend 
the institution to them, modern commercial corporations would be capable 
of satisfying the requirements of criminal law. This observation is far from 
toothless. Eligibility constrains (or at least should constrain) state action; the 
State cannot sensibly extend personhood by fiat just to any entity or object.45 
On the other hand, although eligibility is necessary to justify corporate-
criminal liability, it is not sufficient. Given that corporations are capable of 
satisfying the requirements of criminal law, it is a further question whether 
the State should extend the institution. 
This Section explores disparate reasons why the State should hold cor-
porations criminally responsible. That said, all of these reasons are rooted in 
the State’s obligation to protect the interests of individuals within society—
                                                        
44 See Brandon Garrett, To Big to Jail: How Prosecutors 
Compromise with Corporations 14 (2014). 
45 See Dewey, supra note 3, at 661-62 (claiming that trees could not qualify as 
legal persons, judicial pronouncements notwithstanding). 
  66 
both those outside of the corporation who may otherwise be forced the bear 
the cost of criminal misconduct, and also many individuals inside the corpo-
ration who would suffer in the absence of corporate-criminal liability. 
3.1! Corporate-Criminal Liability Protects Individuals Outside of the 
Corporation 
3.1.1! The Historical Purpose Served by Corporate Personhood 
Consider first the role served by extending personhood to corporations 
in other legal contexts. Both historically and today, personhood exists to 
protect individuals from losing legal protections by virtue of incorporating. 
Thus, for example, economic historians agree that extending personhood to 
corporations served to ensure equal property protections for “‘owners of 
property held in the name of a corporation . . . [and] owners of property held 
in their own name.’”46 More recently, the Supreme Court held in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. that corporations qualify as persons under the aus-
pices of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.47 In discussing the purpose 
of corporate personhood, the Court explained that“[w]hen rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to 
protect the rights of” individuals within the corporation.48 This sentiment is 
reflected in Brandon Garrett’s review of the personhood jurisprudence. 
Garrett concludes that corporate personhood has served to vindicate the 
                                                        
46 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 
Geo. L.J. 1593, 1609 (1988); accord Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transfor-
mations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 767, 793–95 (2005); Blair, supra note 31, at 797–98; 
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 
W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 176–78 (1985). 
47 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., -- U.S. -- , 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) 
(citing The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. 1 (2012)). 
48 Id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (noting that the 
State may not condition the special advantages of the corporate form on the forfei-
ture of constitutional protections). 
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rights of individuals; courts extend personhood to corporations when the 
corporation is best suited to protect the rights of the shareholders.49 
Yet personhood protects against exploitation the interests of more than 
just corporate insiders; personhood just as importantly serves those outside 
the corporation. Granting corporate personhood for the purposes of federal 
diversity jurisdiction increased access to impartial courts for out-of-state 
citizens.50 Personhood in contract law allows corporations to enter into 
agreements, but also provides those on the other side of the transaction an 
identifiable counterpart against whom to seek remedies.51 And tort liability 
ensures remedies for victims, irrespective of whether the harm done came 
from a corporation or an individual. 
3.1.2! Corporate Personhood as a Check on Criminal Misconduct 
Consistent with this historical role, extending corporate personhood to 
the criminal law ensures the State’s ability to seek redress for victims and to 
uphold respect for the rule of law. Put simply, criminal liability for corpora-
tions ensures that individuals do not suddenly become free to commit 
crimes with impunity simply because they pursue their crimes through a 
corporation.  
More generally, corporations reap the benefits of personhood; they 
should take the burdens as well. There is a flavor of reciprocity here: corpo-
rations have had extended to them (with increasing frequency) the benefits 
                                                        
49 Brandon Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 Penn. L. 
Rev. 95 (2014). 
50 Initially, a corporation would escape federal jurisdiction if any one share-
holder of the corporation shared was a citizen of the same state as the opposing par-
ty. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), overturned by Louisville, 
Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844) 
(mentioning that Chief Justice John Marshall came to hold his opinion in Deveaux 
as one of his greatest regrets while on the bench). 
51 See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 Utah L. 
Rev. 1629, 1633–39 (2011) (collecting authorities). 
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of legal personhood, and so should face the burdens of legal personhood. Or, 
as Sherman and Percy put the point, “if corporations are to benefit from 
perceptions of entitativity, they must also accept the downside of being per-
ceived as entitative—collective responsibility.”52 To fail to extend person-
hood status for purposes of criminal liability is to abandon the State’s role of 
protecting individuals: it allows individuals to use corporations as a tool for 
securing the benefits of legal personhood without being subject to legal per-
sonhood’s attendant responsibilities. 
It is vital to secure protection against individuals’ ability to use the cor-
poration to carry out criminal misconduct with impunity. This is especially 
true because incorporation enables, or at least facilitates, misconduct that 
would have been either less likely or less harmful if left to the devices of un-
incorporated individuals. Incorporation brings with it a variety of well-
rehearsed dangers: diffusion of responsibility, adoption of a group identity, 
in-group/out-group bias, bureaucratic myopia, and cognitive dissonance all 
conspire to make more likely criminal misconduct by a corporation than by 
individuals acting alone.53 Small wonder then that harm that can be wrought 
by corporations outstrips that done by individuals.54 These concerns are not 
new; they inform Lord Coke’s infamous aside that “corporations have no 
souls” and arise repeatedly throughout the historical expansion of corporate 
liability.55 Moreover, they offer an explanation to observations by social psy-
                                                        
52 See Sherman & Percy, supra note 30, at 169. 
53 E.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 
Hastings L.J. 1, 10–11 (2012); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for 
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1122–45 (1991); 
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 
473, 493–97 (2006).  
54 Garrett, supra note 44, at 117–46. 
55 Sutton’s Hop. Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612). Coke’s statement is 
often presented as a bald (and legally irrelevant) metaphysical proposition. But a 
better interpretation comes from the Tennessee Supreme Court. Murfreesboro & 
Woodbury Turnpike Co. v. Barrett, 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.) 508, 510–11 (Tenn. 1865) 
(suggesting that corporations are “soulless” in that “[m]en, when associated to-
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chologists that “high-entitativity groups are perceived to be more capable of 
engaging in negative behaviors . . . than low-entitativity groups.”56 
3.1.3! The Case of Google Street View 
For illustration, consider Google’s surreptitious collecting of data from 
private wireless networks. In 2010 German investigators discovered that 
Google’s Street View project—in which Google launched a worldwide fleet 
of vehicles to photograph every public street—was secretly being used to 
download packets of information from any unsecured wireless network in 
range of one of Google’s vehicles.57 The intentional interception of third-
party electronic communications, such as those conveyed over a wireless 
network, violates criminal provisions of the Wiretap Act (among other crim-
inal statutes).58 
There are several senses in which the misconduct at issue—what at the 
time was described as the “biggest wiretap case in U.S. history”59—was dis-
tinctly corporate. First, no individual could accomplish the same amount of 
harm as Google; this project required the global coordination of thousands 
of employees united in service of, and organized around, a shared goal.  
                                                                                                                                            
gether in a corporate capacity, frequently lose that regard for individual rights, they 
have as private persons” such that their “direct responsibility is . . . removed.”). 
56 Anna Kaisa Newheiser et al., Why Do We Punish Groups? High Entitativity 
Promotes Moral Suspicion, 48 J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 931, 92 (2012). 
57 Google gathered MAC addresses and network IDs—effectively, information 
about the network—from all wireless networks. However, Google also collected 
payload data—that is, content being transmitted over the network—from unse-
cured wireless networks. The latter conduct is the source of the controversy. 
58 The Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (d) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(A)(2) (2012) (computer fraud); The Pen/Trap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1327 
(2012); The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (2012). 
59 Karen Gullo, Google Wif-Fi Roundup Has Lawyers Chasing Landmark Jackpot, 
Bloomberg, Sept. 24, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
09-24/google-wi-fi-roundup-mistake-has-lawyers-eyeing-jackpot. 
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Second, no individual would have an incentive to carry out such a 
crime; the value of the misconduct increases exponentially with the breadth 
of data collected. Google has suggested that the event amounts to a series of 
incidental trespasses—technical wrongs, perhaps, but not harms—with no 
real gain for Google.60 This is because, according to Google, a vehicle would 
have been in range of a given wireless network for no more than several se-
conds.61 True, information gathered over a few seconds would, in isolation, 
likely be innocuous. However, snippets of data become potentially valuable 
when collected on a large scale. Google knows this better than anyone—
presentations given to Google executives gave this exact reason to justify 
collecting data from wireless networks in the first place.62  
Third, there is a sense in which Google’s misconduct is distinctly crim-
inal; civil remedies are not a supplement to a criminal conviction.63 The 
Wiretap Act allows for private civil remedies64; however, those remedies are 
deficient in two respects. First, as a practical matter, it will be next to im-
possible for any given plaintiff to prove she was wronged; to win her claim 
an individual would have to sift through terabytes of data on the off chance 
that a Street View vehicle captured personally identifiable information. That 
assumes a plaintiff could get access to the data. Now that international in-
vestigators have discovered login credentials, passwords, medical records, 
and bank records contained in the payload data, it may well be illegal for 
Google to turn the information over to private litigants. 
                                                        
60 This is a moot point for the criminal law, as the Wiretap Act criminalizes 
separately the interception and use of third-party communications.  
61 Alan Eustace, Wifi Data Collection: An Update, Google Official Blog 
(last updated June 9, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-
collection-update.html. 
62 FCC, Notice of Apparent Liability, at 17. 
63 Although in this case they will likely have to be. The Justice Department an-
nounced that it would not prosecute, largely on the basis of Google’s own reporting 
to the FCC, well in advance of most other jurisdiction’s completing their investiga-
tions, from which many of Google’s previous explanations were proven false.  
64 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012). 
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But more fundamentally, the wrong here is not captured by the snippets 
of data that would serve as the basis for a civil suit. Google intentionally en-
gaged in a systematic conspiracy to capture information it knew to be pri-
vate.65 The wrong being accomplished here is the circumvention of other 
people’s privacy for commercial gain. This seems precisely the goal of the 
Wiretap Act to censure. More to the point, personhood exists precisely to 
combat a situation where such misconduct might otherwise go unpunished. 
3.2! The Expressive Concern: Why Tort Liability is Insufficient 
The last point—tort law’s insufficiency as a substitute for criminal lia-
bility in Google’s case—raises a broader argument for the need for corpo-
rate-criminal liability. Corporate crime likely harms more individuals than is 
first suspected; indeed, several studies suggest that corporate crime does 
more harm overall domestically than does all street crime combined.66 Re-
gardless, the absence of corporate-criminal liability would wrong even indi-
viduals outside of the direct victims of corporate misconduct. 
Thus far I have described personhood as a sort of anti-exploitation tool, 
which I have suggested should apply to criminal law the same as it applies to 
contract law, property law, federal jurisdiction, etc. Separate from this, the 
State should extend personhood to corporations for the purpose of criminal 
liability because, given the way our corporate practice developed, it would 
be unfair for the State not to do so. 
                                                        
65 Ironically, Google unsuccessfully argued in ongoing litigation that payload 
data transmitted over an unsecured wireless network is equivalent to radio com-
munications (which are excluded from the Wiretap Act). Joffe v. Google , Inc., 746 
F.3d 920 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. — , 134 S. Ct. 2877 (2013). In other words, 
sending email from your home or Starbucks is the same as publishing that infor-
mation for public consumption. No surprise this characterization is at odds with 
Google’s view of privacy when it comes to Gmail. Google Privacy Policy, (last 
modified June 15, 2015), https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy. 
66 Richard D. Hartley, Corporate Crime 27 (2008) (collecting cites). 
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It is not just victims who suffer when the State fails to hold corporations 
criminally responsible. Law expresses the values of the State—more specifi-
cally, of the citizens the State represents.67 With respect to criminal law in 
particular, “we communicate far more about our condemnation of wrongdo-
ing when we call conduct criminal, whether the defendant is a corporation 
or an individual.”68 And while the State expresses itself in part through leg-
islation, it “continues to express the social meaning of a community through 
the manner of its enforcement.”69 Just as importantly, the State expresses 
itself through the decision to systematically not prosecute misconduct.70  
The systematic non-prosecution of a class of persons—in this case, 
corporations established to be eligible for personhood under the criminal 
law—“undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system” in several 
                                                        
67 Anderson & Pildes, supra note 23, at 1514–30; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Se-
cret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 420 (1999) (“The expressive 
theory of punishment says we can’t identify criminal wrongdoing and punishment 
independently of their social meanings. Economic competition may impoverish a 
merchant every bit as much as theft. The reason that theft but not competition is 
viewed as wrongful, on this account, is that against the background of social norms 
theft expresses disrespect for the injured party’s moral worth whereas competition 
(at least ordinarily) does not.”).   
68 David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1295, 1333, 1343 
(2013); accord Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential For 
Rehabilitation, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1417, 1427 (2009) (“As an expression of 
the community’s moral judgment, there is a significant value to applying the crimi-
nal law to organizations that act through their agents, apart from any instrumental 
benefits from having a coercive means available to deter certain conduct.”). 
69 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence 
Paradigm to Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 
Conn. L. Rev. 865, 916 (2013) [hereinafter Criminal Affirmance]; accord Avlana 
Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 858 (2014). 
70 Obviously, the decision not to prosecute any given person might not send 
one clear message to the public; there are myriad factors that go into whether to 
bring a specific prosecution. 
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respects.71 It implies that those corporate persons immune to criminal liabil-
ity are somehow favored to individual persons.72 Relatedly, it suggests that 
corporations get special treatment; they are persons when it serves their 
economic, political, and now religious interests, but they avoid personhood 
when such a classification would expose the corporation to harmful liabil-
ity.73 As Gilchrist puts the point:  
The failure to impose criminal liability on corporations—where people 
morally condemn corporations qua corporations for criminal conduct—
would expose the criminal justice system to accusations of favoritism and 
undermine its appearance of equal application of laws. It risks sending the 
signal that criminal conduct will be punished—except where it is commit-
ted by a corporation.74  
This discussion should not be read to endorse a substantive principle of 
equality, according to which corporate persons and individual persons are 
(and must be treated) equally. Corporate persons are not equal to individual 
persons for a host of reasons.75 Rather, the suggestion is that corporations 
are not differently situated with respect to individuals when it comes to 
committing criminal harm to victims; accordingly, the mere fact that the 
offender is a corporation is not sufficient to leaves victims and society un-
derserved.76 Finally, and tying into the next section, excluding corporations 
from criminal liability overlooks the State’s capacity to acknowledge, and 
warn against, the corrupting influence of corporate participation on mem-
                                                        
71 Gilchrist, supra note 53, at 48 (“[T]he failure to express condemnation 
through the imposition of criminal liability, where such condemnation is wide-
spread, undermines the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.”) 
72 Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance, supra note 69, at 917 (“Discretionary en-
forcement of law that conveys a negative message of inequality that some law-
abiding citizens are less valued concurrently conveys the message that some citi-
zens are more valued.”) 
73 See Sherman & Percy, supra note 30, at 169 (worrying about reciprocity). 
74 Gilchrist, supra note 53, at 51.  
75 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
76 My thanks to Scott Hershovitz for pressing me to develop this point. 
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bers themselves, which needs to be countered by sound corporate govern-
ance.77 
3.3! Corporate-Criminal Liability Protects Individuals within the Cor-
poration 
Thus far, I have focused largely on why a society that recognizes corpo-
rate-criminal liability is preferable to a society without it. Disregarding crim-
inal misconduct merely because it is attributable to a corporation is a non-
starter; such an approach does a disservice to both victims and other indi-
viduals outside the corporation. Nor is tort law an adequate substitute for 
criminal liability. 
However, there is an obvious third option not yet discussed: holding in-
dividuals inside the corporation, rather than the corporation itself, criminal-
ly responsible. To be clear, I do not believe these options are mutually ex-
clusive; the State should pursue both avenues.78 Nevertheless, exclusive re-
liance on individual prosecutions is an insufficient response to the fact of 
corporate misconduct. 
3.4! Corporate Misconduct Should Not Be Reduced to Individual Mis-
conduct 
Limiting criminal liability to individuals is insufficient because collec-
tive responsibility is not reducible to individual responsibility. The claim 
here is not that it is merely conceivable to attribute criminal liability to a 
                                                        
77 Buell, supra note 50, at 522 (arguing that an expressive defense of corporate-
criminal liability must connect the “social practice of blaming institutions for indi-
viduals’ wrongdoing and the reality of institutional influence on individuals”). 
78 Although the Justice Department agrees, United States Attorneys’ Manual 
§ 9-28.100 cmt. b (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia 
_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm  (“Prosecution of a corporation is not a 
substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without 
the corporation.”), it privileges individual prosecutions over corporate ones. 
  75 
corporation, but that further in some cases it is preferable to do so. Consider 
the following examples.  
3.4.1! Further Examples of Corporate Criminality 
We have already seen the example of Google. Initially, Google blamed 
the collection of payload data on a software tweak included by a “rouge en-
gineer.”79 That story quickly proved false. An FCC investigation found, 
among other things, that the idea to capture payload data was actively dis-
cussed and promoted as a benefit to improve the Street View project, that 
multiple engineers reviewed and modified the software code in question, 
and that managers overseeing the Street View project approved the idea.80 
Moreover, the project fits into the core ethos of Google’s larger commercial 
aims—namely, to gather detailed information about consumers in order to 
prove them with tailored services.  
Or consider the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill, for which British 
Petroleum (“BP”) was largely responsible. BP has predominantly blamed a 
small cadre of middle managers for causing the error that released 5 million 
barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico and onto the shores of the southeastern 
United States. But as Garrett has catalogued at length, BP before the spill 
had a well-earned reputation for sacrificing safety in favor of expediency. In 
the five years before the spill, BP received from the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”) 760 “egregious, willful” violations—the 
worst violation issued by the regulator.81 Nor do these numbers reflect an 
                                                        
79 Chris Davies, Google’s “Rouge Engineer” Street View Explanation Blown 
Apart, Slashgear, April 20, 2012, http://www.slashgear.com/googles-rogue-
engineer-street-view-excuse-blown-apart-30225200/. 
80 Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Apparent Liability for For-
feiture, April 13, 2012, at 10–18, available at https://epic.org/privacy/google/FCC 
%20Google%20SV%20Enforcement%20UNREDACTED.pdf [hereinafter Notice of 
Apparent Liability]. 
81 Pierre Thomas et al., BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABC News, May 27, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safetyrecord/story?id=10763042. 
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industry epidemic. BP received 97% of all violations; Exon-Mobil, for com-
parison, received only one such violation. In 2005, a separate refinery explo-
sion cost the lives of fifteen BP employees and caused hundreds of injuries; 
years later, BP received the largest OSHA fine in history for failing entirely 
to put into place safety measures that would prevent a similar accident—
safety measures BP had acknowledged knowing before 2005 were lacking.82 
Thus, with respect to the Deepwater Horizon spill, even if the specific error 
were traceable to a handful of employees, the case is an apt candidate for 
corporate-criminal liability. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that 
a culture of negligence, reckless risk-taking, and disregard for safety regula-
tions would inevitably produce harm in the way it tragically did. 
Finally, consider the mortgage-lending crisis. Linda Green committed 
fraud on a massive scale, signing affidavits attesting to her personal 
knowledge of the soundness of various mortgage documents, all while pos-
ing as a high-ranking executive at a coterie of prestigious financial institu-
tions.83 Linda Green is not a proper target for criminal responsibility—she 
doesn’t exist. Rather, her persona was created by DocX, which executed 
more than one million mortgage documents across the country.84 To keep 
pace with demand, DocX employees routinely forged or created out of 
whole cloth documents used in foreclosure proceedings; employees signed 
thousands of documents per day.85 An uncovered “Document Recovery So-
lution” list provides prices for which DocX would “recreate” missing 
                                                        
82 Id. 
83 Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Under Piles Of Paperwork, A Foreclosure 
System in Chaos, Wash. Post, Sep. 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/wp-dyn/content/story/2010/09/23/ST2010092300076.html. 
84 Andrew M. Harris, Ex-DocX President Pleads Guilty in Florida in Robo-Sign 
Case, Bloomberg Bus., Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2012-11-20/ex-docx-president-pleads-guilty-in-florida-in-robo-sign-case. 
85 Drew Harwell, Former Florida Mortgage Executive Pleads Guilty To Widespread 
Robo-Signing, Tampa Bay Times, Nov. 20, 2012, http://www.tampabay.com/ 
news/business/realestate/former-florida-mortgage-executive-pleads-guilty-to-
widespread-robo-signing/1262550.  
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mortgages, securitization agreements—even a complete “collateral file” 
providing everything necessary for foreclosure.86 Often DocX’s papers 
served as the primary, or even exclusive, documentation entitling the holder 
to foreclose. Beyond the irreparable harm done to individual homeowners, 
the resultant, massive influx of litigation in state and federal courts have 
prompted several states to respond in the worst possible way—by repealing 
statutory remedies designed to ensure homeowners fair process during fore-
closure proceedings.87 
Holding DocX employees criminally responsible seems unsuitable; 
most were temporary, sometimes unauthorized, employees who were fre-
quently fired if they did not meet onerous quotas.88 The same cannot be said 
for Lorraine Brown, DocX’s president, who among other things taped to 
employees’ desks forged signatures for them to copy. Indeed, Lorraine 
Brown was convicted—first fraud by Missouri, then mail fraud by the feder-
al government, then racketeering by Michigan (curiously, Michigan convict-
ed only Brown of racketeering).89  
Yet convicting Brown seems insufficient to capture the criminal mis-
conduct at issue. DocX was valuable because it produced foreclosure-related 
documents at a (literally) incredible pace. Here we have a criminal enter-
prise—one whose facially benign business model can be maintained only 
                                                        
86 Ryan Chittum, Criminal Charges in the Foreclosure Scandal, Colum. J. 
Rev., Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/nyt_criminal_charges 
_in_the_fo.php (citing DocX’s “‘Document Recovery Solution’ pricing list”). 
87 See, e.g., Pub. Act 2014, No. 124, § 1 (repealing sections of M.C.L. 
§ 600.2167 (governing foreclosure proceedings in Michigan)). 
88 Harwell, supra note 85, at 2. 
89 Dep’t of Justice, Former Executive at Florida-Based Lender Processing Ser-
vices Inc. Admits Role in Mortgage-Related Document Fraud Scheme, Nov. 12, 
2012, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-executive-florida-based-
lender-processing-services-inc-admits-role-mortgage-related; State of Mich. Atty. 
Gen., Schuette Announces Former Mortgage Processor President to Serve 40 
Months to Twenty Years in Prison for Role in Robo-Signing Fraud, May 3, 2013, 
available at http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849-301868--,00.html.  
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through rampant law breaking. Yet DocX as a corporation was not prosecut-
ed. Moreover, DocX was a wholly owned subsidiary of its largest client, 
Lending Processing Services (“LPS”), whose primary business depended 
on DocX’s document services; LPS purchased DocX precisely to meet the 
massive demand LPS faced for foreclosure services. Although Missouri also 
indicted LPS, these were dropped in exchange for assisting in the Brown’s 
prosecution.90 Later, LPS received a non-prosecution agreement from the 
federal government.91  
3.4.2! Causal Reducibility is Distinct from Criminal Responsibility 
To be clear, in arguing that corporate responsibility should not be re-
duced to individual responsibility, I am not making an ontological or meta-
physical claim about corporations existing separately as irreducibly collec-
tive agents. Corporate personhood does not require any “ontologically sus-
pect kind of ‘social spirit’ or ‘group mind”92; on my view a collective agent 
consists all and only of its constitutive members and the structure through 
                                                        
90 LPS claimed ignorance of the rampant fraud at its subsidiary, pointing to 
Brown’s statement that DocX had “robust quality control” measures in place. 
Harwell, supra note 85, at 2. LPS found nothing suspicious about DocX producing 
daily thousands of documents that previously had been missing, spread across the 
country, and thought lost or in the hands of homeowners. Why would they? After 
all, in 2006 LPS touted that its tiny internal document execution team (one sepa-
rate from DocX) could routinely process over one thousand documents daily. Da-
vidy Dayen, The Recession was Her Fault, Salon, Feb. 24, 2013, 
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/24/shes_paying_for_wall_streets_sins/. 
91 LPS Reaches Non-Prosecution Agreement with Justice Department on Robo-
Signing Charges, Nat’l Mortg. Prof., Feb. 18, 2013, http://nationalmortgage 
professional.com/news/24844/lps-reaches-non-prosecution-agreement-justice-
department-robo-signing-charges. 
92 Gilbert, supra note 14, at 3. 
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which they interact.93 In theory, all of this could be spelled out in terms of 
the contributions by individuals.94 
Nevertheless, the fact that corporate attitudes and actions might be re-
ducible to contributions from individuals says nothing about whether it is 
appropriate for the State to hold these individuals responsible.95 That is, the 
fact of causal reducibility does not negate the possibility of irreducibly col-
lective responsibility.96 This distinction should not be surprising when con-
sidered from the individual context. For example, some event—say, my 
shooting another in cold blood—is reducible in principle to a set to a basic 
set of physical descriptions (e.g. electrical currents, positional shifts by vari-
ous atomic elements, etc.) for which there is no need to appeal to my agency 
in the situation. Yet even if we could provide a brute physical description 
from which any notion of my agency is entirely absent, the fact of this de-
scription should not undermine a judgment that I be held responsible for 
murder.97 Put starkly, if the mere fact of causal reducibility were sufficient to 
obviate the appropriateness of moral and legal judgments, criminal law (for 
starters) would cease to function.98 
                                                        
93 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 4 (“[T]he agency of group agents depends 
wholly on the organization and behavior of individual members.”); Larry May, 
The Morality of Groups 14 (1987) (stating that a collective is “not merely 
people but the structures and relationships among those people as well”). 
94 But see List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 76–78 (identifying challenges with 
reducing collective activity to individuals’ contributions). 
95 I am not denying that individuals could bear personal responsibility for the 
actions or attitudes of a corporation, or that an individual’s responsibility could not 
rise to the level of criminal liability. Rather, I am observing that an individual’s re-
sponsibility is logically independent from a corporation’s responsibility. 
96 Gilbert, supra note 14, at 3(“[J]oint commitment . . . cannot be analyzed 
in terms of a sum or aggregate of personal commitments.”). 
97 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 76–78; accord Christopher Kutz, 
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age 71 (2000). 
98 Cf. Peter Frederick Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 Proc. Brit. 
Acad. 1, 9 (1962) (“A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the 
human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which 
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Thus, it is not a response to point out that instances of corporate mis-
conduct can be reduced down to a complicated set of interactions amongst 
individuals. There mere fact of causal reducibility does not render infelici-
tous our responsibility judgments. This is clear in the individual context: We 
do not take causal reductions that explain events without appeal to agency to 
obviate individual judgments. There is no reason to privilege judgments at 
the individual level. For one, doing so sacrifices information about the social 
world.99 For another, it is perfectly coherent to attribute to a corporation or 
collective an attitude not held by any member.100 Accordingly, causal reduc-
ibility proves too much. 
3.4.3! Corporate Crime Does is Not about Deficits or Surpluses 
My defense of corporate responsibility differs slightly from common 
descriptions of the role served by corporate liability. Pettit has claimed that 
holding only individuals responsible produces a “deficit of responsibility,” 
and that the corporation is an apt target to bear the weight of that residual 
responsibility.101 Sepinwall has described the same situation as leaving a 
“surplus [of] blame” for which the corporation is a potential target.102 
I think using accounting as a metaphor for corporate responsibility con-
fuses more than it elucidate. First, it asserts without justification an additive 
quality to responsibility judgments.103 Second, this would have the effect of 
making collective responsibility judgments vary in response to individual 
responsibility. This seems wrong. As Gilbert summarizes the point general-
                                                                                                                                            
human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical 
ground for it.”). 
99 Kutz, supra note 97, at 70–71; List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 76–78. 
100 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 64–72; Gilbert, Corporate Misbehavior, su-
pra note 17, at 1376. 
101 Pettit, supra note 19, at 194. 
102 Sepinwall, supra note 33, at 433. 
103 Cf. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 7, at 146 (noting that 
moral responsibility judgments are not about assigning “pointless grad[es]”). 
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ly: “What does the blameworthiness of the collective’s act imply about the 
personal blameworthiness of any one member of that collective? From a log-
ical point of view, the short answer is: nothing.”104 
In particular, there is no reason to expect that a collective agent’s de-
gree of responsibility will exactly match, or even track, the concatenation of 
members’ individual responsibilities. Consider the following experiment:  
Corner-Cutting Corporations: Several corporations face the 
opportunity to build a factory, which would provide a lucrative opportunity 
if completed by a certain date. The project can be completed on time only 
by disregarding safety and environmental regulations, risking severe dam-
age to employees, community members, and the environment. Approval of 
the project requires the majority support of the board of directors. 
In each of the following cases, the board of directors approves the project, 
and serious physical and environmental injuries occur: 
Corporation A. The directors all know the risks attendant to the 
building schedule, and vote unanimously to begin construction.  
Corporation B. None of the directors know the attendant risks 
because none reviewed the project details available to them; not want-
ing to looking foolish in front of their peers for rejecting a profitable in-
vestment, each member votes in favor of construction.  
Corporation C: While all board members knew of the risk, only a 
majority voted in favor of construction; the remaining board members 
voted against the project. 
To my mind, the corporation’s responsibility for ensuing injury remains 
constant across all three cases. Each board of directors approved the project, 
which the corporation thereby undertook. It does not matter, for the pur-
poses of ascertaining the corporation’s responsibility, the private beliefs of 
any given directors; what matters is that, at the time a vote was called, a ma-
jority of directors voted in favor of the project.105 Indeed, the fact that cor-
                                                        
104 Gilbert, Who’s to Blame, supra note 15, at 109. 
105 See Gilbert, Corporate Misbehavior, supra note 17, at 1376 (explaining that a 
group agent’s belief that p does not require that group members privately believe p, 
provided that “[t]heir behavior generally should be expressive of the belief that p, in 
the appropriate contexts”).  
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porate attitudes, although derived from individual contributions, are not co-
extensive with those individuals’ personal attitudes is essential for creating 
the sort of sophisticated collective agency that is a prerequisite for eligibility 
for criminal liability. 
Yet clearly the personal responsibility of any given director varies with 
the actions she took and the reasons she for which she took those actions. 
Intuitively, a director at Corporation A is more to blame than is a director at 
Corporation B than is a dissenter at Corporation C. Thinking of corporate 
responsibility as the leftover of individual responsibility leads to a mistaken 
understanding of the nature of corporate responsibility. 
3.5! The State’s Complicity for Irreducible Corporate Misconduct 
Suppose I am wrong that collective responsibility is irreducible. Imagine 
that, in principle, an act of collective misconduct could be traced to the con-
tributions of every involved individual. Moreover, suppose we could identify 
the degree to which each individual should be held responsible, hold him or 
her responsible, and guarantee ourselves that no residual or deficit of re-
sponsible remained. Even still, I submit, the State has an obligation to hold 
corporations responsible. This is because our world does not look like the 
world described above, even allowing for the contestable metaphysics of re-
sponsibility the idealized account above assumes.  
To start, society is plagued by epistemic obstacles that make “an easy 
reduction” from collective activity to individual contributions effectively 
impossible.106 Moreover, epistemic difficulties in the corporate context are 
not run-of-the-mill challenges present for ordinary responsibility ascrip-
tions. Rather, an easy reduction is made practically impossible precisely be-
cause the internal structure necessary for sophisticated collective agency 
obscures the contributions of individual members. In other words, the same 
structure that helps to make corporations the kind of agents eligible for 
                                                        
106 List & Pettit, supra note 4, at 76–78. 
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criminal liability simultaneously prevents the State from reducing corporate 
misconduct back down to the level of individuals.107 Worse, it is especially 
difficult to isolate the individual contribution of those high up in a hierar-
chical corporate structure—a phenomenon invoked to explain the lack of 
senior officials prosecuted in prominent cases of corporate misconduct.108  
Were we to depend exclusively on a practice of individual criminal re-
sponsible, many culpable individuals would go unpunished. Individuals 
avoiding punishment would do so precisely because of the collective struc-
ture, and the collection of individuals avoiding punishment would skew to-
wards those who already exercise the most control and who most benefit 
from participation in collective activity.109 The set of culpable individuals 
most likely to avoid being held responsible would also be the set of individu-
als most likely to benefit from the permission of sophisticated collective ac-
tivity in the first place. 
To recall, the structure of the modern commercial corporation is built 
upon a foundation provided by corporate law. Given the State’s role in facil-
itating through corporate law institutions that obscure our ability to reduce 
collective responsibility to individual responsibility, the State has a duty to 
counteract this problem. Of course, one solution would be to prohibit the 
creation of such corporate structures altogether. This solution throws the 
baby, and the rest of the family, out with the bathwater. A better approach 
for satisfying the State’s obligation is to hold the corporation responsible. A 
                                                        
107 Kutz, supra note 97, at 200 (“The judgment of [corporate] fault does en-
tail a claim about individuals, namely that some individuals should have made sure 
the plant’s procedures were up to snuff. But this claim about individuals cannot be 
further localized—the culpable ‘individuals’ are simply placeholders for whoever 
would have, counterfactually, operated the plant safely.”). 
108 E.g., David M. Uhlmann, Crimes on the Gulf, 53 Law Quad. Notes 31, 
32 (2010) (discussing the difficulty of finding “individuals with enough supervisory 
responsibility and personal involvement” in cases of corporate misconduct). 
109 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 349 
(2003) (considering whether collective sanctions delegate deterrence decisions to 
better-situated group members). 
  84 
practice of collective punishment would be a valuable corrective to the pecu-
liar epistemic obstacle attendant to sophisticated collective activity.  
4! The State Does Not Hold Corporations Crimi-
nally Responsible  
For all intents and purpose, and notwithstanding all the reasons provid-
ed for why it should, the federal government does not hold corporations 
criminally responsible. I mean this claim in two distinct senses. First, corpo-
rations are rarely prosecuted; corporate crime represents a vanishingly small 
portion of the federal government’s docket. Second, in the rare case where 
corporations are subjected to criminal liability, it occurs under a doctrine 
that is sharply at odds with the normative and conceptual justifications for 
corporate-criminal liability sketched in the previous two sections. 
4.1! The Rarity of Corporate-Criminal Convictions 
Corporate crime is infrequently prosecuted both in absolute terms and 
when compared to individual convictions. Since 1999, on average 200 organ-
izations are convicted annually of a federal crime; the number of organiza-
tional convictions has actually decreased by approximately 25% since the late 
nineties—this amidst a decade racked by corporate scandals from Enron and 
WorldCom to BP to the financial and mortgage-lending crises.110 Worse, 
during the same period the overall number of federal convictions increased 
by over 50% to more than 70,000 annual convictions.111 Moreover, these fig-
ures overestimate the number of paradigmatic corporate convictions. Data 
from the Sentencing Commission includes all organizations, not just corpo-
rations. Additionally, “the overwhelming majority of corporations prose-
                                                        
110 Data compiled by author using information provided by the United States 
Sentencing Commission, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and 
_Statistics/index.cfm [hereinafter Sentencing Data]. 
111 Id. 
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cuted are small firms that may be alter egos of individuals participating in a 
criminal enterprise.”112 
While I cannot speak to the natural rate of corporate crime, these data 
strongly suggest that the federal government does not prosecute corpora-
tions as vigorously as it prosecutes individuals.113 The scarcity of corporate 
convictions reflects in part the fact that corporate crime remains difficult to 
prosecute. Corporate crime can be hard to detect; often, victims of crimes 
committed by corporations do not realize that they have been victimized.114 
Meanwhile, corporate prosecutions require “a substantial investment due to 
their complexity, the organizations’ greater ability to conceal information, 
attorney-client privilege issues, access to very highly paid defense counsel, 
and the factual complexity of such cases.”115 Likely only a handful of U.S. 
Attorney’s offices—the Southern District of New York most prominent 
among them—have the resources necessary to prosecute complicated cases 
of corporate criminality.116 Accordingly, prosecutors may opt to focus their 
efforts on convicting individuals involved in corporate misconduct.117 Relat-
edly, prosecutors increasingly rely on corporate assistance in identifying and 
prosecuting corporate employees, which discourages prosecutors from sim-
ultaneously prosecuting the corporation.118 
                                                        
112 Brandon Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in Prosecu-
tors in the Boardroom 156 (2011). 
113 Garrett, supra note 44, at 14. 
114 Id. at 20; see also John. C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: 
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 386, 390–91 (1981). 
115 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853, 
880–81 (2007); accord  Ramirez, Criminal Affirmance, supra note 69, at 888. 
116 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in Prosecu-
tors in the Boardroom 192 (2011). 
117 USAM § 9-28.100 cmt. b.  
118 Cf. Lisa Kearn Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in Prosecutors in the 
Boardroom 113 (2011). 
  86 
Regardless of the explanation, it seems overwhelmingly plausible that 
corporations are not being prosecuted with anything like the regularity of 
individuals. This constitutes prima facie evidence that the State is failing to 
meet its obligation to hold corporations criminally responsible. 
4.2! The Disconcerting Rise of the Corporate Prosecution Agreement 
The past ten years have seen the rise of prosecution agreements as an 
alternative to corporate-criminal liability.119 A prosecution agreement 
is a civil agreement between a prosecutor and would-be defendant, accord-
ing to which the prosecutor agrees to delay indefinitely filing an indictment 
against a defendant (in the case of a deferred prosecution agreement) or to 
not file an indictment at all (in the case of a non-prosecution agreement). 
The same prosecution agreement also often resolves the government’s 
pending and prospective civil suits brought for the same misconduct.120 In 
exchange, the corporation accepts a host of sanctions; prosecutors frequent-
ly obtain through a prosecution agreement most everything they would ob-
tain through a conviction. As Ramirez puts the point, a “prosecution 
agreement permits a corporation to civilly resolve a criminal investigation by 
agreeing to similar terms that might be included in a corporate criminal sen-
tence.”121 Meanwhile, corporations avoid indictment, conviction, and any 
consequences that follow. 
I believe that prosecution agreements are an unwelcome innovation for 
a host of reasons that go beyond the scope of this project. For these purpos-
                                                        
119 Uhlmann, supra note 68, at 1307–08 (noting the virtual non-existence of 
prosecution agreements prior to 2001). 
120 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–97 (1997) (holding that the impo-
sition of administrative and criminal penalties against the same firm do not impli-
cate the Double Jeopardy Clause). 
121 Mary Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing 
the Machine through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 952 
(2005). 
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es, note simply that prosecution agreements allow corporations to avoid the 
criminal-justice system in its entirety. This is because, with a single excep-
tion,122 prosecution agreements have been offered only to corporations. This 
has the effect of feeding the expressive worry detailed above regarding dis-
crimination in favor of corporate persons against individual persons. If the 
harm from discriminating among individual and corporate persons with re-
spect to frequency of prosecution is great, then surely the expressive harm 
from exempting corporations from prosecution altogether is greater still.123  
4.3! The Federal Doctrine of Corporate-Criminal Liability 
I mentioned a second sense in which the federal government does not 
hold corporations criminally responsible. In the unlikely case of a corporate-
criminal prosecution, federal doctrine fails to take seriously the corporation 
as a single person separate from its membership. As such, federal doctrine 
disregards the eligibility conditions that make corporations apt targets for 
criminal liability. 
Consider the doctrine for attributing criminal attitudes to a corporation, 
which remains effectively unchanged since first introduced in 1909. In New 
York Central & Hudson River Railway v. United States, the Supreme Court 
affirmed Congress’s power to create a general-intent criminal statute that 
applies to corporations.124 In doing so, the Supreme Court expressly extend-
ed the tort doctrine of respondeat superior to the criminal context; this meant 
                                                        
122 SEC prosecutors recently accepted its first deferred prosecution agreement 
with an individual. SEC Negotiates First Individual Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
Corporate Crime Reporter (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.corporatecrime 
reporter.com/news/200/sec-negotiates-first-individual-deferred-prosecution/. 
123 Uhlmann, supra note 68, at 1335–36; see also Gilchrist, supra note 53, at 56 ( 
“[Civil agreements] carry the expressive downsides of criminal immunity (corpo-
rate crime is priced; corporations are treated differently than persons in a way not 
clearly justified) and the additional expressive cost of appearing unprincipled (cor-
porations are compelled to pay fines under threat of indictment).”). 
124 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
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that a corporation would be “charged with the knowledge and purpose of 
their agents.”125 Following Hudson River, it became standard practice for 
federal courts to hold corporations “guilty of ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ viola-
tions of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondent superior.”126 
Today, a court applying the criminalized version of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior may impute to a corporation the attitudes of any employee, 
provided only that the employee was acting on behalf of the corporation. 
Worse, courts in fact pay little attention to whether the “on behalf of” re-
quirement is satisfied.127 
Using respondeat superior to attribute attitudes to a corporation disre-
gards the corporation’s ability to act and hold attitudes as a legal person. As 
has already been explained, it is possible—and in fact perfectly ordinary—to 
ascribe intentional attitudes to a group agent, although doing so correctly 
requires some appreciation of how the group agent is structured. However, 
the federal doctrine makes no effort to employ a conceptually well-founded 
method of attribution. Instead, the federal doctrine attributes to a corpora-
tion the criminality of any single member.128 This doctrine is over-inclusive 
because it implies that any member’s personal attitudes can be attributed to 
the corporation.129 To return to a previous example, this would be like say-
ing that any single Senator’s comments are always attributable to the Senate 
itself. Yet relying on respondeat superior is also under-inclusive. For one, it 
requires that at least one employee have the relevant attitude in order for 
                                                        
125 Id. at 495. 
126 United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958). 
127 Buell, supra note 53, at 531. 
128 The Model Penal Code fares little better as a conceptual matter; it limits the 
imputation of mens rea to attitudes held by “high managerial agents.” Model 
Penal Code § 2.07(4)(c) (1962). 
129 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom, in Prosecutors 
in the Boardroom 62, 65 (2011). 
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corporate attitudinal attribution to occur.130 However, as has been demon-
strated, a corporation can hold an attitude not held by any member. More 
likely, there is no reason to expect that the corporation’s attitudes be instan-
tiated by the same member carrying out the corporate act.131 
In short, the federal doctrine of corporate-criminal liability effectively 
displaces the eligibility conditions for exposure to criminal liability. In doing 
so, the federal doctrine disregards the corporation as a single agent that 
should be held responsible separate from its members. 
5! The State Could (and Sometimes, Sort of Does) 
Hold Corporations Criminally Responsible  
How do we improve the practice of corporate-criminal liability so that it 
aligns with the sort of institution that I have argued the State has an obliga-
tion to maintain? As a starting point, federal courts should reform the doc-
trine of corporate-criminal responsibility. This is because the point of crimi-
nal judgments is not “pointless grading.”132 A criminal judgment alone 
damages a person’s reputation—be they an individual or corporation. More 
importantly, criminal responsibility licenses and begets punishment. 
The case for punishing a corporation stands on its best footing when the 
eligibility conditions are satisfied—that is, when the court can meaningfully 
attribute to the corporation the actions and attitudes necessary to satisfy a 
criminal statute’s actus reus and mens rea requirements. Particularly be-
                                                        
130 Scholars have suggested that United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 
844 (1st Cir. 1987), establishes a court’s ability to let juries stitch together the par-
tial knowledge of individual employees to satisfy statutory requirements. However, 
this interpretation is inconsistent with the opinion itself, as well as with subsequent 
case law interpreting it. Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology 
of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. W. L. REV. 210, 227 
(1997). Perhaps for this reason, mention of the so-called Collective Knowledge 
Doctrine by courts is exceedingly rare. 
131 See Uhlmann, supra note 108, at 32. 
132 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions, supra note 7, at 146. 
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cause a corporate-criminal punishment will result in harm not just to the 
corporation but also to innocent parties, we should want the argument for 
holding a corporation responsible in any given instance to stand on the best 
foundation possible. Accordingly, federal courts should replace the current 
respondeat-superior approach to corporate-criminal liability with liability con-
ditions that capture genuine corporate attitudes. As it turns out, this is easi-
er than it sounds. 
5.1! The Shadow Practice of Corporate-Criminal Liability 
I have complained that prosecutors do not prosecute corporations fre-
quently enough. That said, in one respect prosecutorial practice represents a 
bright spot in our current federal practice, which may provide a template for 
improving the status quo’s liability conditions consistent with our pragmatic 
account of genuine corporate attitudes. This is because, although the federal 
doctrine of corporate criminal liability remains unchanged since New York 
Central, two modern revisions to the criminal-justice system have drastically 
altered federal practice—to the point that, arguably, “the administration of 
justice is no longer ruled by existing principles of vicarious liability” when it 
comes to corporate-criminal responsibility.133  
First, although federal prosecutors exercise broad discretion in deciding 
which cases to charge, in 1999 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) adopted 
formal policies regarding when to prosecute a corporation. Then-Deputy 
Attorney General Holder first articulated principles for corporate prosecu-
tions; in doing so, the DOJ unilaterally disclaimed much of its authority to 
prosecute corporations based on respondeat superior theories of liability.134 
                                                        
133 William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Crime and Making Amends, 44 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1307, 1311 (2007). 
134 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder on Bring-
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William Laufer describes the Holder Memo as “an explicit renunciation of 
vicarious liability by the U.S. Department of Justice.”135  
The Justice Department continues to refine its position towards corpo-
rate prosecutions through a series of memos and through revisions to the 
United States Attorneys’ Manual.136 That said, the general tenor of DOJ’s 
approach to corporate crime is to prosecute cases that reflect a sense of “in-
stitutional responsibility.”137 For example, prosecutors are instructed to 
consider whether the corporation had embedded in its structure an effective 
compliance program that could have prevented the alleged misconduct, or 
whether instead corporate compliance was ineffective or non-existent.138 
Prosecutors weigh the corporation’s prior offenses as evidence of institu-
tional responsibility.139 They assess the “pervasiveness of wrongdoing with-
in the corporation.”140 And they evaluate whether the prosecution of indi-
viduals would be adequate to address the misconduct.141 
Even when DOJ decides to prosecute a corporation, the manner in 
which it does so can evince an effort to establish robust institutional fault 
not captured by vicarious liability. For example, the federal government’s 
prosecution of Arthur Andersen should have proved a relatively simple one 
given the facts of the case and the flexibility afforded by the doctrine of cor-
porate crime to impute most acts and intentions of any employee to the cor-
poration.142 Nevertheless, both sides spent considerable efforts prosecuting 
and defending the notion that Andersen’s misconduct actually reflected in-
                                                        
135 Laufer, supra note 28, at 37. 
136 Following the Holder Memo, three additional memos have modified the 
treatment of the prosecution of corporations: the McNulty Memo, the Thompson 
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137 Buell, supra note 53, at 485. 
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stitutional fault, as opposed to misconduct by a few individual bad apples 
working at the firm.143 
Second, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission, 
which then provided federal courts with a framework for considering how to 
sentence a convicted corporation.144 The sentencing considerations for or-
ganizations are contained in Chapter Eight of the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines. Many considerations listed in Chapter Eight—especially those con-
cerning the magnitude of the corporate fine to impose—mirror prosecutori-
al considerations about whether to indict a corporation. For example, both 
investigate whether criminal misconduct occurred in spite of, or in the ab-
sence of, a compliance program designed to detect individual misconduct.145 
Both consider the corporation’s prior offenses as circumstantial evidence of 
institutional fault.146 And both consider the “pervasiveness” of criminal ac-
tivity within the corporation.147 In the sentencing context, these considera-
tions provide grounds for increasing the sentence that would otherwise be 
imposed against a corporation.  
These two innovations—factors to prosecute, and sentencing consider-
ations—have created “[a] richer version of entity liability . . . in the shadow 
of respondeat superior.”148 Through such an approach, the criminal-justice 
system recognizes that an institution’s structure produces collective inten-
tional attitudes autonomous from its members. Both prosecutorial and sen-
tencing guidelines seek to isolate corporate intentions by looking to the cor-
porate structure to rule out interpretations of corporate illegality that would 
be more aptly attributed only to individuals. In doing so, the modern prac-
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tice of corporate criminal-liability embraces a meaningful sense of collective 
attitudes like intention while recognizing that collective intentions can 
sometimes be difficult to identify insofar as they overlap with the attitudes 
of individual members. 
5.2! Federal Practice as a Template for Improving Federal Doctrine 
The same considerations developed by courts and prosecutors can and 
should be put before a jury. In short, the jury should be presented with the 
same sorts of considerations to inform whether to attribute the requisite 
mens rea to a corporation. The idea of attributing attitudes to an organiza-
tion would not place an unreasonable demand on jurors. Sherman and Percy 
conclude that, with respect to high-entitative groups like corporations, “the 
inference of group-level intentionality, and thus causality, ought to be simi-
lar to such inferences for an individual actor.”149 There is no reason to sus-
pect that this activity is beyond a jury’s capacity. Indeed, the Andersen trial 
suggests that juries may be surreptitiously considering the factors of their 
own accord.150 The sorts of considerations currently considered by sentenc-
ing courts and prosecutors—whether the misconduct is better attributed to 
identifiable individuals, the corporation’s past misconduct, and the corpora-
tion’s efforts to prevent misconduct—should guide a jury’s deliberations. 
To be clear, the current shadow approach to corporate-criminal liability 
by itself does not redeem the federal doctrine. With respect to sentencing, 
courts are dealing with corporations that have already been sentenced; at 
best judicial consideration ameliorates the excesses of an already unsound 
approach to liability. With respect to prosecutorial discretion, voluntary re-
nunciation is no substitute for genuine corporate attitudes. For one thing, a 
                                                        
149 Sherman & Perry, supra note 30, at 156; accord Thomas F. Denson et al., The 
Roles of Entitativity and Essentiality in Judgments of Collective Responsibility, 9 GRP. 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 43 (2006). 
150 See Buell, supra note 50, at 488. 
  94 
prosecutor’s discretion does not alter the burden of proof. For another 
thing, a prudent corporation must take into account that a prosecutor may 
push his or her doctrinal advantage in any particular case. Finally, recall that 
a respondeat-superior approach to corporate-criminal liability is under-
inclusive as well as over-inclusive. Modern innovations cannot expand the 
scope of liability to account for these missed cases of genuine corporate atti-
tudes; prosecutors have discretion to shrink, but not expand, the space of 
eligible cases beyond that allowed by the doctrine. Accordingly, complete 
reform would require not just giving juries the power to determine corporate 
mens rea, but further replacing the current respondeat-superior doctrine with 
those considerations. 
In short, reforming the current doctrine of corporate-criminal liability 
would place the practice on solid footing. Put another way, it would focus 
corporate-criminal liability on cases where genuine corporate attitudes ex-
isted to satisfy the applicable eligibility requirements. A template for this 
reform exists in current practice. The considerations already being consid-
ered by prosecutors and sentencing courts operating in the shadows of an 
indefensible respondeat-superior doctrine should be passed to juries. Doing so 
would support a practice of holding corporations criminally responsible that 
is required by our existing corporate- and criminal-law practices. 
6! Conclusion 
The State can and should hold corporations criminally responsible for 
their misconduct, even though it rarely does. More specifically, the federal 
government should hold corporations criminally responsible only in cases of 
genuine corporate misconduct—that is, when criminal prosecution and 
conviction would be consistent with the normative and conceptual founda-
tions that undergird the practice. Nevertheless, these reforms serve merely 
to put current federal practice on better footing. The larger takeaway of this 
Essay is that the practice has footing upon which to stand. 
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INTERLUDE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPETING VIEWS OF THE  
CORPORATION AND A TRANSITION TO PUNISHMENT 
 
1! Two Views of the Corporation 
Corporate law and criminal law see the corporation in very different 
ways. Corporate law treats the corporation as a system to be designed, re-
worked, and tinkered with in service of some further end—say, creating the 
most efficient vehicle for economic growth. Call this view the Systems 
View of Corporations. Chapter I illustrated that states took an active 
approach to systems design during the nineteenth century; courts and legis-
latures used corporate design to regulate and second-guess all sorts of cor-
porate decisions. The State controlled the structural makeup of the corpora-
tion, limited what specific corporations could and couldn’t do, arbitrarily 
denied them access to markets, and second-guessed the corporation’s day-
to-day managerial decisions and internal organization. Put another way, the 
State looked past the corporate person and tinkered with the corporation’s 
internal workings.  
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Criminal law, by contrast, is committed to seeing corporations as per-
sons. Call this the Persons View of Corporations. By this I mean 
that the criminal law, in bringing a corporation into the criminal process, 
takes the corporation as a single object of concern distinct or autonomous 
from its constituent members. Criminal law might look into the corpora-
tion—to inform its determination of whether an action or attitude is appro-
priately attributed to the corporation, as opposed to an individual within the 
corporation—but it does not look past the corporation.  
To this point in the dissertation, I have tried to establish several claims. 
First, the Persons View of Corporations implicit to corporate-criminal liabil-
ity is not wrong. Second, regulating corporations as persons, rather than as 
systems, has enabled a more successful society. This is because the treat-
ment of corporations as persons, rather than as systems that the State can 
freely poke around in, was integral in creating the modern corporation. And 
for all the criticism of corporations, I am ultimately a huge fan of them. 
Nicholas Murray remarked in 1912 that “[t]he limited liability corporation is 
the greatest single discovery of modern times.”1 A century later, I believe 
that claim has been largely vindicated. Put another way, the development of 
corporate-criminal liability has enabled a more successful society by serving 
as a substitute for the use of corporate law as the primary means of corpo-
rate regulation. 
However, neither view of the corporation is correct in some absolute 
sense. I think that the State has independent reasons to hold corporations 
criminally responsible, which commits the State (in that setting) to conceiv-
ing of the corporation in a certain way. But the State is not required to see 
corporations this way; corporations do not have some sort of freestanding 
moral claim to be seen as single persons. If there were reason to think that 
the corporate-law regulation of old, with its clunky corporations operating 
                                                        
1 Nicholas Murray Butler, Why Should We Change Our 
Form of Government?: Studies in Practical Politics 82 (1st. ed. 
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under the uncertainty of State meddling in day-to-day affairs, was actually a 
preferably regulatory regime—that is, it benefitted society more than the 
regime that begat and rose to prominence under the modern commercial 
corporation—then I would have no problem giving up my defense of pro-
tecting a corporation’s treatment as a single agent. 
Related to this point, there is nothing obviously problematic with the 
State operating institutions that express, or are committed to different views 
of the corporation. This is Dewey’s point (and likely Dennett’s). Criminal 
law and corporate law serve different roles; there is nothing inappropriate 
with them operating according to different views of the corporation. 
2! Transitioning to Punishment 
Having spent the first part of the dissertation establishing that corpora-
tions can and should be considered legal persons for the purposes of crimi-
nal responsibility, I now pivot to consider the consequences of that deci-
sions. The reason for this interlude is to flag these distinct views of the cor-
poration as the dissertation transitions from corporate-criminal responsibil-
ity to corporate punishment. In particular, Chapter III tackles corporate 
fines—the traditional form of corporate punishment—whereas Chapter IV 
addresses alternative punishments that have arisen in the last few decades.  
More to the point, my approach to corporate punishment is largely con-
cerned with exploring the relationship between corporate law and criminal 
law. Corporate law is not a dead letter, even if it has largely abandoned its 
role as an activist regulatory model. Corporate law still profoundly influ-
ences the structure of the modern corporation. Meanwhile, corporate law 
complicates criminal law when it creates corporations that are hard to pun-
ish effectively. One way to understand the second half of this dissertation is 
an effort is to reinvigorate corporate law not as an alternative method of 
regulation, but rather as a means of improving criminal punishment. 
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This puts us in a delicate position. As I said, neither perspective on the 
corporation is correct in some absolute sense. But neither does it follow that 
the perspective is up for grabs at any time. In particular, criminal law pre-
supposes that the corporation is a person; this commitment is vital to the 
foundation of corporate-criminal liability. Yet introducing corporate law into 
the mix has the potential to upend a pivotal precondition of criminal respon-
sibility. At the extreme, corporate law could improve corporate punishment 
while simultaneously cracking the conceptual foundation upon which corpo-
rate-criminal liability stands. So we have to tread carefully. 
Chapters III and IV both use corporate law to improve criminal pun-
ishments, but they take very different tacks. Chapter III recognizes that cor-
porate law is not a dead letter. Even though corporate law is not the regula-
tory tool of its heyday, it still profoundly influences the structure of corpora-
tions. Indeed, corporate law is inescapable; it will affect corporate structure 
no matter what. The insight of Chapter III is that we can leverage the back-
ground influence of corporate law to enact reforms that will ultimately im-
prove criminal punishment. Crucially, this approach does not require the 
criminal law to abandon or compromise the Persons View of Corporations. 
Chapter IV presents a more challenging case. Rather than use back-
ground corporate-law reforms to improve criminal punishments, Chapter IV 
advocates corporate reform as punishment in and of itself. This presents a 
trickier case: the criminal law is committed to a view of the corporation as a 
single agent, but I will be proposing punishments that restructure that cor-
porate person. This is okay because I will not be looking past the corporate 
agent, but it is a fine line that I walk at the end of Chapter IV. 
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THE ABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATE  
LAW TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL FINES 
 
1! Preface 
Corporate fines are a paradigmatic, ubiquitous, and yet deeply flawed 
form of criminal punishment. Their imposition reliably distributes harm to 
innocent individuals—worse, the brunt of the harm falls on individuals who 
neither participated in nor were in a position to anticipate or prevent the 
corporation’s misconduct. To add insult to injury, all the harm experienced 
by innocent parties looks to be mostly pointless; as punishments go, fines 
serve little, if any penological value. 
It is not difficult to imagine a better corporate-criminal fine. Fines 
whose harm fell instead on corporate members responsible for or able to 
prevent misconduct would improve the status quo: they would be norma-
tively more defensible and penologically more effective. The challenge, 
then, is to secure such a proportional distribution of harm. This Chapter fo-
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cuses on the factors that confound attempts to implement a better fine. In 
doing so, I resurrect the deep, but often disregarded, connection between 
corporate law and criminal punishment, and demonstrate that this seeming-
ly criminal-law problem requires a corporate-law solution. 
Attempts to improve criminal fines are flawed to the extent that they 
overlook the role corporate law plays in influencing the distribution of harm 
resulting from criminal punishment. A common approach for improving 
corporate-criminal fines involves devising methods for the State to target 
individuals within the corporation who are “really” responsible for the cor-
poration’s crime. This strategy puts the institution of criminal law at war 
with itself. Within the span of a single prosecution, the State must presup-
pose the corporation’s single-agent status in order to assign liability, only to 
deny that same single-agent status when punishing. Put simply, reforms that 
focus on targeting individuals for their contributions improve the distribu-
tion of corporate-criminal fines only by undermining the conceptual founda-
tion upon which corporate-criminal liability stands. 
A better approach starts by noticing corporate law’s responsibility for 
producing problematic distributions of corporate fines. Corporate-criminal 
fines have characteristics unusual to other forms of punishment: they are 
one of few punishments whose distributed harm can be controlled, and the 
power to control has been surrendered by the State to the private negotia-
tions of corporate members. Thus, the problem of corporate-criminal fines 
starts well before the moment of punishment: through corporate law, the 
State enables profoundly lopsided corporate structures that render as a fore-
gone conclusion any “negotiation” amongst members about how to distrib-
ute the harm of punishment. 
The State has chosen to punish corporations with fines, and it permits 
the harm of that punishment to be distributed according to the private nego-
tiations of members. But, at the same time, the State has enabled and en-
couraged a corporate structure that makes any pretense of actual negotia-
tions amongst corporate members a farce. Corporate law is complicit for 
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permitting these structures to exist; on the flipside, corporate law is also 
well situated to encourage new structures that will achieve desirable distri-
butions. As proof of concept, I advocate the use and expansion of provisions 
that empower the corporation to recoup officer’s compensation—in par-
ticular, I sketch what I call a corporate-crime clawback provi-
sion—as a remedy for the problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
2! Identifying and Diagnosing the Problem of Cor-
porate-Criminal Fines 
The problem of corporate-criminal fines is frequently 
mischaracterized. The problem is often framed as one where corporate-
criminal fines cause innocent third parties to suffer harm. However, this fact 
alone cannot be the whole problem; punishment, be it individual or corpo-
rate, reliably distributes harm to innocent third parties. Rather, the problem 
is that corporate fines distribute harm to innocent parties and also effectively 
fail to serve any penological purpose for the State. 
2.1.1! Corporate-Criminal Fines Distribute Harm to Innocent Parties 
Start with the obvious: Corporate fines distribute harm to individuals. 
Although the State imposes a fine against the corporation, “[a]s in any other 
sanction or taxation scheme, the impact point is not necessary the final rest-
ing point, or incidence, of the burden.”1 In the case of corporate fines par-
ticularly, the distribution of harm falls heavily on innocent parties.  
A word on terminology. I use notions of guilt and innocence formally—
an innocent person in this context is any person not criminally convicted 
of substantially the same crime, arising out of substantially the same con-
duct, as gave rise to the corporation’s conviction. I use culpable to pick 
out individuals who, irrespective of a legal adjudication of guilt or inno-
                                                        
1 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 Stanford L. Rev. 345, 377 
(2003). 
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cence, bear some responsibility for the corporation’s misconduct.2 A culpa-
ble person either personally contributed to the sanctionable misconduct—
for example, by carrying out the misconduct, authorizing it, or creating con-
ditions that cannot be satisfied without resort to criminality—or stood in a 
position of responsibility to prevent it. Thus, many members of a guilty cor-
poration are culpable but personally innocent; either they were not prose-
cuted, or their personal conduct did not rise to the level of individual crimi-
nality. Many shareholders, consumers, and low-level employees are both 
innocent of and not culpable for a corporation’s misconduct. 
Corporate fines distribute harm in a reliable pattern, which overwhelm-
ingly burdens innocent, non-culpable individuals. On the standard picture, 
“the [most] widely used form of corporate punishment, a fine, will cause 
economic detriment to innocent shareholders” in the form of diminished 
equity value.3 Albert Alschluer describes the effect a bit more broadly: “In-
nocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent employees, creditors, cus-
                                                        
2 For these purposes, I am excluding notions of membership responsibility, ac-
cording to which every member of a group bears personal responsibility for the 
group’s misconduct merely by virtue of his or her membership in the group. See 
Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Digital 
Age 162 (2000); Phillip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171, 193–94 
(2007). Even assuming that individuals are responsible in some sense for the cor-
poration’s misconduct, it would be surprising if this thin notion of responsibility by 
itself were sufficient to justify any and all imposition of harm. 
3 Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
21, 47 (1957); accord Peter French, Punishing the Criminal Corporation, in Col-
lective and Corporate Responsibility 190 (1987). The standard story 
could afford some complication. Recently we have seen circumstantial evidence of 
shareholder value increasing after a criminal fine is announced. E.g., Kevin McCoy 
& Kevin Johnson, 5 Banks Guilty of Rate-Rigging, Pay More than $5B, USA To-
day, May 20, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/05/20/billions 
-in-bank-fx-settlements/27638443/ (noting that three of five banks saw their stock 
value rise by 2% upon the announcement of their guilty pleas.). At any rate, I will 
stay with the standard story.  
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tomers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.”4 Scholars focus 
frequently on shareholders who, though legally owners of the corporation 
and contributors of capital, nevertheless are far removed from the corpora-
tion’s management. For the purposes of this Chapter, I discuss the harm 
distributed to shareholders and low-level employees.5 Largely, we can ex-
pect that most members of these two classes are innocent and non-culpable.  
There is no clear, reliable mechanism to impose harm on culpable, or 
even guilty, parties (assuming for now that such a distribution would be de-
sirable) within the corporation. At best, shareholders can pressure the board 
of directors to sanction or remove the corporation’s executives, at least 
some of whom, by virtue of their position of authority, are likely to be 
amongst the set of culpable members. As will become clear when discussing 
the realities of corporate law, even this circuitous mechanism exists only on 
paper; shareholders effectively have no power to push the harm of a corpo-
rate-criminal fine onto more suitable parties. 
2.2! The Distribution of Harm to Innocent Individuals is Not Unique 
to Corporate Punishment 
So, corporate-criminal fines unquestionably distribute harm to innocent 
(and non-culpable) individuals. However, in this respect, corporate punish-
ment is no different from individual punishment. Punishment always has 
this messy quality to it. The imposition of punishment reliably—indeed, 
barring highly contrived examples, invariably—results in harm being spilling 
over to innocent parties.6 Consider who else suffers when a convicted per-
                                                        
4 Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1367 (2009). 
5 The lessons here could be extended to include harm distributed to other 
stakeholders: consumers, creditors, local communities, etc. I limit my discussion 
for purposes of simplicity and brevity. 
6 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. 
L.J. 473, 522–23 (2006); French, supra note 3, at 188; Peter French, The Hester 
Prynne Sanction, 4 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 19, 21 (1985). 
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son goes to prison: family and friends lose access to a loved one, employers 
lose an employee, and society members pay for an inmate’s care.7 The De-
partment of Justice endorses this characterization, reassuring its prosecutors 
that “[v]irtually every conviction of a corporation, like virtually every convic-
tion of an individual, will have an impact on innocent third parties.”8 Indeed, 
Sanford Levinson argues that this spillover effect makes individual punish-
ments effectively collective.9 On his view, “many sanctioning regimes that 
are de jure individual should be understood as de facto collective.”10  
The State does not ordinarily take the fact of harm being distributed to 
innocent parties as a reason to avoid punishment. At best, considerations of 
innocent third parties can mitigate the punishment imposed. Even then, the 
Sentencing Guidelines broadly discourage courts from taking the harm ex-
perienced by innocent third parties as a reason to mitigate punishment.11 
Thus, if the problem of corporate-criminal fines were merely that they dis-
tributed harm to innocent parties, I would say it is no problem at all—or, at 
least, not one unique to corporate punishment.  
Granted, we might nevertheless want to pay attention to whether cor-
porate punishment were causing outsized suffering to innocent individuals 
as compared to other punishment. For example, it seems plausible that any 
given corporate fine distributes harm to more innocent parties than does, 
                                                        
7 The social cost of prison informs Judge Posner’s suggestion that white-collar 
criminals receive a fine instead of imprisonment. See Richard Posner, Optimal Sen-
tences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409, 415 (1980). But cf. 
Brennan Center for Justice, Is Charging Inmates to Stay in Prison Smart Policy?, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/states-pay-stay-charges (last visited June 1, 2015) 
(identifying  states that require inmates to repay the costs of their incarceration).  
8 USAM § 9-28.100 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
9 Levinson, supra note 1, at 378. 
10 Id. 
11 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 (“[F]amily ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily rele-
vant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.”). 
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say the punishment of an ordinary street crime.12 But ultimately this is an 
empirical question reflecting a difference in degree, not a difference in kind, 
of the harm distributed by different punishments and different crimes. Nor 
does the empirical question clearly cut in one direction. Sara Sun Beale, for 
one, argues that although, “white collar and corporate offenses also impose 
serious hardships on third parties,” equivalent “secondary impacts of fed-
eral drug policies dwarf the effect of policies regarding corporate and white 
collar offenses.”13 
2.3! Addressing Objections 
There are critics who disagree that harm distributed through corporate 
punishment is equivalent in kind to harm distributed through individual 
punishment. Stephen Bainbridge pithily captures the sentiment: “When you 
punish an entity, you’re really punishing the entity’s shareholders.”14 In 
this, he echoes Glanville Williams’ assertion that “a fine imposed on the 
corporation is in reality aimed against shareholders who are not . . .  respon-
                                                        
12 Of course, this may reflect the fact that corporate crimes are themselves 
more damaging to society. See Richard D. Hartley, Corporate Crime 27 
(2008) (collecting citations for the proposition that “loss of life and injuries that 
result from corporate wrongdoing far outweighs those from street crime”). 
13 Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1503, 1522 (2007). Behind the empirical question is a theoretical one about 
how to go about comparing harms. Does the breadth of harm distributed matter? 
The depth of the suffering experienced by innocent parties? Compare David Lewis, 
The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 53 
(1989) (rejecting punishments that are calibrated to the subjected suffering of indi-
viduals), with Posner, supra note 7, at 415 (defending punishments calibrated ac-
cording to personal suffering). 
14 Stephen Bainbridge, What the NY Times Doesn’t Understand About Organiza-
tional Wrongdoing, ProfessorBainbridge.com, May 14, 2015, http://www.professor 
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/05/what-the-ny-times-doesnt-
understand-about-organizational-wrongdoing.html. 
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sible for the crime, i.e., is aimed against innocent persons.”15 Albert 
Alschuler distinguishes the problem of corporate third-party harm as fol-
lows: “The penalties imposed on innocent shareholders and employees 
when corporations are convicted are not incidental, collateral, or secondary. 
They are what the punishment of a collective entity is all about.”16  
Notably, the Supreme Court rejected this line of criticism. In New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States, the Court dismissed peti-
tioners’ characterization that “to thus punish the corporation is in reality to 
punish the innocent stockholders.”17 Nevertheless, the same critique of 
corporate fines, and corporate punishment generally, evidently recurs. Ac-
cordingly, it is worth ventilating and rejecting afresh the critics’ objection. 
There are two interpretations for assertions that the harm distributed 
via corporate punishment is different in kind from, and categorically worse 
than, the harm distributed via individual punishment. Both challenge the 
conceptions of agency underpinning a well-founded practice of corporate-
criminal liability; I will not relitigate aspects to the extent that they are ad-
dressed in Chapter II. At any rate, neither interpretation is compelling.   
2.3.1! Intentional vs. Foreseeable Harm 
One interpretation assigns a morally significant difference between in-
tending and foreseeing, which is a strategy prominently associated with the 
Doctrine of Double Effect.18 This interpretation especially matches 
Alschuler’s comments, which assert that the point of corporate punishment 
                                                        
15 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 863 
(2d ed. 1961).  
16 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1369. 
17 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 (1909). 
18 The first articulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect is often attributed to 
Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas, Of Murder, in The Summa Theo-
logica of St. Thomas Aquinas pt. II-II q. 64, art. 7 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911). 
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is to harm the corporate members—in particular, the shareholders. The 
philosophical literature is littered with thought experiments that purport to 
capture the intuition that a wrong done intentionally for its own sake is 
worse than the same action taken under circumstances where the wrong was 
salient, but not intended, by the agent. Roughly, according to the Doctrine 
of Double Effect, what grounds the divergence in intuitions is the subjective 
attitudes of the wrongdoer; what might be permissible (or less morally prob-
lematic) if merely foreseeable but unintended becomes impermissible (or 
morally worse) by virtue of being intended. 
I am skeptical that the conceptual distinction between intending and 
foreseeing, to the extent there is one, can bear the normative weight that 
Alschuler and others seem to think it does. Elsewhere I have argued against 
the coherence of the Doctrine of Double Effect as it would apply to the 
criminal law.19 Briefly, endorsing the view that intending and merely fore-
seeing delineate the severity of moral and legal judgments has the conse-
quence of elevating obviously irrelevant factual considerations to the status 
of decisive determinants of moral and legal permissibility.20  
That concern aside, there is a separate challenge facing those who seek 
to render corporate punishment normatively indefensible. This is the so-
called Closeness Problem that has plagued accounts of the Doctrine of Dou-
ble Effect for decades.21 In essence, many so-labeled intending cases can be 
redescribed as foreseeing cases (and vice versa). Troublingly, there are fre-
quently no independent standards for determining which description is 
“correct,” assuming a correct description exists as a coherent notion. The 
worry, then, is that an individual privileges a description only because it 
                                                        
19 W. Robert Thomas, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework 
for Criminal Intent in an Intent-Free Moral World, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 647 (2012). 
20 Id. at 664–65 (collecting examples and citations). 
21 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Intention and Punishment, in Punishment and 
Responsibility 113 (2d ed. 2008); see generally Ezio Di Nucci, Ethics 
Without Intention 103–32 (2014) (cataloguing failed efforts to circumvent 
the closeness problem). 
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supports her pre-theoretic moral judgment, which the appeal to intend-
ing/foreseeing was meant to elicit and ground. In other words, appeals to 
the Doctrine of Double Effect risk begging the question. 
Alschuler’s claim acutely suffers from the Closeness Problem. He as-
serts that the goal of corporate punishment is to harm shareholders—that is, 
the State intends to harm innocent individuals. (Presumably, the harm expe-
rienced by innocent individuals is merely foreseeable in the individual con-
text). However, there is no independent reason to accept Alschuler’s char-
acterization of the State’s conduct. (The State does not claim this motiva-
tion as its own.) For one, it is not clear why the State would want to harm 
innocent shareholders, particularly as it has long been the case that share-
holders have few, weak levers to reform a corporation. For another, the 
State already has an institution of individual liability and punishment. As 
Chapter II demonstrates, the State has ample reasons to hold corporations 
criminally responsible separate from their members. Chief among them is 
that conduct not reducible to individuals nevertheless remains criminal; the 
State has a duty to its citizens to hold criminally responsible perpetrators, be 
they individual or corporate. It just so happens the State uses punishment to 
express condemnation, even though individuals suffer as a result.22  
It seems, in essence, that Alschuler is attempting to use corporate pun-
ishment to revisit whether corporations are eligible and apt targets for crim-
inal liability. Appeals to punishment certainly give stakes to that debate—
punishment is one area where the rubber of responsibility judgments meets 
the road. They do not, however, change the terms of the debate that was 
already addressed in Chapter II. 
                                                        
22 It is a broad topic—one well beyond the scope of this Chapter—the limits to 
which the State can punish as a means of enforcing its criminal judgments. On the 
flip side, it is a live question whether there could exist a public institution of crimi-
nal responsibility that did not enforce its judgments through the imposition of 
harm. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 Monist 397, 
400 (1965). Regardless, it suffices for my purposes to observe that, irrespective of 
whether we could have such an institution, manifestly we do not. 
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2.3.2! Corporate vs. Individual Experiences of Harm 
Consider a separate, albeit related interpretation of the characteriza-
tions given by critics like Bainbridge, Williams, and Alschuler—viz., that the 
harm distributed from corporate punishment is categorically worse. This 
second interpretation leverages the fact that a corporation’s experiences in-
puts, harm among them, differently than do individuals. In ordinary cases of 
individual punishment, the convicted individual experiences harm directly 
from his punishment; innocent parties experience harm derivatively from 
the convict’s suffering. For example, “[w]hen an offender with children is 
sent to prison, his children may suffer, yet criminal justice officials may have 
no way to punish the offender appropriately without hurting other peo-
ple.”23 On this view, the family’s harm is dependent on the convict’s harm 
(i.e., his incarceration); innocent parties suffer harm alongside of or because 
of the convict’s need to suffer harm. By contrast, suggests the critic, a cor-
poration cannot experience harm on its own.24 Accordingly, the harm of 
punishment passes entirely through to innocent shareholders; their suffer-
ing is not derivative of or arising alongside the corporation’s suffering of 
harm. Rather, the harm experienced by individuals is a substitute for the 
corporation experiencing harm.  
First, it is not clear punishment requires that innocents’ suffering must 
derive from the suffering of the guilty. The occurrence is reliable, but it is 
not obvious how the suffering of a guilty person grounds the permissible suf-
fering of innocents.25 It seems more likely that State’s fulfilling its penologi-
cal obligations grounds the excusable distribution of harm to innocents. 
Second, there is an equivocation driving the force of the critic’s argu-
ment. The critic makes an uncontroversial observation: corporations do not 
                                                        
23 Alschuler, supra note 4, at 1368–69. 
24 Id. at 1367–69, 1392. 
25 See Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65, J. Phil. 674, 680 (1968) (par-
tially defending historical regimes that relied on collective-criminal responsibility). 
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experience harm like individuals do. Now, if the complaint were that corpo-
rations cannot experience harm like individuals experience harm, then it 
would be irrelevant. This harkens back to, or merely restates, the Individual 
Person Premise that has not survived Chapters I and II. Just because a cor-
poration does not have the single body and sense organs of an individual 
person, it does not follow that the corporation cannot experience harm. 
Yet the critics’ argument requires this stronger claim—viz., corpora-
tions do not experience harm at all (or do not experience harm except 
through the suffering their members). But these stronger claims do not fol-
low from the former, and themselves seem false. Corporations can obviously 
experience harm: they can have their charters to exist revoked, their proper-
ty seized, their internal structures forcibly reworked in ways that severely 
impair the corporation from pursing its goals. Moreover, analogous to the 
fact that a corporation can hold attitudes not held by any of its constituent 
members, corporations can conceivably experience without harm being ex-
perienced by the membership. For one, there is weak evidence of this possi-
bility when shareholders recently saw the value of their equity increase upon 
the announcement of a guilty plea against domestic banks.26 For another, 
recall that a corporation has an internal structure that arranges interactions 
between individuals. Harm imposed on a corporation’s structure need not 
harm any given member of the corporation—indeed, they might benefit 
from the change—but it would still be fair to characterize forced restructur-
ing as harm to the corporation qua corporation.  
2.3.3! Neither is the Distribution of Harm Categorically Less Bad in 
the Case of Corporate Punishment 
It should be noted there are theorists at the other end of the spectrum. 
That is, some claim that the distributive consequence of corporate fines 
merit less attention than does the similar phenomenon in the individual con-
                                                        
26 See McCoy and Johnson, supra note 3. 
  111 
text. French, for one, argues that shareholders voluntarily enter into the 
corporation knowing the risk of criminal misconduct, and so should not be 
an object of concern in the same way that a convict’s family members are.27 
Says French: “If [stockholders] suffer from corporate punishment, that is a 
risk they undertook when entering the market.28 Brent Fisse makes a similar 
claim, suggesting “[d]istribution of retributive punishment to innocent 
shareholders, personnel, and consumers, is warranted” because members 
acquiesced to or assumed the risk of loss by joining the corporation.29 
But it is not clear why voluntariness matters in the collective context 
any more than it does in the individual context. After all, we choose our 
spouses in the same sense—and hopefully more scrupulously—than we 
choose our investments. Moreover, both French and Fisse confuse the fa-
miliar with the necessary. Even if in fact shareholders are willing to accept 
the risk of bearing harm from a criminal fine as a cost of doing business, it is 
a further question whether the State should maintain a legal regime that 
permits or endorses such acceptance. It is worth interrogating whether the 
State should avoid endorsing a message that the chance of corporate crimi-
nality is the kind of gamble it expects investors to make. 
2.4! Corporate-Criminal Fines are Broadly Ineffective as Punishment 
The State can impose harm in service of its obligation to hold persons 
criminally responsible; our system of individual punishment is proof of this. 
So why worry about corporate-criminal fines if not because they reliably dis-
tribute harm to innocent parties?  I submit that the real problem of corpo-
rate-criminal fines is that they are a broadly ineffective form of punishment. 
The harm being distributed to innocent parties serves little, if any purpose.  
                                                        
27 French, supra note 3, at 188. 
28 French, supra note 6, at 20. 
29 Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, 
Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1175 (1983). 
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Consider several common rationales justifying criminal punishment ar-
ticulated by criminal law theorists and by the Sentencing Guidelines. Pun-
ishment can provide retribution, or what the Guidelines refer to as “just 
punishment for the offense.”30 Punishment can deter the specific offender 
from reoffending or deter other would-be offenders. Punishment also ex-
presses the State’s condemnation: it is imposed “to reflect the seriousness 
of the offense” and “to promote respect for the law.”31 The State uses dif-
ferent punishments to express different rationales; no one punishment need 
necessarily convey all rationales.32 For example, federal law is clear that re-
habilitation, a once-prominent rationale for punishment that “eventually fell 
into disfavor,”33 cannot determine whether or for how long to incarcerate.34  
In any event, corporate-criminal fines do not seem to serve any ra-
tionale—or, at least, they do not serve any well. 
2.4.1! Fines as Deterrence 
The received wisdom, for better or worse, is that corporate punishment 
exists almost exclusively to deter prospective misconduct. Regina Robson, 
in cataloguing discussions of corporate punishment, concludes that there 
has occurred a “virtual elimination of retribution as an acknowledged goal of 
[corporate-]criminal sanctioning,” with only deterrence offered to explain 
                                                        
30 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
32 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Supervised re-
lease fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”). 
33 Tapia v. United States, — U.S. — , 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (2011); see Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the 
Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (“[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of pro-
moting correction and rehabilitation.”); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388 (“[A] court mak-
ing [decisions about whether to incarcerate] should consider the specified ration-
ales of punishment except for rehabilitation.” (emphasis in original)). 
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why the State should hold corporations criminally responsible.35 Pity then 
that fines are a famously poor deterrent of corporate crime.  
To be fair, part of the poor deterrent value of fines is that corporate 
crime is infrequently prosecuted and that convicted corporations historically 
receive modest fines. Although the average fine from 1999–2012 is approxi-
mately $7.4 million, the median fine is less than $120,000.36  Meanwhile, the 
Guidelines instruct courts to decrease the fine calculated under the Guide-
lines if a corporation cannot afford it.37 That said, recently there have been 
signs of larger financial penalties for convicted corporations. In 2014, several 
financial firms received criminal penalties well in excess of $1 billion each,38 
although a large portion of these penalties consist in restitution payments to 
victims.39 This trend has continued in 2015; five domestic banks have re-
cently pleaded guilty to a criminal conspiracy involving currency manipula-
                                                        
35 Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Jus-
tification for Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 109, 121 (2010); 
accord V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 
Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1494 & n.91 (1995) (collecting citations for the proposition 
that “deterrence, not retribution, is the aim of . . . corporate criminal liability”). 
36 Data compiled by author using information provided by the United States 
Sentencing Commission, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and 
_Statistics/index.cfm [hereinafter Sentencing Data]. 
37 An equivalent rule applies for individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a). However, in-
dividuals are subject to imprisonment as their primary form of punishment (from 
which there is no such similar relief); by contrast, a fine is the primary form of pun-
ishment of punishment for a corporation. 
38 Credit Suisse ($2.6B in criminal penalties), BNP Paribas ($8.9B in criminal 
penalties), and JP Morgan Chase ($2.6B in criminal and civil penalties). 
39 Sensibly, the Guidelines acknowledge that restitution is not punishment. 
U.S.S.G. ch. 8, pt. B, introductory cmt. Still, there is a long tradition of corpora-
tions paying out only a tiny fraction of their restitution payments, paying restitution 
“in kind,” or using restitution to write down debts that, while already worthless, 
had been kept on the balance sheet precisely in anticipation of a monetary sanction. 
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tion, for which they too received penalties well in excess of $1 billion.40 It 
remains to be seen whether this trend will continue. 
And yet, there is reason for skepticism that even large fines will mean-
ingfully deter corporations. For one thing, it is likely impossible to set fines 
at the appropriate price to deter misconduct. Even assuming reasonable 
rates of enforcement, John Coffee demonstrates that the optimal fine for 
deterring even minor criminal activity would far outstrip the value of most 
corporations, leading to a mismatched calculus that he refers to as the De-
terrence Trap.41 Vince Buccola’s research on corporate insolvency implies 
that the Deterrence Trap, when considered dynamically, is even more of a 
problem than Coffee suspected.42 According to Buccola, the closer a corpo-
ration moves towards insolvency, the more mismatched becomes the Deter-
rence Trap—in particular, the less a large fine acts as a deterrent. Accord-
ingly, at a time of looming insolvency, when a corporation might be most 
inclined to stave off collapse by engaging in criminal activity, criminal fines 
offer the least value as a deterrent.  
Meanwhile, the magnitude of a fine cannot be calculated independently 
of enforcement rates. It is well documented that large punishments can ac-
tually discourage enforcement.43 The chance of bankrupting a corporation 
discourages many prosecutors away from seeking a corporate conviction. 
According to Brandon Garrett, “[t]he DOJ suffered great criticism follow-
ing [Arthur] Andersen’s collapse and has since moderated its approach to 
                                                        
40 David McLaughlin et al., Six Banks Pay $5.8 Billion, Five Guilty of Market 
Rigging, Bloomberg, Mar. 20, 2015 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2015-05-20/six-banks-pay-5-8-billion-five-plead-guilty-to-market-rigging. 
41 John C. Coffee Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 389, 390 
(1981). Essentially, to get the expected cost calculation right (fine * likelihood of 
conviction), the fines would have to be astronomical in order to outweigh the coun-
tervailing expected value from breaking the law. 
42 Vincent S.J. Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 Kansas L. Rev. 1 (2013). 
43 Ehud Guttel & Doren Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense of the In-
nocent, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 596 (2011) (collecting examples). 
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explicitly take into account collateral consequences in organizational cas-
es.”44 
Finally, the corporate fine’s deterrence value is undermined by one of 
several agent/principle problems at the core of corporate law. As Larry 
Summers recently put the point, “[m]anagers do not find it personally cost-
ly to part with even billions of dollars of their shareholders’ money . . . . Pay-
ing with shareholders’ money as the price of protecting themselves is a very 
attractive trade-off.”45 This worry bears out empirically and anecdotally. It 
is the central rationale offered by Professors Alexander and Cohen’s eco-
nomic research into corporate crime, which concludes that “[t]here is little 
evidence that increasing the magnitude of monetary sanctions has a deter-
rent effect.”46 Anecdotally, consider the recent conduct of JP Morgan after 
pleading guilty to manipulating currency markets.47 JP Morgan acknowl-
edged its wrongdoing both in a guilty plea and in a disclosure notice that, as 
a condition of its probation, it was required to circulate to its investors. Yet, 
in a second client letter—which was sent attached to the disclosure no-
tice!—the bank informed investors that it would continue to engage in po-
tentially criminal conduct specifically identified in the guilty plea but that 
was not itself the basis for the instant antitrust conviction.48 
                                                        
44 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853, 880 
(2007). 
45 Larry Summers, Companies on Trial: Are They ‘Too Big to Jail’?, Fin. 
Times, Nov. 21, 2104, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3bf9954-7009-11e490af-
00144feabdc0.html. 
46 Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An 
Economic Perspective, in Prosecutors in the Boardroom 24 (2011). 
47 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes 
Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. Times: Dealbook, May 20, 2015, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-
plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest-rate-cases.html. 
48 Matt Levine, Banks Will Keep Doing FX Stuff that Got Them in Trouble, 
Bloomberg View, May 21, 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles 
/2015-05-21/banks-will-keep-doing-fx-stuff-that-got-them-in-trouble. 
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2.4.2! Fines as Retribution 
There is a widespread view that “corporate criminal liability cannot be 
justified retributively,”49 and as a result retribution has been virtually elimi-
nated from corporate-criminal law.50 Underlying this is anxiety about 
whether corporations, even if they can be subjected to criminal liability, are 
the kinds of agents for which retribution is applicable. For example, even 
while conceding the possibility of corporate personhood, McKenna never-
theless notes that personhood alone is insufficient for robust moral agency.51 
As Chapter II notes, the status of corporate moral agency is heavily con-
tested; a full treatment of the topic is beyond the scope of this project. I am 
inclined to believe that corporations are capable of responding to reasons in 
a way that makes them capable of experiencing the sort of reactive attitudes 
that are essential to moral agency. Likewise, I think they have free will in a 
weak sense; they can act separate from outside pressures.52 In this respect, I 
am optimistic about the possibility of corporate retribution. I am also not 
sure how much this sort of analysis matters.53 
I realize that I am in the minority on this position, at least for now. Ul-
timately however, it may not matter for these purposes. It would not be out-
                                                        
49 Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 Has-
tings L.J. 1, 8 (2012). 
50 Robson, supra note 35, at 121. 
51 McKenna does not believe corporate are incapable in principle of robust 
moral agency, but rather that the creation of a sufficiently well-structured entity 
that could meet all the requisite demands is practically impossible. 
52 See Margaret Gilbert, Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and Its 
Implications for Group Members, 30 Midwest Studs. Phil. 94, 99 (2006); see 
generally Marion Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Bounda-
ries of Community (1992) (ideal, practice-independent notion of moral 
blameworthiness the dessert of which has its source in agent’s free will). 
53 See Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime 
and Accountability 24 (1993) (“[T]he issue is more a matter of what we 
consider moral responsibility to be, rather than what sort of metaphysical entities 
corporations may turn out to be.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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side the bounds of our criminal practice to impose punishment on corpora-
tions notwithstanding reservations about their retributive capacities. Fines, 
and corporate punishment generally, are still justifiable even if corporations 
are not the kind of fully formed moral agents for which retribution is a pre-
requisite. Recall that not all punishments embody all rationales for punish-
ment. With respect to retribution specifically, the law mitigates its punish-
ment of minors and the mentally disabled largely because these individuals 
have yet to establish robust moral agency. However, mitigation is not ex-
emption; these classes are nevertheless susceptible to criminal liability and 
punishment. Moreover, current ineligibility for retributive-style rationales 
would not preclude arguments that the State should treat corporations as 
though they are capable of retribution.54 Indeed, List and Pettit note that 
value of such a practice: by treating corporations as though they are capable 
of moral agents, we may educate them to actually become moral agents.55 
The more mundane, but probably more pressing problem is that fines—
at least in the corporate context, and perhaps in all cases—are a poor vehicle 
to express retribution. The reasons for this are tied into the next section. 
2.4.3! Fines as Promoting Respect for Law 
Perhaps the most common lay criticism of corporate liability and pun-
ishment,56 one echoed just as frequently by criminal-law scholars,57 is that 
                                                        
54 See generally Robson, supra note 35. 
55 Christian List & Philip Pettit, Group Agency: The Possi-
bility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents (2011); see Fein-
berg, supra note 25, at 677 (“Collective responsibility not only expresses the soli-
darity, it also strengthens it, and thus is a good thing to whatever extent the preex-
istent solidarity was a good thing.”); Levinson, supra note 1, at 386–90 (weighing 
the cost and benefits of using collective punishment to “build group solidarity”). 
56 See, e.g., Daniel Kurtzleben, Bank of America’s $17B Penalty is Arguable Too 
Little, Definitely Too Late, Vox, Aug. 20, 2014, http://www.vox.com/2014 
/8/8/5979563/bank-of-americas-17-billion-penalty-is-arguably-too-little-definitely; 
Katie Thomas & Michael Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settle-
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corporations treat fines simply as “the cost of doing business.” By this, I 
take critics to mean that a corporation commits crimes after calculating 
criminality to be in the corporation’s best interest.58 Paying a fine may well 
be worth the benefits of criminality; fines, from this perspective, act as li-
censes retroactively permitting the corporation’s misconduct.59 
I take the root of the problem here to be the fact that corporate fines are 
treated like any other business cost. This is true prospectively in weighing 
the decision to commit a crime, but it is also true after the fact. That is, a 
corporation absorbs the cost of a criminal fine in exactly the same way that it 
absorbs any other business cost—a civil fine,60 for example, or even just an 
exogenous shock from a bad investment or a disappointing quarterly per-
formance. In all of these instances, the costs hit the corporation, and imme-
diately distribute down (primarily) to the shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                            
ment, N.Y. Times, July 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/business 
/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud settlement.html. 
57 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 
Stan. L. Rev. 271, 278 (2008); Dan Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic 
Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Leg. Studs. 609, 619 (1998); French, supra note 6, at 20; 
Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1417, 1426–27 (2009). 
58 Buell, supra note 6, at 495–96 (“An obvious point (but one that bears repeat-
ing, given that questions of how to prevent self-interested agent misconduct tend to 
dominate discussions of enterprise liability) is that agent crimes often benefit organ-
izations and are committed for that reason.”) 
59 This sort of calculation tracks Gary Becker’s economic analysis of corporate 
crime. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in Essays 
in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 1 (1974). Put briefly, 
Becker predicts that a person’s decision to commit a crime is a function of the ben-
efit to be gained by the crime, weighed against the likelihood of detection (en-
forcement) and the severity of the sanction (punishment). 
60 The major difference seems to concern tax implications. See Lynnely Brown-
ing, Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-Offs for Banks, Newsweek Oct. 27, 
2014, http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-are-giant-tax-write-
offs-wall-street-279993.html. 
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Why does this matter for promoting respect for the rule of law? As Hart 
famously put the point: “What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction 
. . . is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and 
justifies its imposition.”61 But it would be a mistake to conclude that a crim-
inal judgment’s condemnatory force—not the imposition of punishment—
distinguishes it from civil or regulatory judgments. That is, we cannot iso-
late condemnation from punishment. Doing so gives short shrift to the fact 
that the State expresses condemnation through action.62  
While it is true that criminal judgments are understood to express con-
demnation more severe than civil judgments, the State conveys, and buoys, 
this convention by accompanying criminal judgments with uniquely harsh 
punishments.63 Conversely, where criminal and civil sanctions are indistin-
guishable, the State’s expression of uniquely criminal condemnation is 
blunted.64 Such is precisely the case with corporate-criminal fines, which as 
a form of sanction appears to be no different from civil fines. In a slogan, the 
problem of corporate-criminal fines is that there is nothing uniquely criminal 
about corporate fines. 
3! Criminal Law’s Shortcomings as a Tool to Fix 
the Problem of Corporate-Criminal Fines 
Thus far, I have diagnosed the real problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
The problem is that corporate-criminal fines reliably impose harm on classes 
                                                        
61 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 401, 404 (1958). 
62 See Feinberg, supra note 22, at 400; accord Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard 
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 Penn. L. Rev., 
1503, 1508 (2000) (“To communicate a mental state requires that one express it 
with the intent that others recognize that state by recognizing that very communi-
cative intention.”) 
63 Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the 
Criminal Law 12 (2008). 
64 See Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in 
Prosecutors in the Boardroom 93–96 (2011). 
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of individuals—namely, stockholders and employees—whose members are 
quite likely to be innocent of, and not culpable for, the corporation’s mis-
conduct. This is a problem because the State is causing innocents to experi-
ence harm without the counterviewing excuse of penological benefit. 
Identifying a solution to this problem is simple: a fine whose harm fell 
on culpable individuals within the corporation would be a vast improve-
ment, morally and penologically speaking, over the status quo. However, 
obtaining such a preferable distribution is remarkably difficult. While a better 
distribution of harm is conceivable, the institution of criminal law is funda-
mentally ill equipped to solve the problem of corporate fines. 
3.1! A Solution: Impose the Harm of Punishment on Culpable Parties 
As a starting point, consider the sorts of distributions of harm that 
might result from a corporate punishment. Eva Pasternak, one of the few 
scholars who has focused exclusively on the distributive questions of collec-
tive punishment, provides a useful framework for discussion.65 Pasternak 
identifies three options for distributing the harm of collective punishment: 
randomly amongst the membership, equally across the membership,66 or “in 
proportion to members’ differing levels of personal association with the col-
lective harm.”67 Pasternak argues that a proportional distribution is most 
“compatible with our basic intuitions about fairness.”68 By contrast, equal 
distributions are more objectionable insofar as non-culpable members expe-
                                                        
65 Avia Pasternak, The Distributive Effect of Collective Punishment, in Ac-
countability for Collective Wrongdoing 201 (Tracy Isaacs ed., 2011).  
66 The distinction between equal and random distributions is slippery. A pun-
ishment that applies randomly on one description—for example, the harm imposed 
is incarceration—applies equally when the harm is redescribed as the chance of 
incarceration. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 53; Posner, supra note 7, at 415. 
67 Pasternak, supra note 65, at 220. 
68 Id. at 224. 
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rience harm alongside and equal to culpable members69; random distribu-
tions are most objectionable because they expose non-culpable members to 
severe harm while allowing culpable members to evade harm. To the extent 
that it places the harm on those culpable for its occurrence, a proportional 
distribution is the most normatively attractive distribution available.  
As it stands now, fines are nowhere on Pasternak’s taxonomy. The fine 
is not equally distributed; managers and directors do not experience the 
harm. Nor is the fine randomly distributed; it falls reliably on shareholders. 
Nor is it proportional, as shareholders likely have at best limited culpability, 
even when they experience the brunt of the imposed harm. Moreover, a fi-
ne’s distribution could not even be categorized as a hybrid of Pasternak’s 
categories. True, a fine falls equally on a set of members (the shareholders); 
however, selection of this set is neither random nor proportional. 
I am inclined to support Pasternak’s suggestion that a proportional dis-
tribution of extra-penal harm is normatively attractive, as are several oth-
ers.70 Certainly the impulse to push extra-penal harm onto those corporate 
members who are culpable for collective misconduct is common both in 
popular culture and in academic scholarship. At least proportional distribu-
tions of harm are among the set of outcomes that are all superior to the sta-
tus quo. What makes them superior? One, all things being equal, it is prefer-
able to distribute harm to culpable individuals than to non-culpable ones.71 
                                                        
69 But see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations 297 (1992) (defending 
equal distributions). I am inclined to support equal distributions with respect to 
restitution, but not with respect to punishment. See Kutz, supra note 2, at 201 
(“[C]laims of victims to compensation have lexical priority over the claims of . . . 
members to fairness.”). 
70 See, e.g., Kutz, supra note 2, at 159–62 (distinguishing the culpability of 
those at the core of an enterprise compared to those at the periphery). 
71 Buell, supra note 6, at 524 (“Tolerance for injury to individuals should lessen 
as we consider persons within the institution further removed from the crime and 
thus less responsible for it even in a diffused sense.”). 
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Second, by imposing harm on those responsible, we improve the penological 
status of fines. Harm that falls on officers and directors is more likely to de-
ter misconduct than ratcheting up fines on the shareholders. It might solve 
the problem of doing business by treating corporate fines as a distinct form 
of financial sanction, one recognizably different from other costs. 
What would a proportional distribution look like in the context of a fi-
ne? Roughly, the harm of the fine would distribute to those individuals who 
are culpable in proportion to their responsibility for the underlying miscon-
duct. Realistically, we should expect that some or all officers will receive a 
distribution of harm—perhaps a sizeable portion of the harm. This would 
especially be true were the State to reform the liability conditions for corpo-
rate crime as suggested in Chapter II—that is, away from respondeat superior 
and towards genuine corporate attitudes. Insofar as officers exercise out-
sized authority within a corporate structure, we can expect that some or all 
of them will be involved in creating the conditions for misconduct by author-
izing, failing to stop or investigate, or creating employee requirements that 
cannot be satisfied without breaking the law. At the other end of the spec-
trum, we can expect that shareholders would receive virtually no portion of 
the distribution; the same goes for the vast majority of low-level employees. 
It is important to note that the distribution sketched above is a generali-
zation based on common ways that individuals within a corporation contrib-
ute to the occurrence of misconduct. To be clear, in imagining an ideal pro-
portional distribution, every case will have its own unique distribution. 
Sometimes mid-level employees, more than the officers overseeing them, 
are most culpable. An activist institutional investor might be culpable. 
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3.2! Two Unattractive Strategies: Abandon Corporate Crime or 
Abandon Corporate Fines 
Identifying a solution to the problem of corporate-criminal fines is easy; 
implementing criminal-law reforms that embrace this solution is hard. Con-
sider two strategies, and why each will ultimately be unsuccessful.  
3.2.1! Abandon Corporate Crime 
We could abandon corporate-criminal liability altogether, focusing in-
stead on prosecuting, convicting, and punishing culpable individuals for 
their involvements in criminal misconduct. Certainly this is the strategy fa-
vored by a host of critics of corporate-criminal liability, many of whom 
ground their criticism precisely on the problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
And there is something superficially, if speciously, attractive about the 
strategy. After all, if the hope is create punishments that fall on culpable in-
dividuals, why not cut out the conceptual middleman that is corporate liabil-
ity and go straight after those individuals really responsible? 
Nevertheless, this strategy is ultimately doomed to fail. I have already 
demonstrated in Chapter II the need for corporate-criminal liability as part 
of our modern practice, and I will not repeat the full breadth of the apology 
here. That said, two points bear recapping quickly in this context. 
First, the State has reason to hold the corporation criminally responsi-
ble separate from its membership; corporate responsibility does not reduce 
to individual responsibility. In the language of this Chapter, being culpable 
does not make someone guilty. At least under the status quo, an individual 
may well be responsible for bringing about corporate misconduct in a man-
ner that does not give rise to individual criminal liability. Amy Sepinwall’s 
recent work on the responsible officer doctrine reveals just how drastically 
the State would have to reform its conception of individual responsibility in 
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order to reach these individuals.72 Sepinwall defends the view that corporate 
officers are guilty of all corporate misconduct based on a drastically expand-
ed conception of fiduciary obligation.73 This approach requires a massive 
revision of criminal responsibility, one where criminal vicarious liability 
takes a prominent role. Given the robust criticism reserved for vicarious 
criminal liability in the corporate context, I imagine it is cold comfort to shift 
the practice out of the corporate context and into the individual context. 
Second, epistemic obstacles plague any strategy that relies solely on in-
dividual prosecutions. The State is simply not in a position to identify those 
individuals within a corporation who are culpable for misconduct. The up-
shot is that prosecutors can, at best, identify and prosecute only the lowest-
level culpable employees—those who carried out the misconduct, as op-
posed to those who ordered, created the conditions for, or were in a position 
to stop corporate misconduct. To improve prosecutorial investigations re-
quires close cooperation with the corporation itself. Put starkly, prosecutors 
must ask high-ranking officers of the corporation to implicate . . . high-
ranking officers of the corporation.74 Little wonder that this strategy has 
been ineffective at producing convictions. 
3.2.2! Abandon Corporate-Criminal Fines 
Instead of abandoning corporate-criminal liability altogether, an alterna-
tive strategy would be to abandon corporate fines as a method of criminal 
punishment. Alternative corporate punishments exist: corporations can be 
placed on probation, they can have their corporate charters revoked (thus 
                                                        
72 Amy Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Re-
sponsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 371 (2014). 
73 Id. 
74 See Lisa Kearn Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in Prosecutors in the 
Boardroom 113 (2011) (“Without the assistance of corporate insiders, prosecu-
tors would find it difficult if not impossible to identify which individuals within a 
firm are involved in criminal activity”). 
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effectively terminating the corporation), and they can be suspended by regu-
lators from participating in specific industries. One benefit of these alterna-
tive punishments is that they more clearly satisfy the State’s penological ob-
jectives, and so are better situated to avoid the problem of corporate-
criminal fines in the first place.75 
On the one hand, alternative corporate punishments should play an ex-
panded role in our corporate-criminal practices, notwithstanding a recent 
trend to use them less often.76 Chapter IV deals entirely with this issue. On 
the other hand, I am reticent to abandon corporate-criminal fines in their 
entirety. Fines are a ubiquitous form of corporate punishment.77 For dec-
ades, they were the only permissible form of corporate punishment.78 More-
over, fines offer clear advantages worth preserving: they are easy to adminis-
ter, and they provide a social benefit in the form of state revenues.79  
Finally, despite the fact that alternative corporations are underused and 
under-theorized, neither are they are a panacea. The forced termination or 
suspension of a corporation will have outsized consequences; very likely 
these punishment will distribute harm to innocent persons on an order of 
magnitude greater than that from fines. Arthur Andersen remains the para-
digmatic example of this possibility. At the least, we should consider limit-
ing the use of existential punishments to serious cases involving pervasive or 
ongoing criminal misconduct. Separately, reforming a corporation through 
probation sounds appealing, but it can be difficult to determine the nature of 
                                                        
75 I hold off defending this claim until Chapter IV. 
76 For example, those major banks that pleaded guilty of conspiring to manipu-
late currency prices first secured waivers from the SEC suspensions that otherwise 
would have occurred upon conviction. McLaughlin, supra note 40. 
77 Eighty-eight percent of organizations convicted between 1999–2012 received 
a fine. Sentencing Data. 
78 United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958) (“As in the case 
of corporations, the conviction of [a partnership] can lead only to a fine levied on 
the firm’s assets.”) (emphasis added). 
79 Posner, supra note 7, at 409–10. 
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the structural defect that led to corporate misconduct—to say nothing of 
designing, implementing, and monitoring a solution. 
3.3! A Third Strategy and a New Constraint: Targeted Punishments  
Proponents of corporate-criminal liability gravitate towards a third 
strategy: design corporate fines that, while imposed on the corporation, 
thereafter target culpable individuals to receive the distribution of harm. 
These proposals self-consciously attempt to produce Pasternak’s propor-
tional distribution. This strategy is part of a larger effort to hold corpora-
tions criminally responsible and then separately apply carefully crafted pun-
ishments that target those individuals “really” responsible. Call this prac-
tice targeting (and the punishments it imposes targeted punish-
ments) because it involves the State targeting individuals within the cor-
poration to bear the harm associated with corporate punishment based on 
those individuals’ culpability. For example, Mary Kreiner Ramirez argues 
that corporations should punished by “remov[ing] the directors and officers 
of the corporation” without displacing “the innocent shareholders.”80 
Sepinwall enumerates several corporate punishments “whose sting is di-
rected towards corporate officials,” who she believes are culpable on her 
aforementioned expanded conception of fiduciary duty.81 Larry May too ad-
vocates targeting directors with the harm of corporate punishment, provid-
ed the individual in question contributed to the corporation’s misconduct.82 
                                                        
80 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Containing the Machine through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 
975 (2005). 
81 Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility 
in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 Hastings L.J. 411, 449 (2012) 
82 Larry May, Negligence and Corporate Criminality, in Shame, Responsi-
bility and the Corporation 137, 146–49 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986)  
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Nevertheless, targeted punishments are ill suited to fix the problem of 
corporate-criminal fines. More importantly, targeting reveals that the insti-
tution of criminal law generally is poorly situated to fix the problem. 
3.3.1! Targeting and the Corporations as Persons View 
As a practical matter, there is no reason to expect that targeted punish-
ments will avoid the epistemic obstacles raised above and in Chapter II; tar-
geting merely pushes the problem from the moment of criminal responsibil-
ity to the moment of criminal punishment. If the State knew who was really 
responsible for misconduct, it would go after them directly. Accordingly, 
relying on targeted distributions of corporate punishment is no more likely 
to succeed than is relying exclusively on individual prosecutions to solve the 
problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
Epistemic obstacles aside, there are deeper problems underpinning the 
turn to targeted punishments. Recall from the Interlude that the Corpora-
tions as Persons view takes corporations as single persons separate from 
their members. Targeting stands in tension with the Corporations as Per-
sons view. This tension is problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, targeting undermines the conceptual foundation establishing cor-
poration’s eligibility for criminal liability. Recall that corporate-criminal lia-
bility presupposes that the corporation is a person for purposes of the crimi-
nal law—that is, corporate-criminal liability is committed to the Corpora-
tions as Persons view. The idea that a corporation can be prosecuted sepa-
rately from its members presupposes that a corporation is an object of con-
cern all on its own. Thus, corporate-criminal liability is about holding the 
corporation, separate from its members, responsible for misconduct better 
attributed to the corporation than to any individual (or set of individual) 
member(s). Accordingly, corporate-criminal liability does not look past the 
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corporation as a single person.83 Yet looking past the corporation to those 
“really” responsible is precisely what targeting does. At the moment of lia-
bility the criminal law asserts the corporation’s status as a single agent; at 
the moment of punishment, the criminal law rejects and looks past that very 
same status. Targeting, in other words, threatens the conceptual framework 
establishing corporation’s eligibility for criminal liability in the first place. 
Second, conceptual tensions aside, targeting is a problematic way to 
spread harm among culpable individuals because it hybridizes individual and 
corporate liability in a manner that skirts individual protections. The State 
already has an institution for reaching individuals; corporate-criminal liability 
operates alongside the well-established practice of individual-criminal liabil-
ity. However, targeting enable the State to use corporate-criminal liability as 
a means of punishing individuals on the cheap. Targeting subjects the cor-
poration to criminal liability. But corporations and individuals have different 
criminal-procedure protections. Moreover, the individual who will eventual-
ly be targeted is not on trial, and so cannot press her constitutional protec-
tions. More generally, the corporation and the individual likely have differ-
ent incentives; the former is not a stand-in for the latter. Targeting thus gets 
individual liability on the cheap. After all, though the State is formally hold-
ing the corporation criminally responsible, it is bypassing the corporation to 
impose harm directly on those “really” responsible. Recall that the State 
expresses its condemnation through criminal conviction and punishment.84 
This scenario is not that, but it is so close as to blur the message. Although 
                                                        
83 This is not to suggest that the State cannot look into the corporation—
inspect its structure, determine actions/attitudes of individual—when prosecuting 
a corporation. But the purpose for doing so is to establish evidence of the corpora-
tion’s attitudes and actions (as opposed to, say attitudes of corporate members not 
attributable to the corporation). It remains the case that the corporation is the 
proper object of concern under these circumstances. 
84 Feinberg, supra note 22, at 400 and accompanying text; Hart, Jr., supra note 
61, at 404 (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment 
of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition.”). 
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the targeted individual has not been found guilty, directing harm directly on 
to her sends an unearned message of individual criminal responsibility.  
Third, and relatedly, targeting does a disservice to the State’s effort to 
hold the corporation criminally responsible. As Chapter II demonstrates, the 
argument for corporate-criminal liability stands on its best footing when the 
case concerns structural misconduct, the reduction of which fails to ade-
quately describe our judgments of responsibility. Among other things, the 
conviction of a corporation expresses the State’s judgment that the corpora-
tion, above and beyond some of its members, bears responsibility for the 
misconduct that occurred. To quote Buell:  
A message of institutional fault says something different than a message of 
individual fault: not just that somebody pursued faulty preferences, but 
that the group arranged itself badly. Such a message is apt to lead to 
reevaluation of group arrangements, not just the rethinking of individual 
choice that might follow imposition of criminal liability on a person.85 
Directing harm onto those “really” responsible blurs the State’s mes-
sage. Worse, directing harm might actually undo the State’s message. Cor-
porations may understandably seek to avoid being judged responsible.86 The 
literature is clear that a corporation’s best way to avoid judgments of re-
sponsibility is to identify and hold out a scapegoat.87 By calling out through 
targeting individuals within the corporation “really” responsible for the os-
tensible corporate misconduct, the State is doing for it the corporation’s 
work of distancing itself from the condemnation of criminal responsibility. 
                                                        
85 Buell, supra note 6, at 502. 
86 French, The Hester Prynne Sanction, supra note 6, at 21. 
87 Steven J. Sherman & Elise J. Percy, The Psychology Of Collective Responsibility: 
When And Why Collective Entities Are Likely To Be Held Responsible For The Misdeeds 
Of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL. 137, 163 (2010). 
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3.3.2! Targeting vs. Veil Piercing 
Perhaps it seems I am overly concerned about maintaining criminal 
law’s commitment to the Corporations as Persons view. But to see why it its 
abandonment is so troubling, consider the circumstances under which the 
State looks past the corporation in a similar institution—piercing the corpo-
rate veil for the purposes of contract or tort liability.  
A court may permit victims to pierce the corporate veil—that is, to look 
past the corporation as the ostensible tortfeasor and reach the shareholders 
behind the corporation. However, veil piercing is rarely permitted under 
famously opaque circumstances.88 That said, permissible instances of veil 
piercing generally involve the use of a corporation as a “sham” or “alter 
ego” for the intended purpose of immunizing an individual from expected 
liability. For example, a classic use of veil piercing is to see past an under-
capitalized corporation—that is, the creation of a corporation that manifest-
ly, from inception, cannot in good faith expect to cover its liabilities.89 Other 
representative cases involve incorporating solely to evade responsibility for 
committing fraud or illegal acts.90  
There is a superficial resemblance between targeting and veil piercing: 
both look past the corporation to sanction directly individuals inside the 
corporation. However, the comparison does not flatter targeting.  For one, 
whatever the factors are that license piercing the corporate veil, courts 
across the country are unanimous in their resolution to use the power “only 
in the rarest of circumstances.”91 By contrast, targeting seeks to reform cor-
                                                        
88 E.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) 
(describing discussions of veil-piercing as “enveloped in the mists of metaphor”). 
89 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
Cornell L. Rev. 1036, 1065–67 (1991) (discussing the frequency of undercapi-
talization as a reason given to pierce a corporate veil in tort and contract). 
90 E.g., Kutty v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 764 F.3d 540, 552–53 (6th Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied, — U.S. — , 135 S. Ct. 1162 (2015). 
91 Schultz v. Gen. Elec. Healthcare Fin. Servs. Inc., 360 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Ky. 
2012); accord Dep’t of Transp. v. McMeans, 754 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. 2014); AIG 
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porate punishment in all instances. Yet there is no reason to suspect that 
every case, even most cases, of corporate crime involve the abuse of the 
corporate form.92 For the reasons described above, and given the longstand-
ing reluctance to look past the corporation in nearly every other area of 
law—and even then only in rare cases—we should be very wary of a strategy 
that abandons the Corporations as Persons view for all corporate punish-
ments. 
3.4! Looking to Corporate Law to Fix Criminal Punishments  
If corporate-criminal punishments are to be reformed, criminal law 
seems the wrong place to look for a solution. Neither abandoning criminal 
liability entirely, avoiding criminal fines, nor using fines to target culpable 
members solve the problem of corporate criminal fines. 
This is not to say that the State is entirely unable to influence the distri-
bution of harm. It is here that corporate law has a role to play. However, that 
role is an indirect one, the explanation of which requires understanding both 
the peculiar characteristics of fines and the role that corporate law already 
plays in influencing the distribution of harm from criminal fines. According-
ly, I next explore the pervasive—and in this case, perverse—role that corpo-
rate law plays in creating the problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
                                                                                                                                            
Domestic Claims, Inc. v. Hess Oil Co., 751 S.E.2d 31, 38 (W. Va. 2013); Green v. 
Freeman, 749 S.E.2d 262, 270 (N.C. 2013); Lipsitt v. Plaud, 994 N.E.2d 777, 788 
(Mass. 2013); Canadian Nat. Ry. Co. v. Waltman, 94 So. 3d 1111, 1116 (Miss. 
2012); Comm’r of Envtl. Prot. v. State Five Indus. Park, Inc., 37 A.3d 724, 732 
(Conn. 2012); Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630, 636 (Utah 
2012); Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 215 (Tenn. 2012); see also 
Se. Texas Inns, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 462 F.3d 666, 675 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(applying Delaware law). 
92 Indeed, to suggest as much echoes back to the old, ridiculed (even then) ar-
gument that a corporation cannot be charged with a crime because criminality is 
ultra vires, and so the corporation’s owners by definition are abusing the corporate 
form. See, e.g., Wheless v. Second Nat’l Bank, 60 Tenn. 469, 475 (Tenn. 1872). 
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4! Corporate Law as the Cause of, and a Solution 
to, Criminal Law’s Shortcomings 
At the start of this Chapter I asserted that corporate law can solve the 
problem of corporate-criminal fines. That was a slightly odd way to frame 
the discussion: corporate law causes, or at least contributes substantially to, 
the problem of corporate-criminal fines. The promise is that diagnosing how 
corporate law undermines corporate punishment will reveal how to undo 
the problem. Looking ahead, the key insight is that corporate law as it exists 
today is not some fixed feature of the landscape around which we must op-
erate. Corporate law can be reformed, and corporate-law reform can approx-
imate the preferred distribution of corporate fines while avoiding the short-
comings of the criminal-law strategies discredited in Part 3. 
4.1! Diagnosing Corporate Law’s Role in Undermining Corporate- 
Criminal Fines: Fines as Negotiable Punishments 
Thus far I have specified ways that corporate-criminal fines are similar 
to other punishments. Yet, as compared to most other individual and collec-
tive punishments, corporate-criminal fines are unusual with respect to two 
features. The interplay between these features leads me to describe corpo-
rate fines as negotiable punishments. 
4.1.1! The Fine-Grained Characteristic of Fines 
Fines—as with any monetary exchange—are fungible and divisible. As 
a result, they are amenable to fine-grained, directed distributions amongst 
members. Fines are one of only a few punishments with this characteristic: 
for example, a term of community service meets this description. Under a 
different regime than the one we have, so could a term of imprisonment. 
This fine-grained characteristic matters more in the corporate context, 
because corporate punishments can separate the distribution of harm from 
the imposition of punishment to a degree rarely achievable with individual 
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punishments. By comparison to paradigmatic forms of individual punish-
ment, the particular distribution of harm that obtains is mostly intertwined 
with the punishment imposed. As an illustration, the State does not impose 
a term of imprisonment on an individual and then subsequently ask which 
individual (or individuals) will serve the time. Moreover, although the State 
can take limited steps to control the distribution of harm,93 it cannot control 
whether and which family members bear the harm.  Corporate fines are dif-
ferent. Indeed, this feature is implicit to the idea of targeted punishment; to 
say that the State should assign portions of corporate punishment to indi-
viduals commensurate to their culpability entails that the State has the abil-
ity to carry out fine-grained apportionments. 
So too in the collective context: Many collective punishments come 
prepackaged with an uncontrollable distribution of harm. Punishments that 
target ineliminably collective features of the group—say, the license to prac-
tice in an industry, which is held by the corporation and not any of its mem-
bers—are not subject to easy division. These punishments distribute harm 
like any other punishment. Where they resemble individual punishments 
and differ from corporate-criminal fines is that the harm distributes haphaz-
ardly and is not subject to control. By contrast, it is conceivable that after 
imposing a fine on a collective agent, there is a further question to answer—
namely, which individuals will provide the funds. 
4.1.2! Who Controls the Fine-Grained Distribution? 
Insofar as a fine’s distribution is subject to fine-grained control, there is 
a further question not just of how to distribute the harm but also of who will 
decide the distribution. The importance of this point cannot be overstated. 
Who decides the distribution strongly influences which distribution will be 
adopted; it is the vote-counters, not the voters, who decide the election. 
                                                        
93 See supra note 7 (discussing “pay to stay” laws). This is not the occasion to 
detail the myriad problems associated with these laws. 
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The State could reserve for itself the power to decide a fine’s distribu-
tion. This is the strategy implicitly assumed by advocates of targeted pun-
ishment. Of course, I have already argued that the State should not impose a 
proportional distribution of corporate-criminal fines, but it is perfectly con-
sonant with (and implicit in) this position that the State could impose a dis-
tribution. And while my comments focused on the State targeting culpable 
members to produce a proportional distribution, the State could insist on 
other distributions. For example, the State could insist that harm be distrib-
uted randomly—the ancient practice of decimation being a classic case. On 
one description, the State “decides” the distribution of harm by imposing 
punishments whose distribution is haphazard and beyond anyone’s control; 
in other words, the State could be said to decide the distribution by taking 
away the ability to decide the distribution.   
Alternatively, the State could hand the power to decide a fine’s distri-
bution over to the corporate agent being punished.94 The State would im-
pose the punishment of its choice—provided that the chosen punishment 
were divisible and subject to fine-grained control—and then leave to corpo-
rate members the task of distributing the harm. Taking a formal description 
of this situation, the determination of how to distribute harm would be left 
to the private negotiations of members constituting the corporation. Hence 
the reason I describe this as a negotiable punishment. 
Fines are a paradigmatic example of a negotiable punishment. Rather 
than insist upon any particular distribution at the time of punishment, the 
State allows corporate members to negotiate amongst themselves how to 
distribute harm. The members could, for example, distribute the cost evenly 
across all members or randomly amongst members. The membership could 
organize an investigation and quasi-trial to determine which members were 
culpable and proportion the cost among these members. Alternatively, the 
                                                        
94 See Levinson, supra note 1 (arguing that in many cases of collective sanctions, 
the “sanctioner effectively delegates the deterrence function to this group.”).  
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collective could prospectively designate members who will bear the harm 
resulting from criminal conduct. It would not matter to the State how the 
harm is divvied up, provided the distribution is completely satisfied. 
The implication is that the distribution that reliably occurs—harm dis-
tributes to shareholders and employees—is “negotiated” amongst corpo-
rate members. But plainly, any sense that such negotiations occur in the real 
world is a farce. In reality, nothing like a negotiation occurs to decide which 
members will bear the harm of a corporate fine. The distribution of a corpo-
rate fine is not negotiated amongst members; it is announced to those who 
will bear the harm. Even that characterization overstates the sense in which 
there is any deliberation afoot. It might be better said that there exists a set-
tled, default distribution of corporate-criminal fines, and nothing ever (or 
rarely) occurs to disrupt the default distribution. 
The mismatch between formalism—corporate fines as negotiable pun-
ishments—and the reality of corporate fines is the fault of corporate law. 
4.2! Corporate Law Creates the Problem of Corporate-Criminal Fines 
Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum. How corporate members decide 
to distribute harm is inseparable from—indeed, is all but determined by—
the deliberative structure through which members interact. The outcome 
agreed upon by members within a broadly egalitarian structure—Senators 
on the Senate floor, for example, or partners in a partnership—are likely to 
be quite different from the outcome “negotiated” within a rigidly hierar-
chical structure in which large swaths of decisionmaking authority are con-
centrated in a small class of individuals. Per Chapter II, commercial corpo-
rations have just such hierarchical structures.  
The State plays a pivotal role in producing corporations that consoli-
date and compartmentalize decisionmaking. The State is ultimately respon-
sible for creating, or at least permitting and endorsing entities with hierar-
chical structures. To begin, corporations are partially a creation of state law; 
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founders must receive official recognition in order to take advantage of the 
corporate form. Meanwhile, exactly the role of corporate law is to facilitate 
individuals’ ambitions to pursue (predominantly commercial) collective ac-
tivity and to prove a structure through which to pursue those ends.  
There is no natural corporate law. Corporate law could arrange or en-
courage myriad different structures. As Chapter I details, states used corpo-
rate law in the mid-1800s to control the corporation’s size, purpose, dura-
tion, geographic limitations, ownership rights, degree of shareholder liabil-
ity, and even day-to-day decisionmaking. The 20th century ushered in a dif-
ferent vision for corporate law, one that emphasized “giving the greatest 
freedom and vigor to central management.”95 Although corporate law con-
sists largely of jurisdiction-specific default rules, this has not prevented a 
near-worldwide adoption of a universal corporate foundational structure.96 
Relevant for our purposes, corporate law establishes shareholders as 
owners of the corporation. Yet since at least the turn of the 20th century, the 
practical value of those ownership rights has steadily eroded. That power 
passed first to directors—those charged with running the corporation—and 
then to officers, who are appointed by directors to manage the day-to-day 
affairs. Today, the balance of power within a corporation rests somewhere 
between the officers and directors.97 As for shareholders, so little power 
does the average shareholder wield that, when Facebook went public, it sold 
only a special class of equity—one stripped of any voting rights.98 Given the 
practical value of shareholder voting rights, investors were nonplussed to 
forgo these formal rights. 
                                                        
95 James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corpo-
ration in the Law of the United States 1780–1970 at 57 (1970).  
96 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for 
Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001). 
97 This is a permeable barrier. Most corporations have inside directors—that is, 
directors who are also officers. 
98 James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, New Yorker, May 28, 2012, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/28/unequal-shares. 
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Corporate law provides innocent shareholders precious little ability to 
negotiate the distribution of harm with officers and directors. It provides 
employees even less recourse, a point Chapter IV discusses at length. In-
stead, and as a result, corporate punishments are distributed through and 
out of a corporation as if they are any other cost borne by the corporation. 
Although members could agree to adopt a different distribution—the State 
would not turn down a payment of a fine if, for example, officers had agreed 
to forgo their salaries to cover the cost—the status quo of corporate law vir-
tually guarantees that deviations from the current setup will not occur. In-
deed, plausibly the only negotiations that actually occur surrounding the dis-
tribution of corporate-criminal fines are among the founders in trying to de-
cide whether to incorporate or to adopt instead a different commercial vehi-
cle. The mere decision to incorporate by itself all but guarantees the out-
come of future distributions. 
Thus, we see the crux of the problem. The State entrusts the distribu-
tion of harm to the private negotiations of corporate members, but only after 
creating corporate structures that virtually guarantee those negotiations will 
result in harm being pushed away from culpable members and onto inno-
cent, non-culpable shareholders and employees. In doing so, the State’s 
blind eye towards the influence of corporate law means that it is sabotages 
its own attempt to punish corporations with criminal fines. 
4.3! Why Reform Corporate Law to Save Criminal Fines? 
I want to defend first in the abstract the claim that corporate-law re-
forms are better than criminal-law options, including targeting. Put another 
way, I argue that the State should do indirectly what I have already suggest-
ed it should not do directly. Part V uses executive-compensation clawback 
provisions to illustrate how to address negotiating imbalances through cor-
porate-law reform, while simultaneously providing a template for reform. 
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4.3.1! Reforming Corporate Law is Preferable to Targeting 
Corporate-law reform has the potential to approximate a proportional 
distribution of harm while avoiding each problem identified with targeting. 
First, both targeted punishment and corporate-law reforms would at 
best approximate an ideal, proportional distribution; it is not clear if either 
would produce a close approximation. On the one hand, insofar as corpo-
rate-law reforms occur antecedently to any particular crime being commit-
ted,99 the best we should probably expect is that corporate-law reforms in-
oculate from receiving distributions of harm classes of reliably innocent, 
non-culpable individuals—shareholders and employees—while leaving 
those in charge to negotiate amongst themselves the ultimate distribution. 
On the other hand, targeted punishments must grapple with the same messy 
reality. Even if an idealized targeted fine would distribute harm more exactly 
in line with the proportional distribution, well-rehearsed epistemic realities 
make obtaining this idealized outcome implausible. Using corporate law to 
push harm away from innocent, non-culpable classes will likely fare no 
worse than targeting in approximating an ideal proportional distribution. 
Second, corporate-law reforms are less likely to invite questionable cir-
cumventions of individual rights or undermine the State’s effort to con-
demn the corporation separate from its members. Recall that one problem 
with targeting was that the State’s distributing the harm from corporate 
punishment called individuals for being “really” responsible for purportedly 
corporate misconduct. This created the impression of punishing individuals 
without affording them constitutionally due criminal-procedure protections. 
Meanwhile, it undermined the State’s own message of corporate condemna-
tion by creating and highlighting a State-endorsed scapegoat. 
This problem does not recur with corporate-law reforms. The goal of 
corporate-law reform is to influence intra-corporate negotiations in such a 
                                                        
99 I mean lexical priority, not necessarily temporal priority.  
  139 
manner as to encourage and empower members to agree upon distributions 
of harm that fall proportionately on culpable individuals. For its part, the 
State is shifting how the harm of a prospectively criminal corporation’s pun-
ishment will distribute amongst individuals. That is, the State is altering de-
fault positions for hypothetical cases of wrongdoing; it is not identifying ac-
tually culpable individuals. 
Third, corporate-law reforms are not in tension with the Corporations 
as Persons view. One problem with targeting is that it preempts or second-
guesses the internal deliberations of corporate members; targeting looks past 
the corporate person to reach culpable individuals directly. The reason this 
was a problem for targeting is that criminal law is premised on the idea that 
the corporation is a single person eligible for, and deserving of, criminal lia-
bility separate from its members. Thus, targeting presupposes a conception 
of corporations that is inconsistent with the vision of corporate personhood 
criminal law must maintain in order to provide a sound moral and conceptu-
al foundation of corporate-criminal liability. 
Corporate law carries no such burden. Quite the opposite: corporate 
law is in the business of creating the default rules and procedures that help 
give rise to the possibility of corporations that can qualify as persons in the 
criminal, and other legal, contexts. This is embodied in corporate law’s em-
brace of the Corporations as Structure view. To suggest that corporate law 
looks past the corporate person gets the relationship entirely backwards—
corporate law creates the conditions for the corporate person to exist. 
How does this play out in the context of corporate-criminal fines? Un-
der the status quo, fines distribute harm primarily to shareholders by virtue 
of structures, created and influenced by corporate law, that render intra-
corporate negotiations utterly predictable. If the State were to use targeted 
fines while leaving corporate law undisturbed, then it would preempt the 
(predictable) outcome of corporate negotiations and substitute in its own 
judgment for how the harm of a corporate-criminal fine should be distribut-
ed. This normatively preferable distribution imposed by the State would 
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come at the cost of the view of corporate personhood that licenses corpo-
rate-criminal responsibility in the first place. 
By contrast, corporate-law reforms can alter the background internal 
structure against which corporate negotiations occur. This sort of reform is 
entirely within the prerogative of corporate law (whether it is advisable to 
exercise this prerogative is a question I take up shortly). Done well, it would 
have the effect of producing intra-corporate negotiations that approximate 
proportional distributions. In other words, the criminal law would be able to 
fine a corporation, leave to the private negotiations of members how to dis-
tribute the harm, and trust that culpable members would endure most of the 
harm—all without invading intra-corporate negotiations in a manner that 
puts the foundations of corporate-criminal liability in jeopardy. 
The key insight is that the critique of targeting from the vantage of the 
Corporations as Persons view gets its purchase by smuggling in a corporate 
structure that makes shareholder harm a reliable outcome of intra-corporate 
negotiations. Unburdening the criminal law of this corporate arrangement is 
the key to solving the problem of corporate-criminal fines. 
4.3.2! Solving the Problem of Corporate-Criminal Fines is Worth Re-
forming Corporate Law 
Assume I am correct that corporate-law reform promises a better option 
than criminal-law strategies to fix the problem of corporate-criminal fines: it 
avoids blurring the State’s message, it does not circumvent individual 
rights, and it shows the right amount of respect for corporate decisionmak-
ing. Even if all this were true, why should the State be interested in attempt-
ing this sort of reform? Put another way, does the problem of corporate-
criminal fines merit a corporate-law solution? 
I believe it does. First, we need to be realistic about corporate law’s role 
in the world. Corporate law is not some immutable property of the universe. 
I do not worry about interfering with some natural state of corporate struc-
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tures, because no such mythical state exists. Corporate law can and does 
change—Chapter I demonstrates how drastic those changes have been. 
Moreover, corporate law is still in flux today, even with respect to questions 
about the proper distribution of harm amongst members. For example, in 
the mid-1980s Delaware permitted a corporation, through its bylaws, to lim-
it or eliminate entirely directors’ personal liability for violations of their duty 
of care.100 Currently, the Delaware legislature is debating whether to permit 
“loser-pay” provisions, which would make shareholders who bring a deriva-
tive suit, not the corporation, pay the litigation costs of a failed suit.101 
To be sure, the fact that corporate law can change does not mean that 
we should consider the entire enterprise up for grabs. For one, the current 
state of corporate law reflects centuries of incremental reform developed 
across state, federal, and international jurisdictions. For another, altering a 
doctrine that controls the foundational structures of hugely sophisticated 
entities can have profound consequences. The background rules of corpo-
rate law, and enterprise law generally, should not be tinkered with lightly. 
Nevertheless, there are three reasons not to shy away from the prospect 
of using corporate law to fix the problem of corporate-criminal fines. First, 
corporate law inescapably impacts a corporation’s structure in ways that, at 
least as far as criminal law is concerned, are deeply problematic. It is im-
portant to realize that I am not advocating using corporate law to solve just 
any problem. Rather, I am advocating reforming corporate law to solve a 
problem created by corporate law. Put another way, I am trying to get corpo-
rate law out of the way of the State’s objective to hold corporations crimi-
                                                        
100 Del. Code § 102(b)(7); see generally Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Di-
rectors’ Liability: Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) and The Erosion of The Directors’ Duty 
Of Care, 136 Penn. L. Rev. 239 (1987). 
101 C. Steven Bradford, The Death of Loser-Pays in Delaware, Bus. L. Prof 
Blog (June 15, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law 
/2015/06/the-death-of-loser-pays-in-delaware.html (discussing the continued via-
bility of ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 553 (Del. 2014)). 
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nally responsible. This is particularly important because, at a fundamental 
level, the State has chosen to use a tort/crime model of regulation rather 
than a corporate-law model of regulation. We should endeavor to protect 
corporate law from sabotaging its regulatory replacement. 
Second, I expect we can cabin the consequences of corporate-law re-
form insofar as we are working in the narrow context of corporate crime. 
Granted, any reform has the potential to produce spillover consequences. 
That said, my reforms are tied to a corporate conviction; I don’t intend to 
alter anything about the corporate structure except how it is to respond to 
the distribution of harm associated with criminal punishment. 
Finally, the State currently accepts a status quo that permits, and some-
times encourages, corporations to treat criminality as a business plan. 
Meanwhile, the State endorses a world where investors should be willing to 
gamble on the prospect of criminal activity the same as they would a bad PR 
strategy or poor product rollout. I agree with Mueller that the State should 
not “add a [criminal law] gamble to the economic gamble which already in-
heres in most, if not all, stock market ventures.”102 Fundamentally, this tol-
erance is a mockery of what the criminal law is supposed to represent. It also 
betrays the absolute minimum limitation on corporations—the only rem-
nant of the nineteenth century’s belief that incorporation should serve a 
public goal—which today exists in nearly all corporation’s articles of incor-
poration: the corporation must confine its activities to “any lawful act.”103 If 
corporate law contributes significantly to this dysfunction, it behooves us at 
least to explore reform. I turn now to what such a reform might look like. 
                                                        
102  Mueller, supra note 3, at 40. 
103 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3). 
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5! Putting Theory to Practice: Clawback Provi-
sions as a Model for Reform 
Here I sketch the broad parameters of a policy reform consistent with 
the account I have developed. My intention is to demonstrate how we might 
start thinking of using corporate law to ameliorate the problem of corporate-
criminal fines without (A) abandoning corporate-criminality, (B) abandon-
ing corporate-criminal fines, and (C) altering fundamentally the nature of 
fines as a form of negotiable punishment. A centerpiece of my proposal is a 
new clawback provision—what I call the corporate-crime claw-
back—that applies when the State imposes a corporate-criminal fine.  
5.1! Clawback Provisions: An Overview 
Before getting into the proposal, it is worth discussing clawback provi-
sions in general: what they are, how they fit into corporate law, and why 
those that exist today are fail to solve the problem of corporate crime. 
5.1.1! Clawback Provisions Initiated by Corporations 
In its basic form, a clawback provision is a term, included either in an 
employment contract or in the corporation’s compensation policies, that 
allows the employer to recoup previously paid out incentive compensa-
tion—bonuses, stock options etc., but not earned income—under pre-
negotiated circumstances. One paradigmatic circumstance: an employee 
commits fraud against or on behalf of the corporation.104 Incentive payments 
awarded for this period could be recouped; in essence, the corporation is 
                                                        
104 Clawback provisions are also beginning to be used as a form of non-compete 
clause. See, e.g., American Express Co., Definitive Proxy Statement in Connection 
with Contested Solicitations (Form DEFC14A) 37–38 (Mar. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4962/000119312512121814/d302637dd
efc14a.htm (identifying “working for certain competitors” as an instance of “det-
rimental conduct” triggering the clawing back of compensation). 
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recovering funds that were paid out under the false pretense of job perfor-
mance, which itself may have exposed the corporation to liability as a result. 
A corporation may adopt a clawback provision policy voluntarily.105 
However, clawback provisions have recently exploded in popularity; where-
as fewer than 20% of Fortune 100 companies had such provisions in 2006, 
today that number is close to 90%.106 A major driving force is that corpora-
tions are responding to the federal government’s attempt to use clawback 
provisions as a tool of corporate governance.  
5.1.2! Clawback Provisions Initiated by the Federal Government 
To date, there have been three federal legislative attempts to develop 
clawback provisions applicable to corporations. First came the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).107 SOX empowers the SEC,108 rather than 
corporate directors, to claw back incentive payments to the CEO and CFO 
of a publically traded company after an “accounting restatement due to the 
material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct.”109 Nota-
bly, the misconduct at issue need not have actually been carried out by the 
                                                        
105 Id.; see also Sam Sharp, Note, Whose Money is It Anyway? Why Dodd-Frank 
Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks Are Bad Public Policy, 10 Geo. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 321, 337–39 (2021) (collecting examples). 
106 Equilar, Inc., 2013 Clawback Policy Report at 5 (2013), available at 
http://info.equilar.com/rs/equilar/images/equilar-2013-clawbacks-policy-report. 
[hereinafter 2013 Equilar Report]. 
107 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
108 The SEC has been slow to exercise its authority. Gretchen Morgenson, 
Clawbacks? They’re Still a Rare Breed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/business/clawbacks-theyre-still-a-rare-
breed.html. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 7243(A) (2012). 
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CEO or the CFO; misconduct by any employee suffices to ground an action 
by the SEC provided the misconduct led to material noncompliance.110 
Next came the Trouble Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) as part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.111 TARP’s clawback provi-
sions differ substantially from those in SOX. Among other things, the provi-
sions apply beyond the CEO and CFO.112 Further, TARP mandated that 
directors adopt their own clawback provisions, but further required that 
those provisions be enforced under triggering circumstances. That said, 
those triggering conditions never occurred; no institution receiving TARP 
funds ever executed one of its clawback provisions.  
Most recently, and of most interest for my purposes, Congress in 2010 
passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”).113 Dodd-Frank’s rules concerning clawback provisions 
have not yet been set by regulators114; nevertheless, the broad parameters 
bring together elements of past federal interventions with elements from 
clawback-provision policies that corporations have voluntarily adopted. Like 
SOX, Dodd-Frank allows for recovery because of an “accounting restate-
ment due to the material noncompliance of the issuer”; however, Dodd-
                                                        
110 S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1075–76 (D. Ariz. 2010); accord 
S.E.C. v. Microtune, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 867, 886 (N.D. Tex. 2011) aff’d sub nom. 
S.E.C. v. Bartek, 484 F. App’x 949 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[15 U.S.C. § 7243(A)] con-
tains no personal wrongdoing element . . . that would require scienter or misconduct 
on behalf of the officers in order to trigger reimbursement.”). 
111 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, P.L. 110-343 § 111, 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5221). 
112 12 U.S.C. § 5221(a)(3) (2012) (covering “senior executive officer[s] and any 
of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees”). 
113 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
114 Indeed, regulations governing clawback provisions may be (merely) pro-
posed this year. Joshua Miller & Andrea Rattner, SEC Announces Open Meeting on 
Proposed Clawback Requirements under Dodd-Frank Act, JDSupra Bus. Advi-
sor, June 29, 2015, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-announces-open-
meeting-on-proposed-95808/. 
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Frank does not require that the misreporting be the result of misconduct.115 
Like TARP, Dodd-Frank covers individuals beyond the CEO and CFO.116 
Where Dodd-Frank diverges from SOX and TARP’s approach is that it in-
centivizes, but does not require, corporations to create their own clawback 
policies implementing the goals outlined in § 78j-4(b) and subsequent regu-
lations.117 Thus, Dodd-Frank influences the corporate structure, creating a 
clawback provision that directors may(?) enforce to recoup incentive pay-
ments. 
5.1.3! The Benefits and Problems of Clawback Provisions 
As someone interested in the distribution of harm amongst members in 
a corporation, clawback provisions are an enticing mechanism. An executed 
clawback provision straightforwardly redistributes costs away from share-
holders and towards officers. Equally promising, clawback provisions have 
the potential to distribute harm proportionate to culpability. 
Nevertheless, there are several features that make the recent spate of 
clawback provisions unsuitable for my project of repairing the problem of 
corporate-criminal fines. First, clawback provisions under SOX, TARP, and 
Dodd-Frank are limited in scope with respect to the industries affected, the 
types of activities that trigger recoupment, and the individuals who are sub-
ject to clawback provisions. In particular, these clawback provisions only 
tangentially relate to the broader issues of corporate crime. In one respect, 
corporate crime is broader than extant federal regulation. Corporate crime is 
neither industry-specific nor limited to accounting and securities fraud. As 
illustration, clawback provisions under SOX, TARP, and Dodd-Frank would 
                                                        
115 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-4 (2012). 
116 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(b)(2) (allowing recovery from “any current or former ex-
ecutive officer of the issuer who received incentive-based compensation”). 
117 It does so by prohibiting non-complying corporations access to national se-
curities exchanges. So, “incentivize” might understate it. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4(a). 
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not apply to any cases of corporate crime discussed in Chapter II.118 In a dif-
ferent respect, corporate crime is narrower than federal regulations. That is, 
neither “material noncompliance” nor “misconduct” by an employee will 
necessarily rise to the level of criminality, particularly if evaluated through 
the lens of the reforms articulated in Chapter II. Insofar as I am interested in 
approximating proportional distributions of harm—that is, distributions that 
are responsive to culpability—these brands of clawback are unappealing.  
Third, and most fundamentally, the execution of clawback provisions is 
mired by profound incentive problems. Indeed, federal interventions can be 
seen as an effort to create clawback provisions that will actually be enforced. 
SOX left enforcement to the SEC. TARP made enforcement mandatory up-
on directors. The largest regulatory fight currently surrounding Dodd-Frank 
is whether the SEC should make the enforcing of clawback provisions man-
datory.119 Irrespective of whether making clawbacks mandatory is good poli-
cy, it reflects the fact that clawback provisions are rarely exercised. 
To understand the incentives problem, consider first why clawback 
provisions were uncommon when their adoption was an issue of private ini-
tiative—viz., in the absence of federal regulations pressuring their adoption. 
Directors have several reasons to resist having their powers “expanded” to 
allow them to hunt down disbursed payments. Directors work closely with a 
corporation’s executives. It is common practice for one or more members of 
the executive team to serve simultaneously as directors of the corporation. 
Inasmuch as officers have an outsized role in influencing who will be a direc-
                                                        
118 Indeed, corporate-criminal liability may be less important in industries that 
have pervasive administrative oversight and regulation. See Vikramaditya Khan-
na, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis, 82 Wash.U.L.Q. 95 
(2004) (identifying conditions under which a corporate conviction is preferable to 
civil or regulatory alternatives). That said, a preference for corporate-criminal lia-
bility presumes systematic enforcement by civil regulators. In reality, as Buell 
notes, prosecutors today often use corporate-criminal liability as a quasi-substitute 
to compensate for regulatory laxity. Buell, supra note 67, at 93–96. 
119 See Sharp, supra 106, at 336–41. 
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tor in the future, directors are often beholden to officers in ways that the le-
gal regime does not capture. Directors might understandably (if cravenly) 
want to simply avoid a situation where they could be called upon to upset 
their relationship. Less cynically, even directors in support of clawback pro-
visions likely recognized the first-mover dangers inherent in adopting them. 
In the competitive landscape of executive recruitment, shepherding through 
provisions to claw back executive compensation might diminish the corpora-
tion’s prospects when it comes to recruiting top executive talent.120 
Meanwhile, shareholders have virtually no ability to create clawback 
provisions, or to ensure their enforcement. Absent a specific provision in 
either the certificate of incorporation or the corporation’s bylaws, compen-
sation policies fall within the exclusive purview of the board of directors.121 
Amending the certificate of incorporation to include a clawback-provision 
policy is a non-starter for shareholders; any amendment must be proposed 
by the board of directors.122 Shareholders are able to amend the corpora-
tion’s bylaws,123 but the process is arduous. Moreover, shareholders have 
effectively no recourse if directors decline to enforce a clawback provi-
sion.124 Removal of a director is possible, but challenging; removing multiple 
directors—enough to make a difference—can be exponentially harder.125 
And even if shareholders convinced a court that the directors’ duties to the 
corporation required they exercise clawback provisions, by now most corpo-
rations have adopted Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) or its jurisdictionally relevant 
                                                        
120 But see 2013 Equilar Report, supra note 106, at 4 (finding limited evidence 
that “[t]he lack of a clawback does not lead to higher pay”). 
121 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(h) (2013) (“Unless otherwise restricted by 
the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, the board of directors shall have the au-
thority to fix the compensation of directors.”).  
122 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242 (2013). 
123 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2013). 
124 Enforcement almost certainly could not be mandated in a bylaw, as it would 
likely interfere with the director’s judgment to run the “business affairs of the cor-
poration,” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2013), which courts guard carefully. 
125 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k). 
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counterpart, which immunizes directors from damages for breaching pre-
cisely the duty of care. In short, directors have little more incentives to exer-
cise clawback provisions than they did to adopt them in the first place. 
5.2! The Corporate-Crime Clawback 
With an understanding of clawback provision on the table, turn now to 
my proposal to use corporate law to influence proportional distributions of 
harm resulting from a corporate-criminal fine.  
The proposal has two key components. First, the State should hold di-
rectors jointly and severally personally liable for a fine imposed as a result of 
a corporate conviction. This means that the set of directors will be personal-
ly responsible for the entire fire.126 Because liability would be joint and sev-
eral, directors may negotiate amongst themselves how to divvy up the fine. 
Second, the State should provide a series of model bylaws, which cor-
porations may adopt at their discretion, that allow directors to distribute the 
costs of a criminal fine to other members of the corporation. Chief among 
them, a model bylaw will outline the conditions for adopting a corpo-
rate-crime clawback—one that allow directors to shrink their liabil-
ity with funds recouped through the corporate-crime clawback. 
5.2.1! Joint and Several Liability for Directors 
Consider each component in more detail. First, the State should hold 
directors joint and severally liable for corporate-criminal fines. The motiva-
tion here is not that directors are culpable per se, thereby deserving to pay 
the harm of a corporate fine.127 Admittedly, it is antecedently more likely 
that the set of culpable members within a corporation will include directors 
than that it will include shareholders; distributing harm to directors makes it 
                                                        
126 I consider tweaks to this requirement in the Objections section. 
127 Contra Sepinwall, supra note 81, at 435–44. 
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more likely than the status quo that some culpable parties will bear the harm 
of corporate punishment.  
Regardless, the motivation behind holding directors personally liable is 
that directors are in the best position to negotiate a proportional distribution 
amongst corporate members. After all, recall that “the impact point is not 
necessary the final resting point, or incidence, of the burden.”128 In this re-
spect, this component of my proposal might be best described as creating a 
type of vicarious director liability. Under the status quo, unfortunately, di-
rectors lack both incentives and a clear pathway within the corporate struc-
ture to negotiate a proportional distribution. Making directors personally 
liable addresses the lack of incentives by establishing a new baseline distribu-
tion, one different from the default distribution that applies to all other cor-
porate costs. Whereas in the status quo director inaction results in share-
holders bearing the cost of a corporate fine, under my proposal director in-
action means directors will be paying out of pocket. 
5.2.2! Model Bylaws  
The central innovation of my proposal is to provide directors, now hav-
ing been incentivized to avoid the harm of corporate-criminal fines, with 
clear mechanisms through which they can distribute harm in a manner that 
approximates a proportional distribution. To that end, I advocate a model 
bylaw that allows the corporation to recoup incentive payments made to in-
dividuals who are culpable for the corporation’s misconduct.  
This sort of clawback provision—the corporate-crime claw-
back—should have the following features. First, the corporate-crime claw-
back applies to any member of the corporation, past or present, found to be 
culpable for the misconduct that produced a corporate conviction. This mir-
rors TARP and Dodd-Frank in one respect—it reaches beyond the CEO 
and CFO—but differs in that it grounds the basis for eligibility upon one’s 
                                                        
128 Levinson, supra note 1, at 377. 
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culpability for corporate misconduct. Second, director liability is diminished 
in proportion to funds recouped from culpable members. Third, a model 
bylaw should specify procedures for investing and adjudicating culpability in 
a manner that protects against director exploitation. Key procedural protec-
tions should include: an opportunity for a hearing, clear standards of proof, 
third-party adjudication and/or review of culpability determinations, etc.129  
5.3! Evaluating the Proposal and Anticipating Objections 
No policy proposal survives contact with the real world. That said, on 
the account provided here, I can venture answers to a few key questions and 
respond to a few probable objections.  
5.3.1! Answering the Problem of Corporate Fines 
First, does my proposal solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem of 
corporate-criminal fines? Absolutely. Consider first the penological benefits. 
My proposal would improve the deterrent effect of corporate-criminal fines. 
Recall that fines, even large fines, were unlikely to deter corporate miscon-
duct. This is in large part because those running the firm are, to a large ex-
tent, personally unaffected by a corporate fine. My proposal creates a mech-
anism to impose those costs on directors, officers, and other high-level em-
ployees. In doing so, it disrupts the status quo dynamic that unites the inter-
ests of officers and directors against those of shareholders. Moreover, as 
members inside the corporation—and especially members with broad pow-
ers to monitor and direct corporate internal deliberations—directors may be 
both well-positioned and, thanks to my reforms, well incentivized to cir-
cumvent the epistemic obstacles that plague state enforcement.130 
                                                        
129 One could do worse than to look at the factors articulate by Judge Friendly. 
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 Penn. L. Rev. 1267 (1975). 
130 See Levinson, supra note 1, at 379 (“Collective sanctions thus have the po-
tential to leverage group solidarity by substituting more efficient intra-group moni-
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A further virtue of the corporate-crime clawback is that it can improve 
deterrence even for corporate crimes where officers are not the obvious tar-
get for the brunt of a proportional distribution. I consider this an an im-
provement on similar attempts to improve deterrence, and consistent with 
the fact that the personal culpability for corporate misconduct is idiosyncrat-
ic to the particular corporation and particular misconduct. Thus, my ac-
count is not committed to the view that officers are the only individuals cul-
pable for misconduct, even if they are likely candidates.131  
Separately, my proposal would ameliorate the cost-of-doing-business 
problem. Recall that the root of the problem is that corporate-criminal fines 
are indistinguishable from any other financial imposition on a corporation. 
That would not be true under my proposal. By creating an incentive struc-
ture that inoculates, or at least pushes the harm away from, shareholders 
and onto officers, corporate-criminal fines are readily distinguishable from 
civil monetary penalties. Accordingly, corporate-criminal fines would be 
unique from other financial sanctions to the extent they approximated a 
proportional distribution. 
                                                                                                                                            
toring and control mechanisms for less efficient externally imposed sanctions 
aimed at individual wrongdoers.”). 
131 Buell, supra note 6, at 529 (“It is easy to imagine serious harm produced by 
lower-level employees (such as telemarketing salespeople who defraud) without 
the knowledge of high managers, but explainable by institutional norms.”). But see 
Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? 
Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. Corp. Fin. 1, 52 
(1999) (“[O]ur evidence is consistent with the view that efforts of top management 
can and do affect corporate crime’s occurrence. Even where the culprits are lower-
level employees, corporate crime does not appear to be a random event beyond top 
management’s control. The evidence is that incentives of top management affect 
conduct at all levels of the corporate hierarchy.”). 
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5.3.2! Distinguishing from Targeted Punishment 
One could imagine a complaint that I have created a targeted punish-
ment—one that targets directors—which I spent so long decrying. Howev-
er, such a complaint misunderstands the nature of my proposal. There are 
several reasons why my proposal avoids the pitfalls of targeted punishment. 
First, as previously explained, the directors are not facing harm because 
they are culpable per se. The harm of a corporate-criminal fine defaults to 
them because they are best in a position to institute a proportional distribu-
tion. Second, my proposal leaves ample room to decide the ultimate distri-
bution of the harm according to the private negotiations of members. By vir-
tue of joint and several liability, directors are in a position to negotiate 
amongst themselves who should bear the burden of the harm. Directors 
stand in relatively egalitarian relations to one another; qua director, no one 
director has any more power than another. Accordingly, we can feel confi-
dent that decisions about how to divvy up their personal liability—equally, 
according to an assessment of culpability, according to personal wealth, 
etc.—will be negotiated in a meaningful sense. Likewise, officers and high-
ranking employees have powerful de facto authority within a corporation; 
they are well positioned to negotiate with directors the issue of personal cul-
pability. Crucially, the class of shareholders and low-level employees—who 
are institutionally unable to effectively defend their interests, and whose 
number of culpable members is vanishingly small—are protected from bear-
ing the harm of fines.132 
                                                        
132 As an aside, I could imagine circumstances arising under which it might be 
desirable for shareholders to bear the cost of a fine.  Accordingly, I would take seri-
ously a bylaw that passes the cost from directors onto shareholders, provided that 
the decision met with majority approval of shareholders after conviction (i.e., there 
could be no bylaw giving directors blanket authority to pass on costs). 
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5.3.3! Other Objections 
The magnitude of corporate-criminal fines makes my proposal infeasible. It is 
the rare board of directors that can personally afford $1 billion in fines. 
However, recall that most fines are significantly more modest: the median 
fine over the past 15 years is $125,000, while the average fine is $7 million.133 
More to the point, we may not need gigantic fines, which we have seen are 
an unsuccessful solution to a problem of deterrence that my policy solves in 
a different way. On my proposal, smaller fines could nevertheless accom-
plish the desired effect. Indeed, per Guttel and Teichman, smaller fines may 
have the benefit of increasing the number of prosecutions.  
If the State were to continue imposing large fines, a similar effect could 
be achieved by holding the directorship personally responsible for a portion 
of the fine. A sentencing court could calculate the board’s responsibility ac-
cording to a variety of factors. It could limit personal liability to earnings re-
ceived as a director (or some multiplier thereof). It could hold directors re-
sponsible for a portion—either a percentage or an absolute amount—of the 
total fine. I am not in a position to announce the best implementation strate-
gy, but I trust that sentencing courts could develop best practices. 
 
Executives will neuter the policy by insisting on higher salaries instead of in-
centive-based payments. Likely they will try; there is some evidence to suggest 
that they are already doing so in response to federal regulations.134  
However, it is important to remember why employment contracts have 
incentive payments in the first place—to align employee’s personal interests 
with the corporation’s interests. That is, incentive-based payments already 
are not in the interests of employees when the same value could come in the 
                                                        
133 For comparison, each clawback executed by the SEC, to the limited extent 
the SEC actually exercises its authority under SOX, often brings in over $1 million. 
134 Claudia H. Deutsch, A Brighter Spotlight, Yet the Pay Rises, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/business/06comp.html (not-
ing that executives are insisting on compensation not tied to performance). 
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form of a salary. Directors are not likely to abandon entirely this well-settled 
mechanism merely because officers now dislike them more. 
Indeed, my proposal has an advantage over other clawback provisions. 
In the ordinary case, directors insisting on incentive-based payment are act-
ing in the best interest of the corporation. Under my proposal, directors now 
further have a personal financial interest to include incentive payments in 
contracts, particularly for the sorts of employees positioned to participate in, 
or otherwise produce corporate misconduct. Accordingly, I expect that of-
ficer pushback will be met with stiffer resistance under my proposal than 
under the evolving status quo. 
 
Directors will avoid harm by scapegoating hapless employees. This I expect 
to be the thorniest aspect that a model bylaw would have to face. I cannot 
address the issue in every permutation, but I can say a few things.  
Ideally, under my proposal directors would pursue in good faith two 
goals: to identify culpable individuals (and, if possible, some measure of 
their culpability), and to protect non-culpable individuals. However, insofar 
as directors benefit personally each time they find a culpable individual, they 
may be tempted to pay short shrift to the latter goal. 
Any model bylaw should prioritize creating a fair process through which 
directors may exercise their powers to use the corporate-crime clawback. 
We can look to administrative law for guidance on what constitutes fair pro-
cess; modifying Matthews v. Eldridge to the current setting would mean bal-
ancing the weight of the interest of the corporation in identifying culpable 
individuals, the weight of the interest in individuals not being wrongly found 
culpable, and the marginal benefit gained from additional process.135 I favor 
strong procedural rights—in particular, the use of third-party investigations 
                                                        
135 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Matthews establishes the three-
part modern doctrine for assessing how much process is due. 
  156 
and neutral tribunals136—for several reasons. First, individuals have much to 
lose from a corporate-crime clawback. Analogizing to SOX, the few SEC 
enforcement cases frequently claw back millions of dollars in incentive com-
pensation—one case clawed back a staggering $468 million from a single indi-
vidual.137 Second, as explained, directors have conflicting interests. Accord-
ingly, while some processes may be too onerous to make corporate-crime 
clawbacks feasible, the burden should fall to directors to make this case. 
More importantly, and process aside, I want to note two things in de-
fense of my proposal with respect to scapegoating. First, although we should 
worry about scapegoating, it would be naïve to pretend that this problem is 
not already ongoing. The discussion of DocX in Chapter II tells a familiar 
story; a corporation avoids conviction in exchange for building the govern-
ment’s case against an individual within the corporation. Or, consider Sie-
mens—a corporation responsible for paying out $1 billion in a global bribery 
scheme the existence of which insiders described as “common knowledge” 
inside the firm.138 Although Siemenes pleaded guilty, its punishment was 
greatly reduced for its “outstanding” help in developing cases against mid-
dle managers at the corporation. Garrett summarizes the outcome of these 
individual prosecutions as follows: “The Banker’s fears were thus realized. 
He was right that individual low-level employees like him would get prose-
cuted as scapegoats while those at the top would go free.”139 At least under 
                                                        
136 Among the conditions of an adequate hearing, according to Judge Friendly: 
an unbiased tribunal; notice of the accusation and its grounds; an opportunity for 
defense, including evidence, witnesses, and cross-examination; and a decision 
based exclusively on the evidence presented. See generally Friendly, supra note 129. 
137 SEC, Former UnitedHealth Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Back-
dating Case for $468 Million, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2007/2007-255.htm. 
138 Brandon Garrett, To Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Com-
promise with Corporations 2 (2014). 
139 Id. at 9. 
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my proposal, the scapegoating might lead to financial disgorgement rather 
than imprisonment—a small consolation, but a consolation nonetheless. 
But my proposal might offer greater consolation than this. Notice who 
is unlikely to experience the corporate-crime clawback: shareholders and 
low-level employees. Shareholders cannot have costs passed to them be-
cause they are not compensated by incentives (they are owners). And more-
over, low-level employees are effectively immune from scapegoating: either 
they do not receive incentives, or any incentives they do receive are small 
enough to not be worth the effort to recover. In short, there is cautious room 
for optimism that adequate process could help to produce proportional dis-
tributions, bolstered by the low bar set by the status quo. 
 
My proposal outsources the State’s duty to carry out justice and punishment 
to private corporations. Yes and no. The State is still responsible for convict-
ing the corporation and deciding the appropriate punishment; it then depu-
tizes the corporation to carry out the punishment.  
But justice is already being outsourced—that is the central insight to be 
gleaned from recognizing corporate fines as negotiable punishments. I am 
not advocating handing over penal authority to corporations; I am advocat-
ing that the State take seriously the decision it has already made to hand 
over this authority. If the State is going to hold corporations criminally re-
sponsible, it further has reason to insist on distributions of harm that work to 
the benefit both of the State and of non-culpable individuals. Put another 
way, my proposal aims to creates space for better “private govern-
ments”140—that is, an internal structure that protects non-culpable mem-
bers who experience harm under the status quo in a manner that under-
mines the State’s penological interests. As Elizabeth Anderson has detailed, 
                                                        
140 Elizabeth Anderson, Keynote Address as the Princeton Univ. Tanner Lec-
tures on Human Values: Private Government 5 (Mar. 15, 2015). (“Private govern-
ment is government that has arbitrary, unaccountable power over those it gov-
erns”); id. at 1–3 (identifying corporations as private governments). 
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corporations themselves are private governments—and particularly dicta-
torial ones at that.141 Introducing some semblance of quasi-judicial process, 
combined with protection for the most vulnerable corporate members, 
should provide something of a step away from corporate dictatorships. 
6! Conclusion 
Corporate-criminal fines are a ubiquitous form of punishment, yet they 
neither secure penological benefit to the State nor serve the interests of 
those innocent individuals who suffer harm in response. Although this prob-
lem of corporate-criminal fines is perceived as a failing of criminal law, there 
corporate law is the real culprit. By leaving the distribution of harm to the 
private negotiations of members, all the while creating corporate structure 
that silence most members’ ability to participate in any such negotiations, 
corporate law undermines the very institution of criminal law that arose as 
its regulatory replacement. Only by restructuring the relationship of corpo-
rate and criminal law—say, through the corporate-clawback provisions de-
scribed here—can we expect to make traction on the problem of corporate-
criminal fines. 
 
 
 
                                                        
141 See id. at 1–3. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUNISHING CORPORATIONS WITH  
CORPORATE REFORM: THE UNFULFILLED  
AMBITION OF CORPORATE PROBATION 
 
1! Preface 
Plenty of ink has been spilled on the idea of corporate-governance re-
form—that is, reforming corporate law to fix any number of perceived fun-
damental problems with the corporation. To my knowledge, no has pro-
posed leveraging the corporate-governance literature in a different way: to 
punish recidivist corporations. 
Essentially, my proposal amounts to gathering together different re-
forms proposed in the corporate-governance literatures, sorting them ac-
cording to the broad structural problem they aim to fix, and offering them as 
a sort of menu for sentencing courts to employ through probation against 
recidivist or pervasively criminal corporations. I refer to this coterie of off-
the-rack corporate reforms, and thus my new proposed corporate punish-
ments, as forced restructuring or simply restructuring. Us-
ing a particular corporate-governance reform as an illustration, I demon-
strate one major value to restructuring: standard objections to corporate re-
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form fall apart when the conversation switches from the ordinary commer-
cial context to the domain of criminal law. 
Restructuring is more than just a good idea—it fills a valuable gap in our 
practices of corporate punishments. To make this point, I scrutinize Chap-
ter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines, which covers the punishment of or-
ganizations. The adoption of Chapter Eight reflects an effort to broaden the 
array of punishments applicable to corporations; Chapter Eight creates a 
spectrum of corporate punishments that had not previously existed. At one 
extreme Chapter Eight makes possible existential punishment more severe 
than any fine; at the other extreme, the Guidelines created a probation sys-
tem as a less severe form of punishment. However, I demonstrate that the 
Guidelines also planted the seeds for a new potential punishment. Restruc-
turing is perfectly situated to fill this space, and thus to realize the full po-
tential of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
To support this claim, I look beyond the Guidelines to the broader justi-
fications, and methods of implementation, for criminal punishment general-
ly. Restructuring falls into the spectrum of corporate punishment in approx-
imately the same place as do imprisonment and supervised release in the 
comparable spectrum of individual punishment. I discuss imprisonment and 
supervised release together because the two punishments are tightly inter-
twined with respect to method, function, and contribution to the State’s 
pluralistic approach to justifying punishment. As it turns out, restructuring 
operates according to similar methods and serves the same penological in-
terests to imprisonment and supervised release—methods and interest cur-
rently unrepresented by the panoply of corporate punishment. 
Restructuring is not imprisonment for corporations; analogizing corpo-
rate and individual punishments requires taking seriously real differences 
between corporate and individual persons. That recognized, restructuring 
can and should serve as a spiritual successor of sorts, one that combines as-
pects of imprisonment and supervised release into a punishment specially 
suited for corporations.  
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Situating restructuring in our practices of punishment—both as a need-
ed contribution to the spectrum of corporate punishments, and as a corpo-
rate counterpart to the methods and penological justifications served by im-
prisonment and supervised release—vindicates the idea of restructuring. 
Restructuring is not just an interesting idea, not just technically possible un-
der current law, but in fact a necessary innovation that realizes the unmet 
potential of our current approach to corporate punishment. 
2! Using Corporate Restructuring as Punishment 
2.1! The Contested Ground of Corporate Reform  
There is an active literature on corporate reform, sometimes operating 
under the title of corporate-governance reform. Over the years, plenty of 
reforms have been developed in responses to myriad shortcomings in the 
corporate status quo.1 These reforms have met with sustained resistance 
from the defenders of the status quo, arguing in essence that (A) commer-
cial corporations are fine just the way they are,2 or (B) reforming corpora-
tions to be something other than they are would only make matters worse.3 
For the sake of simplifying discussion, I will limit my attention to one 
corporate reform in particular: adopting the German model of director-
                                                        
1 See generally Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate 
Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (2007) 
(cataloguing proposed reforms); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Progressive 
Corporate Law: New Perspectives on Law, Culture, and Soci-
ety (1995) (same); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate 
Governance, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431 (2006) (providing a framework for 
evaluating proposal related to corporate social responsibility). 
2 The most famous articulation of this position comes in Milton Friedman’s re-
jection of corporate social responsibility. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility 
of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times. Mag., Sep. 13, 1970. 
3 E.g., D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 
Emory L.J. 985 (2008) (responding to Kent Greenfield, Debate: Saving the World 
with Corporate Law?, 57 Emory L.J. 947 (2007)). 
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ship composition, which I explain below. Although any particular proposal 
will have its unique benefits and criticisms—the German model has an am-
ple literature surrounding it4—the dialectic between reformers and apolo-
gists is broadly similar across proposals. I am confident that most everything 
I say about the German model will apply to any other proposal to reform 
corporations or corporate governance. 
What is the German model? Start with the particular problem motivat-
ing the call for this reform. Our current corporate framework overlooks the 
importance of the employee as a stakeholder in the success of a corporation. 
Under the American model,5 the legal structure of a corporation—that 
is, the background rules of corporate law that govern and shape a corpora-
tion and the interrelationships of its members—focuses nearly exclusively 
on three classes: shareholders, directors, and officers. Employees (other 
than officers) are virtually absent from the legal framework; they have “have 
no role, or almost no role, in the dominant contemporary narrative of corpo-
rate law.”6 Yet, of course, employees are a vital constituency within a cor-
poration.7 The complaint is not just about a lack of representation for its 
                                                        
4 E.g., Florian Stamm, A Comparative Study of Monitoring of Management in 
German and U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Are the German Enrons, 
Worldcoms, and Tycos?, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 813 (2004); Marleen A. 
O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate 
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 936-65 (1993); The-
odor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate 
Governance in the United States and Germany, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 31, 36 (2005); 
Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse 
at German Supervisory Boards, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1819 (1996); Timothy L. Fort & 
Cindy A. Schipani (FNaaa1), Corporate Governance in A Global Environment: The 
Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 829 (2000). 
5 I use as a proxy for the American model corporate law enacted by Delaware or 
recommended by the Model Business Corporate Act, which together form the 
primary contours of corporate law as it exists today in America. 
6 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 
283, 283 (1998). 
7 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 250 (1999). 
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own sake.8 Critics have catalogued ways those running the corporation bru-
talize, humiliate, and otherwise denigrate employee’s dignity.9 More gener-
ally, employees are ever subject to the potential of brutality10; the modern 
corporation leaves employees without representation and without recourse. 
The German model incorporates employees into the legal framework 
and decisionmaking structure of a corporation by guaranteeing employees 
representation on a corporation’s board of directors.11 The German model 
gets its name from German corporate law, which requires, among other 
things, a very different directorship structure as compared to Anglo-
American corporations. German corporations have two boards: a manage-
ment board, consisting of executives responsible for managing the corpora-
tion’s day-to-day affairs; and a supervisory board, which oversees and ap-
points members to the management board.12 The supervisory board is com-
                                                        
8 Cf. Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, Putting a Stake in Stakeholder Theory, 88 J. 
Bus. Ethics 605 (2009) (noting confusion in the corporate-governance litera-
ture over whether stakeholder theories say more than that stakeholders should be 
recognized as having interests). 
9 See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Recharting the Map of Social and Political Theory: 
Where is Government? Where is Conservatism?, BleedingHeartLiberatians.com (June 
12, 2012),  available at http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2012/06/recharting-
the-map-of-social-and-political-theory-where-is-government-where-is-
conservatism (listing examples of employee abuse, and noting that “25% of Ameri-
can workers say their workplace is a dictatorship” (internal citations omitted)). 
10 As List and Petit note, “the imbalances of power between corporate enti-
ties” creates a situation of “power at its most perfect: power that does not need to 
be actively exercised to have an effect.” Christian List & Philip Pettit, 
Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corpo-
rate Agents 184 (2011). 
11 There are other reforms meant to address this problem. E.g., Robert A. 
Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (1986) (arguing for the 
moral necessity of workplace democracy as a means of, inter alia, protecting the 
interests of employees). Historically the United States has relied on a system of 
voluntary employee unions to counterbalance corporate power. It is beyond the 
scope of this project to discuss the various explanations for the decline in employee 
unions, and the subsequent effect on worker protections. 
12 Andre Jr., supra note 4, at 1283–85. 
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posed partially of shareholder representatives and partially of employ-
ee/labor representatives; members of the management board are prohibited 
from serving on the supervisory board.13 By comparison, formally under the 
American model the board of directors consists exclusively of shareholder 
representatives. Meanwhile, senior executives routinely serve simultaneous-
ly as directors. Absent a dramatic departure from corporate law’s default 
rules, a corporation under the American model denies employees an avenue 
for electing directors. 
2.2! Standard Objections to Reform 
Again, there are a host of arguments for and against adopting the Ger-
man model of corporate directorship that are specific to the problem diag-
nosed and the efficacy and rightness of the proposed solution. I want to ab-
stract from the minutiae to introduce, without comment, what I take to be 
four standard objections to corporate reform, which I frame in terms of the 
German model but can be extended to most corporate reforms. 
2.2.1! The Status Quo is the Best Possible Arrangement 
Overwhelmingly, corporations have voted with their feet to adopt the 
American model over the German model. It may be possible for corpora-
tions to succeed under the German model—after all, there are prominent, 
successful German corporations. However, neither has the German model 
spread far past Germany.14 Instead, the American model has spread around 
the world.15  
                                                        
13 Id. at 1286. 
14 David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate an Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325, 1392 (1998) (noting that there are “powerful 
constraints on opting out” of the German model for German corporations). In part 
German corporations are constrained by legal requirements surrounding board 
composition. See, e.g., Act Concerning Co-Determination of Employees of May 4, 
1976, Mitbestimmungsgesetz, 1976 BGB1. I 1153 (mandating equal representation 
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The widespread adoption of the American model, both by corporations 
and by countries developing their own corporate law, is strong circumstan-
tial evidence that the American model is the best method available for ar-
ranging intra-corporate relationships. Inasmuch as commercial corporations 
overwhelmingly drive economic growth, we should encourage adoption of 
the most successful model of corporate activity. The State should not pre-
clude the adoption of what we have good reasons to think are best practices 
with respect to corporate management.  
2.2.2! Abandoning “Good Enough” is Risky and Costly 
Suppose that the German model were better than the American model 
in the abstract. It does not follow that shifting from a “good enough” sys-
tem to a questionably better one would be worth the costs.  
The American model was not created overnight. It has evolved, across 
two centuries and across multiple jurisdictions, into its current form. In-
deed, it still evolves to address new challenges in an ever-changing econo-
my.16 The claim above is that the evolution of corporate law through “labor-
atories of democracy” likely produced the best possible corporate law, but it 
may be that this common-law style development produced only a “good 
enough” corporate law. Even still, this incremental, piecemeal testing and 
revising represents the best way to identify necessary reforms and imple-
ment them. Abandoning a centuries-old approach to testing and refining 
                                                                                                                                            
between shareholders and employees for all corporations with more than 2000 em-
ployees). 
15 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439 (2001). 
16 See, e.g., Phillip S. Crain et al., Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection Clauses: Del-
aware Passes New Legislation, Nat’l L. Rev. (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fee-shifting-and-forum-selection-clauses-
delaware-passes-new-legislation. 
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corporate law guarantees massive transition costs while offering uncertain 
benefits at the risk of unpredictable consequences.  
2.2.3! Corporate Reform Cannot Avoid the Race to the Bottom  
Corporate reform, even if laudable, is fundamentally unenforceable. 
New Jersey’s rise and fall as the locus of corporate activity is an elegant ex-
ample of what happens when the State tries to reorganize corporations in a 
manner that does not serve the interests of those currently running the cor-
poration. At the end of the nineteenth century, New Jersey became the cen-
ter of the corporate universe by adopting reforms sought by corporations of 
the day. Approximately 95% of major corporations reincorporated in New 
Jersey within fifteen years after New Jersey began its reform movement.17 
Yet today Delaware, not New Jersey, is the locus of corporate activity. Two 
reasons explain the change. First, Delaware mimicked New Jersey by adopt-
ing its corporate-law reforms.18 Second, and more importantly, New Jer-
sey’s then-governor Woodrow Wilson enacted several progressive reforms 
intended to rein in the power of corporations within his state.19 The corpo-
rations left New Jersey and never returned. 
As corporations have gone international, so too has corporate law. As a 
result, the number of available jurisdictions too has grown—any number of 
which would love to become the next Delaware. Corporations facing an un-
attractive enough reform will simply relocate to a more hospitable jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, we have already seen recently several examples of American 
firms expatriating to avoid taxes through “corporate inversion,” whereby a 
                                                        
17 Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2008) (citing 
Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 Am. J. 
Legal Hist. 160, 164 (1982)). 
18 Smith, supra note 3, at 1006. 
19 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 
1888–1936, 50 Harv. L. Rev., 27, 43 & n.67 (1936). 
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corporation re-incorporates in another jurisdiction by having its assets pur-
chased by another corporation.20  
2.2.4! Autonomy 
The State should not be engaged in the practice of regulating how indi-
viduals choose to associate.21 Corporations, after all, are merely associations 
of individuals bound together through a complicated nexus of contracts.22 
Regulate commercial activity through external rules and regulations—with 
respect to the German model, a bevy of laws and regulations already protect 
employees. But leave to individuals the freedom to organize the manner in 
which they pursue their commercial ends consistent with external rules. 
This approach has been the hallmark of corporate regulation since its 
transition from the Corporations as Systems view to the Corporations as 
Persons view around the turn of the twentieth century—a transition that 
proved tremendously beneficial to society writ large. To that end, corporate 
law gives corporations freedom to organize as they see fit; most of corporate 
law consist of default rules that can be supplanted by corporate members as 
they wish. On this point, the American model does not prevent a corporation 
from putting employees (or their representatives) on the board. By the same 
token, neither should the State mandate the composition of corporate 
                                                        
20 E.g., Liz Hoffman, The Tax Inversion Wave Keeps Rolling, Wall St. J., July 
7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/horizon-pharma-at-the-nexus-of-taxes-and-
deals-1436296946; Zachary Mider, The Greatest Tax Story Ever Told, Bloom-
berg, Dec. 18, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2014-12-18/i-
hear-america-singing-never-pay-taxes-the-inversion-operetta (describing the first-
ever corporate inversion); see generally Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-
Based Multinational Businesses: Analyzing the Causes for, Effects of, and Solutions to 
the Corporate Inversion Trend, 23 Nw. J. Int’l Bus. 551 (2003). 
21 U.S. Const. amend. I ( “right to peaceably assemble”). 
22 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) (coin-
ing the phrase that a corporation is merely a “nexus of contracts”). 
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boards. To force corporate to give employees representation deprives 
shareholders of their property interests, and more generally deprives corpo-
rate members their freedom to contract and arrange their private activity. 
 
***** 
Some of these arguments are more compelling than others are; that 
said, for my part, the standard objections taken together pose a meaningful 
response to corporate reformers. I am not going to wade into the substantive 
debate over the German model—or any other corporate-law reform, for that 
matter. Rather, what I intend to demonstrate is that the force of the stand-
ard objections is drastically diminished when we shift the debate from the 
ordinary commercial context and into the rarefied world of corporate-
criminal punishment. 
2.3! Restructuring: Using Corporate Reforms as Punishment 
Start with my proposal to use restructuring as punishment: Sentencing 
courts should impose, as a condition of corporate probation, structural re-
forms on a criminal corporation. In particular, courts should take corporate 
reforms developed by reformers, intended to be applied to the corporate 
community writ large, and force criminal corporations to adopt those re-
forms. 
Sticking with the German model as an example, I will illustrate restruc-
turing using British Petroleum (“BP”) as a test case. BP is a serial corporate 
offender. From 2005–10, BP garnered 97% of its industry’s worst violations 
available under OSHA regulations.23 An overwhelming portion of these vio-
lations was for “plain indifference to employee safety and health,” while the 
rest were for “intentional disregard” of regulatory requirements and federal 
                                                        
23 Pierre Thomas et al., BP’s Dismal Safety Record, ABC News, May 27, 
2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-dismal-safetyrecord/story?id=10763042. 
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law.24 The Deepwater Horizon spill was the second fatal disaster for the 
corporation in ten years; each incident claimed several lives and injured 
hundreds more.25 A vast majority of the victims were employees or contrac-
tors of either BP or its subsidiaries.  
It is no stretch to conclude from this data that BP’s corporate structure 
and associated culture systematically disregards the safety of the environ-
ment and others—especially its own employees. Indeed, a federal commis-
sion said as much, stating the cause of the spill “can be traced to a series of 
identifiable mistakes made by BP [and its partners] that reveal such system-
atic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture 
of” all those involved.26 
Using restructuring as punishment, a court that found BP guilty of 
manslaughter after the Deepwater Horizon spill could have imposed the 
German model upon BP as a condition of its probation.27 BP would have to 
guarantee that representatives of the corporation’s employees constituted a 
meaningful portion of the board of directors, while removing insider direc-
tors from the board. This seems a fitting response not just to the conditions 
that gave rise to the specific crime itself, but further to the systemic corpo-
rate failing likely to cause similar tragedies in the future—viz., the fact that 
                                                        
24 See OSHA, Federal Employer Rights and Responsibilities Following an 
OSHA Inspection, https://www.osha.gov/Publications/fedrites.html (discussing 
the spectrum of violations under 29 CFR § 1960). 
25 Brandon Garrett, To Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Com-
promise with Corporations 150 (2014). 
26 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore 
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling at vii 
(2001), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/ 
pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
27 See Dep’t. of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. Pleads Guilty, Is 
Sentenced to Pay Record $4 Billion for Crimes Surrounding Deepwater Horizon 
Incident (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-
exploration-and-production-inc-pleads-guilty-sentenced-pay-record-4-billion-
crimes (confirming BP’s guilty plea to eleven counts of felony manslaughter). 
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BP routinely fails to give adequate consideration to the wellbeing and safety 
of its employees. BP’s German model restructuring promises to remedy this 
problem by giving employees a meaningful voice within the corporation. 
The German model is an example of how restructuring should be ap-
plied to BP. In general, the German model is well-suited for corporations 
whose criminal misconduct reflects, or derives from, inadequate attention to 
employee’s interests.  
That said, my proposal more broadly is to provide courts with a range of 
corporate reforms suitable for addressing different sorts of systematic short-
comings in criminal corporations. Providing such a menu of corporate re-
forms would allow sentencing courts to assign pre-designed conditions of 
reform based on the nature of the offender’s misconduct. 
2.4! Standard Objections to Corporate Reform Fall Away in the Con-
text of Criminal Punishment 
The standard objections to corporate reform, to the extent they have 
traction in the ordinary commercial context, slip away in the face of my re-
structuring proposal. This is because the standard objections are broadly 
motivated by concerns that are inapplicable to criminal punishment. Indeed, 
some arguments that previously militated against reform in the broader 
commercial context plausibly support using restructuring as punishment. 
2.4.1! The Status Quo is the Best Possible Arrangement 
The American model may well be the most efficient method for organ-
izing corporate activity towards productive ends. However, efficiency and 
productivity concerns are simply not germane when discussing punish-
ment.28 The consideration of whether and how to punish is not constrained 
                                                        
28 Of course, some have argued for making efficiency a central virtue of our 
criminal practice. See Richard Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 
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by efficiency; as Chapter III demonstrates, punishment spills over harm in 
ways that can be tremendously inefficient. Moreover, corporate punishment 
especially should not embrace efficiency as a relevant consideration. As we 
saw, this sort of pricing out the costs of criminal activity contributes to the 
sentiment that criminal punishment is an ordinary cost of doing business. So 
to point out that a shift towards the German model would render the pun-
ished corporation less efficient or productive is not an argument against us-
ing the forced adoption of the German model as punishment. 
Indeed, forced reforms that decrease a corporation’s profitability may 
actually be desirable insofar as they constitutes one way in which the corpo-
ration experiences punishment. Far from productivity arguments being a 
strike against restructuring, in the context of criminal punishment they 
count as a potential argument in favor of forced reform—or, at least, a con-
firmation that restructuring constitutes corporate punishment. 
2.4.2! Transition Costs of Abandoning “Good Enough” 
This criticism fails to attach to the extent that it focuses on the wrong 
scope. In the ordinary reform context, we are worried about the effect of 
systemic changes to corporate law. By contrast, in the criminal context, re-
forms are being imposed only against a single corporation.  
Worries about transition costs and unintended consequences are less 
salient when talking about one corporation rather than the entire economy.29 
Moreover, courts would not be restructuring just any corporation. At issue 
is a corporation whose pervasive, systematic, or repetitive misconduct indi-
cates an internal structure so corrupted as to, essentially, be either unable or 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 409, 415 (1980). Regardless, that is decidedly not our 
practice, nor is it obviously a desirable change. 
29 Indeed, this approach may have the incidental benefit of creating pilot cases 
from which to observe the effect of alternative corporate governance structures. 
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unwilling to prevent criminality. Criminality counsels in favor of punish-
ment; systematic criminality counsels in favor of drastic punishment.  
Finally, as explained above, concerns about harm to the corporation are 
misplaced to the extent we are interested in criminal punishment. Harm to 
the defendant is an essential component to criminal punishment; pointing 
out that a corrupted corporation will experience harm under restructuring is 
just a way of restating that the corporation is being punished. 
2.4.3! Race to the Bottom  
As Chapter I noticed, one benefit to regulating corporations through 
criminal law is that criminal regulation is immune to race-to-the-bottom 
concerns in a way that corporate law is not. Whereas a corporation can rein-
corporate in a new jurisdiction in order to avoid changes to corporate-law 
reform, relocation is unlikely to help a convicted corporation escape crimi-
nal punishment.  
Indeed, in this respect the globalization of corporate commercial activi-
ty has actually made it harder for corporations to escape criminal penalties.30 
Major federal convictions over the past decade go beyond American corpo-
rations to include South Korean technology companies, European banks, 
and Japanese pharmaceutical companies. Where globalization undermines 
the State’s ability to enforce the law through corporate reform, globalization 
actually aids the State in enforcing regulation through criminal law. 
2.4.4! Autonomy 
Arguments for corporate autonomy might actually be stronger in the 
criminal context that in the ordinary commercial context, for reasons I hint-
                                                        
30 See Rashna Bhojwani, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public And Private En-
forcement Collide, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 66, 68 (2012) (describing the impact of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); accord Garrett, supra note 25, at 239–40. 
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ed at in Chapter III. Ordinarily, corporate autonomy is not sacrosanct; indi-
viduals may have broad rights of association, but that does not mean that 
they get the benefits of the corporate form no matter the form they take. 
Moreover, corporations are not merely a nexus of contracts; they are a nex-
us of contracts registered with the State in order to secure benefits—limited 
liability, freestanding constitutional protections, etc.—that cannot be gener-
ated out of thin air through private agreement.31 
All that said, the institution of criminal law is premised on a view that a 
corporation is a single agent. Piercing that conception at least creates a ten-
sion that I sought to avoid in the context of criminal fines. Concerns about 
corporate autonomy are surmountable. However, I think it best to delay the 
discussion until the Coda. 
 
***** 
In summary, whatever the arguments against corporate reform, they are 
made significantly weaker when conversation switches from the ordinary 
commercial context to the context of criminal punishment. Indeed, many 
arguments that would count against corporate reform in the ordinary con-
text actually count in favor of using forced corporate reform as punishment.  
In the next section I argue that courts could impose restructuring, right 
now, under the guise of corporate probation. In other words, there already 
exists a legal basis for courts to impose restructuring. The subsequent sec-
tion takes a broader view of our practices of punishment to argue that re-
structuring is more than just a good idea with a plausible legal basis; it is a 
necessary complement to our extant practices of corporate punishment 
whose adoption would realize the full potential of the Guidelines. 
                                                        
31 Stefen J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 Okla. L. Rev. 327 
(2014) (“[L]imited liability is the biggest obstacle in the way of nexus-of-contracts 
theory gaining unquestioned dominance.” (citing Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liabil-
ity and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev. 80, 82, 83 (1991))). 
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3! The Existing Legal Basis for Restructuring 
Corporate probation as it is enumerated in the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines provides an adequate legal hook for courts to begin imposing restruc-
turing today. Strictly speaking, there is no need for a pre-existing legal basis 
to consider such a policy. Nevertheless, I show that such a basis already ex-
ists because I think it helps to see that this sort of punishment is anticipated, 
and because it lays the groundwork for thinking about the role that restruc-
turing plays as punishment. In particular, a robust system of restructuring 
fulfills the potential of corporate probation as it exists in the Guidelines. 
3.1! A History of the Expansion of Methods of Corporate Punishment  
For most of the time that corporations have been eligible for criminal li-
ability, the only available punishment was a criminal fine.32 This changed in  
1991 when the United States Sentencing Commission promulgated Chapter 
Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines, which governs the sentencing of organi-
zations.33 Although today the Guidelines are merely advisory,34 they never-
theless still carry great weight in providing the basis for most punishments 
imposed against corporations.35  
                                                        
32 E.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958) (“As in the 
case of corporations, the conviction of [a partnership] can lead only to a fine levied 
on the firm’s assets.”) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River Ry. 
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909) (“We see no valid objection in law, and 
every reason in public policy, why the corporation . . . shall be held punishable by 
fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom it has entrusted au-
thority to act…”) (emphasis added); cf. State v. Ice & Fuel Co., 81 S.E. 737, 738 
(N.C. 1914) (It is true that, when the statute imposes a penalty of a fine or impris-
onment, only the fine can be placed upon a corporation.”). 
33 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amd. 421 (U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n 2003) (adopting “Chapter Eight (Sentencing of Organizations)” effec-
tive Nov. 1, 1991) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. 
34 See United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 220 (2005). 
35 Most, but not all. For example, the Guidelines do not apply to environmental 
crimes with respect to fines, but do apply with respect to restitution. U.S.S.G. 
  175 
To be sure, the Guidelines still encourage using fines as punishment. 
The vast majority of Chapter Eight is dedicated to calculating the appropri-
ate fine to impose based on a broad array of considerations.36 However, and 
more importantly for my purposes, Chapter Eight also expanded the spec-
trum of punishments applicable to corporations and other organizations.37  
3.2! Forced Termination: An Extreme, Absentee Punishment 
At one extreme, the Guidelines empowered a court to terminate a cor-
poration. Although technically accomplished through a specially calculated 
fine, the Guidelines permit a sentencing court to “to divest [an] organiza-
tion of all its net assets.”38 This punishment is severe, and as such the 
Guidelines reserves its usage to only an organization that “operated primari-
ly for a criminal purpose or primarily by criminal means.”39 Courts are ex-
tremely wary to impose this existential fine; to my knowledge, forced termi-
nation under the terms of Chapter Eight has been used only once.40 
Worth noting is an analogue to forced termination, which exists just 
outside of the criminal-justice system—namely, within regulatory agencies 
under the guise of “collateral consequences” to conviction. Calling these 
sanctions collateral consequences should not change the fact that they are 
                                                                                                                                            
§§ 8C2.1 cmt. n.2 (fines); 8A1.1 (restitution); see generally U.S.S.G. app. B (collect-
ing sentencing statutes, some of which supersede the Guidelines). 
36 U.S.S.G. §§ 8C1.1–8C4.11.  
37 Chapter Eight also establishes a requirement that a conviction organization 
pay restitution or otherwise make amends (which make include community ser-
vice). U.S.S.G. §§ 8B1.1–4. However, the Guidelines makes explicit that “[t]he 
resources expended to remedy the harm should not be viewed as punishment, but 
rather as a means of making victims whole for the harm caused.” U.S.S.G. ch. 8, 
pt. B, introductory cmt. This accords with common sense: a thief is not punished 
by being forced to return that which he stole. 
38 U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1. 
39 Id. 
40 See United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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clearly punishment, and should be considered as such.41 At issue are sanc-
tions imposed by the federal government directly in response to a federal 
criminal conviction. In particular, regulators in various industries have the 
discretion—and in some cases are required—to disbar or suspend the or-
ganization’s license to do business in the regulated industry or with the fed-
eral government.42 For example, organizations convicted of any of a broad 
range of felonies are automatically prohibited from participating in any fed-
eral healthcare program for a minimum of three years.43 The EPA takes a 
similar approach to mandatory debarment, as do other statutes.44 Mandato-
ry-suspension regulations exist in the accounting, securities, and banking 
sectors; meanwhile, regulators have authority to impose a much broader ar-
ray of similar sanctions.45 Likewise, the federal government automatically 
                                                        
41 See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Preda-
tors,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 670, 670–80 (2008) (noting that distinctions between 
direct consequences—i.e., punishments—and collateral consequences are often 
arbitrary and more a matter of historical convention than logic). 
42 For my part, I think these sanctions should be expressly treated as punish-
ment by putting them under the auspices of a sentencing court for a host of reasons 
concerning institutional competence, agency capture, and expressive clarity. 
43 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7(a) (2012) (mandatory-exclusion provision); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 1001.101 (identifying scope of mandatory-exclusion provision). 
44 See, e.g., U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, Suspension and Debar-
ment: Some Agency Programs Need Greater Attention, and 
Governmentwide Oversight Could Be Improved, Aug. 2011, availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585277.pdf (collecting statutes); Project on 
Gov. Oversight, Federal Contractor Misconduct: Failures Of 
The Suspension And Debarment System, May 10, 2002, available at 
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2002/co-fcm-20020510.html (same). 
45  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2000); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (2000); Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1818(a)(2) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(2) (2008) (prohibiting convicted ac-
counting firms from advising publicly traded companies). 
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excludes from participating as a federal contractor nearly any corporation 
convicted of a crime.46  
At least on paper, regulatory suspension is a less severe sanction than 
termination: the corporation could enter a new business, or wait out the pe-
riod of suspension. In reality, it is widely understood to be functionally 
equivalent to forced termination—so much so that regulatory suspension is 
often referred to colloquially as a “corporate death penalty.”47 Why this is 
the case plays an important role in explaining the impossibility of corporate 
imprisonment, which I defer discussing until Section 4.4.  
Like forced termination, regulatory suspension is rarely implemented. 
Indeed, notwithstanding its ostensibly mandatory character, regulators have 
recently found ways to circumvent its application. For example, a spate of 
guilty pleas secured against major banks in 2015 came only after the SEC 
prearranged to grant the banks waivers from regulatory suspension.48 Nev-
ertheless, the combination of the Guidelines and a raft of federal regulations 
create at least a (faint) specter of existential punishment for corporations. 
3.3! Corporate Probation: A Curious Punishment 
Chapter Eight did more than create an existential alternative to fines. It 
also created corporate probation, which can be less severe than a fine. 
Whether there is more to corporate probation is the focus of this section.  
                                                        
46 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (debarment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (identifying 
conditions under which to grant excusal from debarment); see also 33 U.S.C. § 
1368(a) (mandating debarment upon a conviction under § 1319(c)). 
47 E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in Prosecu-
tors in the Boardroom 179 (2011); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fic-
tion of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine through the Corporate 
Death Penalty, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 949–50 (2005). 
48 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes 
Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. Times: Dealbook, May 20, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-
billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest-rate-cases.html. 
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Corporate probation is an odd and underexplored punishment. If it 
were indistinguishable in character from the federal probation applicable to 
individuals,49 then I would have scant ground to defend my claim that forced 
restructuring is already within the power of courts. However, that is not the 
case. Although corporate probation superficially resembles probation appli-
cable to individuals, upon closer inspection it draws inspiration from two 
separate punishments. To appreciate this oddity requires detouring slightly 
to discuss two forms of punishment applicable to individuals: (ordinary) 
probation and supervised release. 
3.3.1! Ordinary Probation vs. Supervised Release 
The federal system has a system of probation that applies to individuals 
(and, ostensibly, organizations),50 which allows for the imposition of proba-
tion, in lieu of imprisonment, on offenders who commit either a misde-
meanor or a low-level felony.51 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this pun-
ishment as either probation or ordinary probation; this is in dis-
tinction to corporate probation, which I use to refer to the specific 
punishment detailed in Chapter Eight of the Guidelines. Ordinary probation 
represents a kinder alternative to the harsh punishment of imprisonment, 
albeit one that operates under the threat of imprisonment.52 
Separately, the federal system has a system of supervised release, which 
is an analogue to the system of parole once used by the federal government 
and still used by many states.53 “Supervised release, in contrast to proba-
                                                        
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2012). 
50 18 U.S.C. § 3561. 
51 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a). 
52 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3565(a)(2), (b) (identifying conditions under which a court 
may or must resentence an individual who violates the terms of probation). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Supervised release is not parole; there is no such thing as 
federal parole (at least not applicable to crimes committed after Nov. 1, 1987). The 
regimes are not-coextensive, but the differences are not germane to this project.  
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tion, is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.”54 Rather, supervised re-
lease is imposed at sentencing to be served immediately upon completion of 
a term of imprisonment.55 Thus, supervised release is not a standalone pun-
ishment; it is derivative of imprisonment. By that I mean that a court cannot 
impose only a term of supervised release—supervised release must follow 
some period of imprisonment.56 
Although it can impose many of the same conditions as probation im-
poses, supervised release is a much harsher and more invasive punishment. 
First, the imposition of supervised release presupposes an individual’s for-
mer incarceration, thus signaling a more serious degree of criminality. Se-
cond, whereas violations of probation can trigger resentencing—i.e., impris-
onment—those on supervised release have already served their term of im-
prisonment. Nevertheless, §3583 allows courts to sentence violators to serve 
the rest of their term either in prison or under house arrest—up to five years, 
depending on the nature of the original crime (not the nature of the violation 
of supervised release).57 
Third, supervised release is more expansive in its invasion into individ-
ual autonomy. Probation under federal law consists of an enumerated set of 
conditions, some of which a court must impose and others that a court has 
                                                        
54 United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50 (1994).  
55 18 U.S.C. § 3583. While supervised release is not mandatory—judges have 
discretion not to impose a term of supervised release—“more than 95 percent of 
people in the federal system sentenced to a term of imprisonment were also sen-
tenced to a term of supervised release.” Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sen-
tencing: The Imposition of Supervised Release, 18 Berkley J. Crim. L. 180, 182 
(2013) (citing U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Federal Offenders Sen-
tenced to Supervised Release 50 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Sem
inar/2012/2_Federal_Offenders_Sentenced_to_Supervised_Release.pdf). 
56 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a); United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 56–58 (2000) 
(discussing the relationship between imprisonment and supervised release). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)–(4). 
  180 
limited discretion to impose.58 By contrast, 18 U.S.C. § 3583 lists mandatory 
and recommended conditions of supervised release. However, it further 
empowers courts to fashion their own conditions of supervised release, pro-
vided only that a bespoke condition is “reasonably related” to the penologi-
cal objectives and “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reason-
ably necessary.”59 Fueled partially by a lenient standard of review, courts 
have interpreted this power extremely capaciously. In fact, in light of exam-
ples discussed in Section 4.2.1, I would argue that courts effectively disre-
gard the “deprivation of liberty” requirement. 
Put simply, although superficially similar, probation and supervised re-
lease are drastically different forms of criminal punishment that occupy 
starkly different spaces in our practices of punishment. 
3.3.2! Corporate Probation as an Amalgamation of Ordinary Proba-
tion and Supervised Release 
Corporate probation is an odd amalgam of probation and supervised re-
lease, able to act as either depending on the circumstances. For example, 
corporate probation must be imposed in cases where no fine is employed.60 
In this respect, corporate probation mirrors ordinary probation under 
§ 3561—that is, it is a milder punishment issued in lieu of the harsher pun-
ishment (a fine for corporations, imprisonment for individuals). And corpo-
rate probation includes most of the same mandatory and voluntary condi-
tions of probation as does ordinary probation—chiefly, prohibiting further 
criminal activity during probation, notifying victims of criminality, and per-
forming community service or other remedial actions.61 
                                                        
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a) (mandatory conditions); (b) (discretionary conditions). 
59 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2). 
60 U.S.S.G. 8D1.1(a)(7). 
61 Compare U.S.S.G. §8D1.3(1)–(2) (conditions of corporate probation), with 18 
U.S.C. § 3563(a) (conditions of ordinary probation). 
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On the other hand, corporate probation can be used in a manner similar 
to supervised release. For one, corporate probation can be imposed in addi-
tion to, instead of merely in lieu of, harsher punishment. Of particular inter-
est to this project, the Guidelines require that corporate probation be im-
posed if it “is necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organi-
zation to reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct.”62  
Also like supervised release, a court has authority to impose any condi-
tions of corporate probation “that (1) are reasonably related to the nature 
and circumstances of the offense or the history and characteristics of the 
organization; and (2) involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as 
are necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing.”63 In practice, and again 
similar to supervised release, this power has been interpreted capaciously. 
As a result, a court’s “opportunity to remedy corporate misbehavior 
through [conditions] of probation is almost endless.”64 
3.4! Why a Legal Basis for Restructuring under the Guidelines is Insuf-
ficient to Establish the Practice 
To the extent that corporate probation provides a legal hook for mas-
sive corporate reform, my policy of restructuring could fit soundly here. 
However, although courts frequently impose corporate probation,65 vanish-
ingly few courts take advantage of the broad license the Guidelines afford 
them. But if courts already have the power to restructure recidivist or oth-
erwise structurally corrupted corporations, then why aren’t they doing so? 
After all, the Guidelines themselves identify as an overarching priority of 
                                                        
62 U.S.S.G. 8D1.1(a)(6). 
63 U.S.S.G. 8D1.3(c). 
64 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437, 1439 (2009). 
65 Sixty-eight percent of organizations sentenced from 1999–2012 received pro-
bation. Data compiled by author using information provided by the United States 
Sentencing Commission, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and 
_Statistics/index.cfm. 
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organizational sentencing “to reduce and ultimately eliminate criminal con-
duct by providing a structural foundation from which an organization may 
self-police its own conduct.”66 
Three reasons explain this reticence. First, courts lack guidance. The 
Guidelines are not entirely silent; they encourage courts to impose a condi-
tion of probation requiring the corporation to adopt an “effective compli-
ance program.”67 The Guidelines even provide some detail as to what com-
pliance programs should consist of.68 Beyond this, however, courts are on 
their own should they feel that some other form of restructuring is appropri-
ate. To be clear, internal compliance programs may well be valuable. How-
ever, internal compliance programs are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
address structural inadequacies within every corporation. There is no one-
size-fits-all solution to reform a corrupted institution, which is the point be-
hind introducing a menu of reforms. 
Second, and related to the first point, courts lack the competence to de-
sign structural reforms on their own. Judges have many skills, but manageri-
al expertise in the commercial sector is not one of them.69 In fairness, it can 
be difficult in its own right to identify the nature of the structural obstruc-
tion that is producing criminality. Designing a bespoke solution to the cor-
rect problem identified would likely be exponentially more complicated. 
                                                        
66 U.S.S.G. ch. 8, introductory cmt. 
67 U.S.S.G. § 8D1.4. Additionally, the existence of a compliance program can 
serve as grounds to decrease the fine levied against a. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f). 
68 See U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1. 
69 The same holds for prosecutors, yet this has not stopped them from imple-
menting reforms on the fly for corporations and even whole industries. See generally 
Prosecutors in the Board Room (Barkow & Barkow eds., 2011). While I 
applaud the initiative, I agree with most critiques that prosecutors are ill suited to 
the task. The reforms articulated here could just as easily be appropriated by prose-
cutors should they continue to use prosecution agreements. Cf. Ramirez, supra 
note 47, at 975 (noting that prosecution agreements tend to include “similar terms 
that might be included in a corporate criminal sentence”).  
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These challenges cry out for restructuring as I have described it. A 
menu of corporate-governance reforms would address both problems. First, 
it would assist courts in identifying the broad sort of structural problem at 
issue, and would identify a reform most fitting to address said problem. Se-
cond, it would provide guidance to courts as to how to implement a forced 
restructuring of a corporation.  
However, there is a third reason why courts might decline the invitation 
I suggest the Guidelines extend to them. Likely there is skepticism that the 
Guidelines really intend for corporate probation to be used in the aggressive 
manner that I am suggesting. To be sure, elements of supervised release ap-
pear in corporate probation. But other evidence points against a broad read-
ing of the Guidelines. For example, although the Guidelines empower 
courts to use corporate probation as a means of “providing a structural 
foundation from which an organization may self-police its own conduct,”70 
the Guidelines seem to expect that an effect compliance program alone is 
sufficient to meet the challenge. Court thus might understandably worry 
that I am using fragments to justify the equivalent of severe conditions of 
supervised release. And, to be sure, restructuring a corporation will usually 
cause a severe intrusion. By contrast, while supervised release can be severe, 
it need not be and often is not. 
4! Restructuring is a Necessary Component of 
Corporate-Criminal Punishment 
4.1! Locating Restructuring among Corporate Punishments 
Whereas the first objections to restructuring under the Guidelines con-
cerned matters of feasibility and implementation, this final objection nar-
rows in on the suitability of restructuring. Addressing it requires shifting our 
gaze from the legal framework of the Guidelines themselves and towards our 
                                                        
70 U.S.S.G. ch. 8, introductory cmt. 
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broader practices of punishment. I turn now to consider where restructuring 
falls within the spectrum of other corporate punishments, and, by analogiz-
ing to individual punishments, how restructuring serves as a necessary com-
ponent in our pluralistic approach to justifying criminal punishment. 
4.1.1! Restructuring as Punishment 
What makes restructuring punishment? After all, reformers evidently 
don’t think of themselves as punishing corporations. That said, many ac-
tions not considered punishment in the ordinary course of things become 
punishment when saddled with the appropriate social meaning.71 Certainly 
the forced restructuring of a single corporation by a court in response to a 
corporate conviction connotes a different message than does the adoption of 
global reforms applicable to all corporations in the ordinary commercial con-
text. What we are really asking is whether restructuring can constitute hard 
treatment, the kind that reflects criminal condemnation.72 
Restructuring has all the hallmarks of the kind of hard treatment that 
could serve as the basis for the State’s expression of criminal condemnation. 
Restructuring aims to reform a corporation. In doing so, the State may—in 
fact, likely will—frustrate the corporation’s interests. For example, a BP 
that is more protective of its employees may well be a significantly less prof-
itable BP. Forced restructuring of the corporation will cause it to experience 
harm in the form of compliance costs, lost lines of business, new initiatives 
enacted by previously voiceless stakeholders, etc. Meanwhile, the nature of 
the hard treatment is distinctly corporate. That is, to the extent that restruc-
turing aims to reform a corrupted structure, the message being conveyed is 
                                                        
71 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 
413, 420 (1999). 
72 Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 Monist 397, 400 
(1965). 
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that the misconduct is not reducible to any individual; there is something 
separate from the members causing the problem. 
4.1.2! A Spectrum of Corporate Punishments 
Where does restructuring fit on the spectrum of corporate punishment? 
Consider first such a spectrum as it exists without restructuring. At one end 
is ordinary probation—or more accurately, corporate probation used in a 
manner tantamount to ordinary probation. Like probation for individuals, 
ordinary corporate probation is a mild sanction, one given in lieu of more 
severe punishment. The impositions can be relatively minor: the primary 
purpose for using corporate probation as ordinary probation is to ensure a 
convicted corporation makes outstanding restitution payments and satisfies 
other remedial obligations.73 
At the other end of the spectrum is termination, either by court order or 
(effectively) by regulatory suspension. Like the death penalty to which it is 
analogized, forced termination is the ultimate sanction for corporations: it is 
irreversible and uniquely harsh in its effects. To be sure, we should not take 
the metaphor too seriously: the execution of an individual person is unques-
tionably a more serious affair than is the termination of a corporation. 
Among other things, those individuals previously constituting a terminated 
corporation are still around and free to join another enterprise; in theory, 
they could even attempt to recreate the corporation just terminated.74 But 
forced termination need not reach the level of capital punishment to count 
as especially severe punishment. Arthur Anderson is the paradigmatic ex-
ample: the firm’s termination—not because of its overturned conviction, 
                                                        
73 See U.S.S.G. § 8D1.3(2); § 8D1.1(a)(1) (requiring probation if “necessary to 
secure payment of restitution, enforce a remedial order, or ensure completion of 
community service” (internal citations omitted)). 
74 I suspect that this is more difficult than it sounds, and even the formation of 
a doppelgänger would still come at a cost great enough to consider forced termina-
tion an extreme sanction. 
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but rather because of its SEC debarment75—cost 85,000 jobs, cancelled a 
broad swath of contracts and business relationships with a host of third par-
ties, and reorganized the collection of major domestic accounting firms.76 
The severity of forced termination is reflected in the strict conditions for its 
application,77 under which courts have found only one corporation to termi-
nate under the Guidelines in the past 25 years.78 
In between ordinary probation and forced termination are criminal 
fines, the traditional and still paradigmatic form of corporate punishment. 
By definition, any fine less than the amount calculated to terminate a corpo-
ration will be less severe. On the other hand, fines are worse punishment 
than ordinary corporate probation as signaled, among other things, by the 
fact that corporate probation must be imposed in the absence of a fine, but 
not vice versa.79 
Where would restructuring fit on this spectrum? I consider restructur-
ing to be more severe a punishment than a fine but less severe than termina-
tion. First, restructuring is a more invasive punishment than a fine; it re-
works a corporate structure that ordinary and historically is predominantly 
within the purview of members to design. By contrast, as Chapter III articu-
lates at length, a fine takes a corporation as a single agent, leaving preserved 
the underlying structure voluntarily entered into by the members. Second, 
                                                        
75 Garrett, supra note 25, at 150. 
76 The aftermath of Arthur Andersen’s prosecution also probably influenced 
the government decision to enter into a massive deferred-prosecution agreement 
with KPMG, one of the remaining major accounting firms, in 2005. 
77 U.S.S.G. 8C1.1 (applying to organizations “operated primarily for a criminal 
purpose or primarily by criminal means”). This is not to endorse the Guideline’s 
standard. For my part, I think it is too restrictive; the State should be more willing 
to terminate corporations for the same reasons that termination, if an analogue to 
capital punishment, is incomparably less severe. That point aside, the absence of 
corporation terminations reinforces the argument in Chapter II that corporations 
receive preferential treatment under the criminal law as compared to individuals. 
78 United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 (4th Cir. 2002). 
79 U.S.S.G. § 8D1.1(a)(7). 
  187 
the misconduct towards which restructuring should be responding is worse 
than that associated with a fine. Consider that an act of criminality by a cor-
poration—even one that could be called genuinely corporate under the ac-
count developed in Chapter II—nevertheless does not establish an endemic 
problem; corporate crime, like individual crime, can be an isolated event. By 
comparison, restructuring responds to structural, repetitive misconduct. 
This proposed spectrum of corporate punishments mirrors the spec-
trum of standard, individual punishments.80 With respect to individuals, 
probation is less severe than a fine, which is less severe than imprison-
ment,81 which is less severe than capital punishment. That restructuring oc-
cupies the same relative position as imprisonment on its respective spec-
trum is not an accident. This is because restructuring is the spiritual succes-
sor, or at least the corporate counterpart, to imprisonment and its derivative 
supervised release. 
4.2! Establishing the Analogy between Individual and Corporate Pun-
ishments: The Tight Connection between Imprisonment and Su-
pervised Release 
To analogize between individual and corporate punishments, I need to 
establish both the role imprisonment and supervised release play as punish-
ment, and how they function to fulfill that role. Imprisonment and super-
vised release are practically inseparable. Legally, supervised release must 
follow imprisonment—the imposition of the former presupposes and re-
                                                        
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (identifying, in ascending order, punishments availa-
ble to individuals as follows: probation, a fine, or imprisonment). 
81 This should evident from the fact that the price of going to prison is virtually 
inelastic. Even Posner, who argues that a fine and a term of imprisonment are in-
terchangeable in theory, acknowledges that the exchange rate between the two 
could only be paid by the very wealthy when face with only a short term of impris-
onment. Posner, supra note 28, at 415. 
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quires the imposition of the latter.82 Factually, imprisonment virtually en-
sures supervised release: supervised release is imposed in over 95% of cases 
where a term of imprisonment is imposed.83 
More fundamentally, imprisonment and supervised release are broadly 
similar punishments in ways that can easily go overlooked. Both operate 
through physical coercion: they impose severe constraints on an individual’s 
ability to act freely either by constraining an individual’s liberty to act or by 
forcing an individual to take action he or she might otherwise not have tak-
en. Further, they do so in service of the same aspects of the State’s plural-
istic approach to penological justification. Recall from Chapter III that our 
practices of punishment respond to a host of justifications: retribution, spe-
cific and general deterrence, respect for the law, incapacitation, and rehabili-
tation.84 At issue here are the latter two justifications: to incapacitate an of-
fender, and to rehabilitate an offender. Imprisonment and supervised release 
are the primary,85 if not exclusive, methods through which the State pursues 
these two penological objectives.  
4.2.1! Incapacitation 
Consider first the role of imprisonment and supervised release in satis-
fying the State’s effort to incapacitate offenders. I understand the goal of 
incapacitation to be the protection of society from the prospect of future 
                                                        
82 Arguably, the relationship is tighter between imprisonment and parole at the 
state level—the connection is more conceptual than it is legal. This is because, in 
many states, parolees are still considered to be in the custody of the State, albeit 
outside a prison. To that point, one federal circuit has held that to be on parole just 
is to be serving a term of imprisonment. United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710, 717 
(8th Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he term “imprisonment” in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 . . . does not include parole.”). 
83 Scott-Hayward, supra note 55, at 182. 
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (enumerating justifications for punishment). 
85 Ordinary probation too plays a rehabilitative function, but for a very different 
class of criminals. 
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criminality by a current offender; to that end, incapacitation is often cited as 
a primary response to recidivism.86 Incapacitation operates either by remov-
ing entirely an offender from society or by rigorously limiting and control-
ling the offender’s ability to freely interact with society. 
Incarceration—that is, placement in a jail or prison87—represents the 
paradigmatic form of incapacitation. Through incarceration, the State phys-
ically removes an individual from society, restricts them to a prison for a pe-
riod of time, and controls nearly every aspect of the defendant’s daily exist-
ence. The State prohibits prisoners from most activities on the one hand, 
and on the other hand forces them to perform basic activities—working, 
sleeping, eating, exercising, etc.—according to the jailor’s schedule and dis-
cretion. Incarceration is the purest expression of the State’s effort to punish 
through incapacitation.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which supervised release can incapacitate 
an individual is hard to understate; to the extent it differs from incarcera-
tion, that difference is one only of degree. To be fair, what I describe below 
are extreme, albeit perfectly legal, conditions of supervised release; many 
defendants receive only the mandatory conditions of supervised release, and 
one or two discretionary conditions.88 With that caveat aside, and putting 
aside for now a court’s ability to invent its own conditions of supervised re-
lease, the enumerated terms of supervised release can severely incapacitate 
a defendant. A court can restrict a defendant’s physical movement.89 It can 
exercise fine-grained control over a defendant’s professional life: requiring 
the defendant to work, but prohibiting a defendant from pursuing certain 
                                                        
86 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24 (2003) (defending the view that re-
cidivists “must be isolated from society in order to protect the public safety”). 
87 The Guidelines define “term ‘sentence of imprisonment’ [to] mean[] a sen-
tence of incarceration.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b). That said, the concepts need not be 
coextensive. See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
88 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 55, at 211–12 (identifying common conditions 
imposed from a survey of cases out of the Eastern District of New York). 
89 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(1) (geographic limitations); § 5D1.3(e)(5) (curfew). 
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jobs and industries.90 It can limit a defendant’s freedom of association.91 It 
can mandate participation in substance-abuse and mental-health programs, 
even if that means forced confinement in a community center.92 It can em-
power probation officers to conduct random drug tests, to search an offend-
er and his home at any time without notice, and to seize contraband (which 
includes property legal for ordinary citizens to possess) without process.93 
And this list only covers enumerated conditions of probation. Courts of 
appeal have granted district courts broad discretion to invent “reasonably 
related” conditions of supervised release. For example, one defendant was 
foolish enough to express a “desire to overcome his criminal history and to 
secure a stable life.”94 Almost exclusively on this basis, and notwithstanding 
that “[n]othing about [his crime] suggests a need to monitor Gaynor’s fi-
nances,”95 the district court granted a probation officer unfettered, ongoing 
access to all of the defendant’s financial information, and further required 
the defendant to file tax returns even though he was not required to do so 
under federal law.96 Conditions of supervised release for sex offenders are 
especially severe. Courts have prohibited offenders from ever accessing the 
Internet,97 and even possessing Internet-accessible smart phones.98 Courts 
                                                        
90 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(5) (“[D]efendant shall work regularly at a lawful occu-
pation.”); § 5D1.3(e) (“Occupational restrictions may be imposed as a condition of 
supervised release.”). 
91 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(9) (prohibiting “associat[ing] with any person convicted 
of a felony”). 
92 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(1). 
93 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(10) (“[D]efendant shall permit a probation officer to 
visit the defendant at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation 
of any contraband observed.”); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4) (mandating periodic drug 
testing for all defendants on supervised release). 
94 United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App’x 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished 
opinion) 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting cita-
tions).  
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even require offenders to submit to repeated plethysmographic testing, 
whereby offenders are forced to observe images of child pornography while 
wearing medical equipment that measures genital bloodflow to serve as a 
means of detecting arousal.99 
The line between supervised release and imprisonment is especially 
blurry with respect to conditions like house arrest. The Guidelines specify 
that a term of home detention must be imposed through supervised release 
rather than imprisonment100; a term of imprisonment is reserved for incar-
ceration in a prison.101 However, courts and regulators do not always share 
the Guideline’s perspective; outside the criminal law they have held repeat-
edly “that imprisonment does not mean incarceration in a jail.”102 For ex-
ample, the Third Circuit recently concluded, on the basis of an immigration 
“statute’s disjunctive phrasing—’imprisonment ... include[s] the period of 
incarceration or confinement’—. . . that Congress intended for ‘imprison-
ment’ to cover more than just time spent in jail.”103 Accordingly, the Circuit 
joined others in holding that house arrest is a form of imprisonment.104 
                                                                                                                                            
98 See United States v. Mizwa, 574 F. App’x 220, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (uphold-
ing a 15-month sentence against a defendant for violating his conditions of super-
vised release by, inter alia, obtaining “a cellular phone with internet access”); ac-
cord United States v. Wood, No. 1:11-CR-0210-SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 4053925, at *1 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2014). 
99 United States v. Music, 49 F. App’x 393, 395 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished 
opinion). I have no idea how any court finds this process to be constitutional. See 
United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2013) (detailing why such a 
condition of supervised release violates substantive due process). 
100 U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2; see also § 5F1.1 (community confinement). 
101 U.S.S.G. § 5C1.1(c)(3), (d)(c). 
102 United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856, 860–61 (E.D. Va. 
1988); see 28 C.F.R. § 2.52(c)(2) (“[I]f a parolee has been convicted of a new of-
fense committed subsequent to his release on parole, which is punishable by any 
term of imprisonment, detention, or incarceration in any penal facility…”) (em-
phasis added); accord 5 C.F.R. § 890.1003. 
103 Ilchuk v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 434 F.3d 618, 623 (3d Cir. 2006).  
104 Id.; accord Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 749 (11th Cir.1995); see also 
Mills v. Taylor, 967 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (permitting instances of deten-
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Both imprisonment and supervised release serve to incapacitate a de-
fendant. The incapacitation executed through incarceration is almost cer-
tainly more severe than any single alternative through supervised release. 
That said, the difference between the two punishments is one of degree—in 
theory, that difference can be quite slight. Supervised release can approach 
the breadth and scope of incapacitation exemplified by incarceration. 
4.2.2! Rehabilitation 
What about the second penological justification served by imprison-
ment and supervised release—viz., the rehabilitation of defendants? Again, 
both imprisonment and supervised release operate to rehabilitate offenders; 
the difference between each punishment’s commitment to this justification 
is merely one of degree. 
Whereas imprisonment is oriented more towards incapacitation, super-
vised release is oriented more towards rehabilitation. According to the Su-
preme Court, “Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in 
their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative 
ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”105 For example, the 
Guidelines explicitly permit courts to impose conditions of supervised re-
lease designed “to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most ef-
fective manner.”106 
Nonetheless, imprisonment continues to play an important role in in-
stantiating the State’s justification of rehabilitation. Although rehabilitation 
has decreased in prominence relative to its heyday in the mid-twentieth cen-
                                                                                                                                            
tion that “approach those of incarceration” to count towards the calculation of a 
term of imprisonment (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 3585 (2012))). 
105 United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). 
106 U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1)(D). 
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tury,107 rumors of its demise are greatly exaggerated. Although rehabilitation 
cannot serve as the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment,108 once a term 
of imprisonment has been imposed, rehabilitation may be considered.109 In-
deed, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that “opportunities for rehabilita-
tion within prison” are “important matters” to discuss with a defendant 
during sentencing.110 Meanwhile, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) operates 
more than a dozen rehabilitative programs for inmates focused on educa-
tion, vocational training, psychological services, and religious services.111 
Indeed, one such program—the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Pro-
gram112—constitutes one of the only ways to obtain early release within the 
federal system.113 With respect to vocational training, each federal prison 
tailors the jobs it creates for convicts according to jobs available in the local 
market; federal prisons provide opportunities intended to maximize their 
employment prospects upon release.114  
In summary, imprisonment and supervised release are intertwined 
methods of punishment through which the State primarily achieves its pe-
                                                        
107 See Tapia v. United States, — U.S. — , 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (2011) (de-
scribing how the pre-Guidelines era “system was premised on a faith in rehabilita-
tion” that “eventually fell into disfavor”); see generally Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and 
Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2003). 
108 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). 
109 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392. 
110 Id. 
111 Bureau of Prisons, Directory of Bureaus of Prisons’ 
National Programs (2015), available at http://www.bop.gov/inmates 
/custody_and_care/docs/BOPNationalProgramCatalog.pdf (listing programs). 
112 28 C.F.R. § 550.53. 
113 See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55 (implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)). 
114 See Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Occupational Training 
Directory (2014), available at http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody 
_and_care/docs/inmate_occupational_training_directory.pdf. As an example 
both of this and the pervasive problem of collateral consequences to conviction, the 
federal prison in Mansfield, OH does not train prisoners in barbering because Ohio 
prohibits former convicts from obtaining a license to cut hair. 
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nological goals of incapacitation and rehabilitation. Both punishments are far 
along a spectrum of state intrusion, with imprisonment more directly serv-
ing incapacitation and supervised release serving rehabilitation. Still, each 
punishment goes a long way towards expressing both goals of punishment. 
4.3! Comparing Restructuring to Imprisonment  
When I say that restructuring is the corporate counterpart to impris-
onment and supervised release, what I have in mind is that restructuring sat-
isfies, through similar methods of state coercion, the same penological ob-
jectives uniquely or primarily satisfied by these individual punishments. Re-
structuring functions similarly: by reworking the corporation’s structure, it 
forces the corporation to refrain from actions the corporation might want to 
take and forces the corporation to take actions it might otherwise have 
avoided. Of course, the analogy between restructuring and imprisonment 
runs square into a clear obstacle: corporate imprisonment is impossible. 
The impossibility of corporate imprisonment is by now a truism in 
scholarship on corporate crime—an assertion so obvious that it neither 
needs neither (and thus receives neither) an explanation nor a defense.115 
                                                        
115 Here is a mere smattering of citations to that effect: Melrose Distillers, Inc. 
v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959); Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal 
Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 Wash U. L.Q. 393, 396 
(1982); Pamela H. Bucy supra note 64, at 1439; V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal 
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1478 (1996); Ga-
briel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corpo-
rate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. 797 
(2013); Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organiza-
tional Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 Am. Bus. L.J. 489, 499 (1996); 
Leonard Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search of Theory and Schol-
arship, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1980); Peter C. Kostant, Meaningful 
Good Faith: Managerial Motives and the Duty to Obey the Law, 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. 
Rev. 421, 430 (2011); Ramirez, supra note 47, at 938 (2005); David M. Uhlmann, 
Deferred Prosecution And Non-Prosecution Agreements And The Erosion Of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 72 Md. L. Rev. 1295, 1333 (2013); Kyle Noonan, Note, The 
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And, to be clear, I agree that corporate imprisonment is impossible—or, at 
the very least, possible only by creating institutions so foreign to our ordi-
nary criminal practice as not to be worth taking seriously.  
Nevertheless, I can think of two reasons why it is worth arguing for a 
claim that no one seems to contest. First, a bit of conceptual housekeeping: 
many assertions of the impossibility of corporate imprisonment presuppose 
an anachronistic conception of personhood whose rejection played an essen-
tial role in developing the modern corporation. Those who implicitly invoke 
the individual-person premise to dismiss corporate imprisonment would not 
like us to take seriously the consequences of their assertions. Second, devel-
oping a sympathetic account of corporate imprisonment, even if it fails, 
highlights which differences between corporations and individuals make a 
legal difference; accordingly, the exercise informs the limits of analogizing 
between individual and corporate punishments. 
That said, an in-depth discussion of corporate imprisonment is mostly 
tangential to the current project. Ultimately, the impossibility of corporate 
imprisonment is less an obstacle than it might first appear; supervised re-
lease can accomplish most everything that imprisonment would. The upshot 
is that restructuring resembles a particularly aggressive, freestanding form 
of supervised release, one whose aggressiveness comes as a counterweight 
to the impossibility of corporate imprisonment. Nevertheless, I include a 
discussion of corporate imprisonment for the sake of completeness, and be-
cause little has been done to explain the impossibility of corporate impris-
onment. Those who do not need convincing, or who are uninterested in the 
details of the discussion, can skip to Section 4.4. 
                                                                                                                                            
Case for a Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
602, 612 (2011). 
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4.3.1! Dispensing with the Body Argument 
First, I pause for a bit of conceptual housekeeping consistent with the 
broader project. A naïve, and specious, explanation of the impossibility of 
corporate imprisonment would be to point a syllogism of the following sort: 
 
P1.! In order to experience imprisonment, an entity e 
must have its own single body to be put into prison.  
P2.! A corporate entity ec does not have its own single 
body to be put into prison.  
C1.! Therefore, ec cannot experience imprisonment. 
 
In other words, corporate imprisonment is impossible because corpora-
tions have no bodies to throw into jail. The observation is an old one: First 
Baron Edmund Thurlow quipped that “Corporations have neither bodies to 
be punished, nor souls to be condemned.”116 A bastardized version—one 
that credits Thurlow with saying that a corporation “has no soul to be 
damned, and no body to be kicked”—continues to be a favorite among 
scholars in the modern day.117 Meanwhile, impossibility arguments of this 
form have been popular throughout the history of corporations. Consider 
that fifty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that it was impossible for a 
corporation to experience any form of punishment except for a criminal fi-
ne.118 Until fifty years before that, courts routinely held that it was impossi-
ble to attribute to a corporation a specific or general criminal intention. And 
fifty years before that, courts declared it impossible to attribute attitudes to a 
corporation in any context, civil or criminal. Throughout early corporate 
                                                        
116 See John Poyner, Literary Extracts vol. 1 at 268 (1844). 
117 A Westlaw search confirms that this particular misquotation has been in-
cluded in more than fifty law review articles during the past ten years alone. 
118 United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958) (“As in the case 
of corporations, the conviction of [a partnership] can lead only to a fine levied on 
the firm’s assets.”) (emphasis added). 
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history, courts took seriously the legal relevance of a corporation’s missing 
tongue,119 hand,120 body,121 mind,122 and soul.123 
We have seen this sort of argument before: it is a variant of the Individ-
ual-Person Premise considered in Chapters I and II. Yet, as established 
there, the individual-person premise is anachronistic to our modern concep-
tion of the corporation. Specifically, Chapter I established that arguments 
from impossibility get their purchase from this outdated conception of per-
sonhood whose abandonment was essential to developing modern corpora-
tions of sophisticated-enough organization to satisfy the demands of legal 
personhood. Meanwhile, Chapter II recognized that that the individual-
person premise is inconsistent with our larger framework for making sense 
of corporate personhood. Giving up this framework would come at the ex-
pense of much of what makes corporations an invaluable means of sophisti-
cated collective activity. Accordingly, the naïve argument against corporate 
imprisonment is specious grounds for maintaining that a corporation cannot 
experience imprisonment. 
4.3.2! Developing a Pragmatic Account of Corporate Imprisonment 
As should come as no surprise, corporate persons are not similarly situ-
ated to human persons in all respects. In particular, corporations are differ-
ently situated with respect to how they experience imprisonment. However, 
making sense of this difference is not aided by, and is probably impaired by, 
appealing to the presence or absence of a single body. We can make sense of 
                                                        
119 Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 92 (1827) (Marshall, C.J. 
dissenting); Childs v. Bank of Mo., 17 Mo. 213, 215 (Mo. 1852). 
120 See Copey v. Grover & Baker Sewing-Mach. Co., 6 F. Cas. 517, 519 
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1875), cited with approval in City of Salt Lake City v. Hollister, 118 
U.S. 256, 262 (1886). 
121 See United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898); Bank of 
Ithaca v. King, 12 Wend. 390, 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). 
122 McDermott v. Evening Journal Ass’n, 43 N.J.L. 488, 490 (N.J. 1881) 
123 Sutton’s Hop. Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612) (Coke, J.).  
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imprisonment as punishment irrespective of whether the person has a sin-
gle, physical body to incarcerate. 
Suppose we were to construct the most sympathetic account of corpo-
rate imprisonment we could: one consistent with the pragmatic conception 
of personhood rather than anachronistic, legally irrelevant assertions.  Doing 
so would require, as starting point, a broad view of the concept of impris-
onment.  
Imprisonment need not be understood so narrowly as to refer only to 
putting a single body into prison. I have already suggested some basis in the 
law for distinguishing imprisonment from incarceration. Some courts of ap-
peal treat house arrest as imprisonment.124 Others have held that state pa-
role—the portion of a sentence during which an individual is released from 
prison back into society subject to onerous restrictions, activity monitoring, 
and reporting requirements—constitutes imprisonment.125 The tort of false 
imprisonment applies in settings other than a prison.126 The Guidelines im-
plicitly acknowledge the distinction by clarifying that, for purpose of the 
Guidelines, “[t]he term ‘sentence of imprisonment’ means a sentence of 
incarceration.”127 There is even some support in ordinary usage, where im-
prisonment, but not incarceration is used to describe non-physical confine-
ment—that is, where “the object confined, or the nature of the confine-
ment, or both, are other than physical.”128 
                                                        
124 See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
125 United States v. French, 46 F.3d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1995). But see United 
States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We hold that the term “impris-
onment” in U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 (2001) and Application Note 2 does not in-
clude parole.”). 
126 Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 35–36. 
127 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b). 
128 Compare, e.g., Imprison, Oxford English Dictionary (2d. ed. 1996) (second 
definition) (“To confine, shut up: in various [connections], in which either the 
confining agent or cause, or the object confined, or the nature of the confinement, or 
both, are other than physical, or in which the object is inanimate.”), with Incarcerate, 
Oxford English Dictionary (2d. ed. 1996) (“To shut up in prison; to put in con-
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Leveraging this distinction, I use the term imprisonment to de-
scribe the State’s imposition of an extreme restraint, suggestive of confine-
ment, on a person’s liberty to act. By extreme, I mean that the restraint op-
erates across a broad swath of domains in which a person would otherwise 
be free to act, and within those domains severely limits or controls the per-
son ability to act. By contrast, I use the term incarceration to refer the 
State’s physically imprisoning a person within a prison or jail. Incarceration, 
in other words, is a means of operationalizing imprisonment—just not the 
only means of operationalizing imprisonment.  
Even with a broad conception of imprisonment, it is a challenge to see 
how to operationalize corporate imprisonment. We could not do so by in-
carcerating corporate members. Although there is an argument that incar-
cerating individuals on behalf of a corporation could count as corporate pun-
ishment,129 it still would not count as corporate imprisonment. Even our ex-
pansive notion of imprisonment still requires a broad restriction of liberty to 
act. Locking away individual group members would work an extreme, wide-
scoping restraint on the liberty of those individual members. However, doing 
so would not obviously restrain in extreme the corporation. The corporation 
could still go about its day-to-day business, could replace (best it could) the 
incarcerated members, etc. In short, individual incarceration is an inapt 
method for imprisoning a corporation. 
A promising approach for operationalizing corporate imprisonment 
would be to aim instead at the other essential characteristics of a sophisti-
                                                                                                                                            
finement; to imprison.”); see generally Keally McBride, Incarceration and Imprison-
ment, 6 L., Culture, & Hum. 341, 343 (2010). 
129 The argument for incarnation as corporate punishment leverages Chapter 
III’s discussion of negotiable punishment. Terms of imprisonment are not current-
ly treated as divisible and fungible, but they could be. Accordingly, as it does with 
fines, the State could impose a term of years on a corporation and leave it to the 
corporation to distribute the term amongst its members. To be clear, I think this 
would be a terrible policy. I also think that putting minors in prison is a terrible pol-
icy, but that fact does not make the policy something other than punishment. 
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cated collective agent: either its structure or its ability to use that structure 
to purse a collective goal. The idea here would be to prevent individuals 
from participating through a corporate form to pursue their shared goal. In 
effect, the State would incapacitate a corporation by suspending access ei-
ther to the corporate form itself or to the collective goal motivating the cor-
poration’s existence in the first place. With respect to the latter, many states 
require that founders identify a collective goal in order to incorporate; a col-
lective goal is frequently an essential component of a corporate charter.130 
As a matter of practice, a membership’s collective goal will be both more 
focused than the boilerplate “any lawful act” offered as a collective goal in 
the standard corporate charter. Such a collective goal may be memorialized 
in a mission statement or prospectus to investors, or it could be implicit in 
the corporation’s participation in a certain industry. Regardless, the gov-
ernment could imprison a corporation by prohibiting the corporation from 
pursuing its chartered or actual collective goal. Indeed, one district court 
actually tried sua sponte to imprison a corporation by suspending its charter. 
Unsurprisingly, the Fourth Circuit summarily reversed.131 
All the same, this lone district court opinion may have been vindicated 
by the subsequent development of regulatory suspension.132 As explained 
earlier, federal regulators can, and sometimes must, suspend temporarily 
corporate participation in a variety of commercial enterprises in response to 
a corporate conviction. Regulatory suspension approximates corporate im-
                                                        
130 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit 8, § 284(a) (West 2010). Many states re-
serve the right revoke a corporate charter for “serious criminal violations,” that 
power is effectively a dead letter. See Noonan, supra note 115, at 616 (noting that 
Delaware has not invoked this power in over sixty years). 
131 United States v. Allegheny Bottling Co., 695 F. Supp. 856, 860–61 (E.D. Va. 
1988), rev’d sub nom., United States v. Harford, 870 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1989) (un-
published table case). 
132 Cf. David Debold, Sentencing of Organizations, PRACTICE UNDER THE FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES §17.01 n.3 (2012) (describing the district court’s 
vindication after the adoption of the Guidelines). 
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prisonment insofar as it imposes upon a corporation an extreme wide-
scoping restriction on the corporation’s ability to pursue its actual collective 
goal. On this view, there is at least one perfectly ordinary sense in which a 
corporation could be imprisoned.  
Arguments from impossibility seem to overstate the conceptual chal-
lenge. Contra the standard argument, corporate imprisonment is possible. 
More to the point, practices approximating corporate imprisonment already 
exist either outside of the corporate setting, or within the corporate setting 
but technically just outside our system of corporate-criminal punishment. 
4.3.3! Even a Pragmatic Account of Corporate Imprisonment Fails 
And yet, our initial discussion of regulatory suspension foreshadowed 
the real problem of corporate imprisonment. Even the most sympathetic, 
pragmatic account of corporate imprisonment suffers from a fundamental 
defect: completely incapacitating a corporation for any meaningful period 
will reliably result in its termination. To reiterate a slogan, corporate impris-
onment of the kind described above is a de facto corporate death penalty. 
The real problem with trying to imprison corporation is that corporate 
personhood is voluntary in a way that individual personhood is not. A cor-
poration necessarily consists of its members. Unlike members of some other 
types of groups,133 corporate members are formally free to leave the collec-
tive enterprise at any time. Indeed, the formal preservation of so-called exit 
rights is a foundational feature of the modern corporation; as Chapter I ex-
plained, exit rights are essential to the modern corporation’s success as a 
commercial vehicle.134 Voluntariness is written into the foundation of the 
corporation as a vehicle for successful, collective commercial activity. Indi-
                                                        
133 Cf. Peter French, Types of Collectives, in Individual and Collec-
tive Responsibility 33 (2d. ed., 1998) (taxonomy of collectives). 
134 See Margaret Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for 
Business Organizers During the Nineteenth Century, 51 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 387 
(2003). 
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vidual persons are not similarly situated; they cannot abandon their humani-
ty in the way that corporate members can abandon a corporation. 
Thus, the issue is not that it is conceptually impossible to imprison a 
corporation. We could imagine ways to remove a corporation temporarily 
from society, which in fact approximates the practice of regulatory suspen-
sion that we already have. Rather, the issue is that it is effectively impossible 
to just imprison a corporation—that is, to imprison a corporation in a way 
that does not invariably lead to its termination. 
4.4! Comparing Restructuring to Supervised Release 
We should not take the wrong less from the impossibility of corporate 
imprisonment. In particular, it would be a mistake to conclude from the fact 
that corporations cannot experience incapacitation in its most extreme man-
ifestation that corporations are immune to any sort of incapacitation. Ra-
ther, the impossibility of corporate imprisonment is merely a recognition 
that a corporation cannot be entirely removed from society with any expec-
tation that it will return.  
That corporations cannot experience the most extreme form of incapac-
itation is not actually much cause for concern. After all, the ambition is not 
to recreate corporate versions of individual punishments for its own sake. 
Rather, the enterprise is to demonstrate that restructuring fulfills a similar 
purpose, and in a similar way, as imprisonment and supervised release. Just 
as imprisonment and supervised release are a necessary part of our criminal 
practice—necessary in the sense that they uniquely (or at least primarily) 
accomplish penological objectives not reached by other punishments—so 
too do I want to establish by analogy that restructuring is necessary to satisfy 
these objectives. 
The practical impossibility of corporate imprisonment is reason to shift 
attention back to supervised release. Supervised release is capable of achiev-
ing most everything that imprisonment can accomplish. In particular, alt-
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hough supervised release is tilted towards rehabilitation, it nevertheless is 
capable of severely incapacitating an individual. 
Indeed, from what we have seen, restructuring resembles a freestand-
ing, aggressive supervised release.  I say freestanding because restructuring, 
but not supervised release, can be imposed without a term of imprisonment. 
Of course, being freestanding makes sense if the counterpart prerequisite—
total incapacitation from incarceration—is impossible. I say aggressive be-
cause the sense of supervised release applicable to corporations has to com-
pensate for the impossibility of corporate imprisonment. In particular, the 
fact that the State is unable to achieve to the same degree its aims of inca-
pacitation through a corporate counterpart to imprisonment suggests that 
supervised release, the State’s other tool for incapacitation, should pick up 
the slack. Put another way, an aggressive form of supervised release is justi-
fied for corporations by the impossibility of corporate imprisonment. 
4.5! Summarizing the Dialectic 
Restructuring is a good idea as policy goes; among other things, stand-
ard objections to the sorts of corporate-governance reforms at issue fall away 
when we begin to think of using reform as punishment. The legal seeds for 
restructuring are already present in the Guidelines’ creation of corporate 
probation, which combines elements of ordinary probation with the more 
invasive, severe potential of supervised release. 
Beyond a legal basis restructuring promises to fill a gap in our practices 
of punishment—viz., a severe punishment, reserved for recidivist or espe-
cially pervasive corporate offenders, that uniquely achieves the State’s stat-
ed goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation. In this respect, restructuring 
accomplishes the same purposes, and in similar ways as imprisonment and 
supervised release for individuals. Although imprisoning a corporation is 
impossible, we can use supervised release to accomplish the same objec-
tives. Indeed, supervised release is a fitting analogue to restructuring: both 
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allow for massive incapacitation of an offender in the service of rehabilitative 
ends. Indeed, as the Coda will suggest there are even reasons to think that 
restructuring is less controversial than supervised release itself in light of the 
absence of concerns over paternalistic invasions of autonomy.  
Regardless, restructuring is a natural corporate counterpart to super-
vised release, and the spiritual successor to the type of punishment occupied 
in individual context by imprisonment and supervised release. Accordingly, 
we need restructuring as a complement to our pluralistic penology. There is 
more than a legal basis tucked in the Guidelines permitting restructuring as 
a form of corporate punishment. Forced restructuring fulfills the potential 
of the Guidelines to deliver a full spectrum of corporate punishments.  
5! Conclusion 
Restructuring offers a new way to leverage developments in corporate-
governance reform in a way that skirts standard objections to reform. How-
ever, it does much more than that. Restructuring realizes the full potential 
of the Sentencing Guidelines as they exist today by filling a gap in our cur-
rent practices of corporate punishment. It serves as a spiritual successor to 
imprisonment and supervised release for individuals—a sort of freestanding, 
aggressive version of supervised release applicable to corporations—in that 
it expresses justifications of incapacitation and rehabilitation currently miss-
ing from our panoply of corporate punishments. Restructuring is thus not 
just a good idea; it realizes the unmet potential of our current practices of 
corporate punishment. 
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RESTRUCTURING VS. TARGETING: FINAL WORDS ON HOW 
THE CRIMINAL LAW VIEWS A CORPORATION 
 
1! Restructuring Avoids the Sins of Targeting 
Both Chapters III and IV have leveraged corporate reforms to improve 
corporate-criminal punishment. Arguably, restructuring goes a step beyond 
the proposal in Chapter III. Chapter III advocates using corporate-law re-
form to improve the efficacy of preexisting, paradigmatic corporate punish-
ment; corporate-law reform served to facilitate corporate punishment. By 
comparison, Chapter IV advocates the use of corporate reform as punish-
ment itself. Specifically, I am advocating using a pre-existing punishment—
corporate probation—as a vehicle for forcibly restructuring criminal corpo-
rations consistent with already developed corporate reforms.  
The Corporations as Persons view introduced in the Interlude—by 
which the criminal law takes the corporation as a single person, and declines 
to look past to the corporate members—operated as a major constraint in 
Chapter III. In particular, I took the Corporations as Persons view to pre-
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clude the State from interfering directly with the negotiations of corporate 
members over how to distribute the harm of punishment. Yet Chapter IV 
advocates restructuring a corporation without regard for the preferences of 
the corporation’s members. At least at first blush, Chapter IV seems to do 
precisely what I decried in Chapter III. Is restructuring inconsistent with the 
constraints I placed on myself in Chapter III? 
Restructuring does not fall into the same trap that targeting does, be-
cause restructuring takes the corporation as the object of its concern in a 
way that targeting does not. Recall the problem with targeting: it exploits the 
Corporation as Persons view in order to secure a conviction, but then im-
mediately looks past the corporation as the object of concern to go after in-
dividuals deemed “really” responsible. In particular, targeting switches 
mid-prosecution its object of concern in ways that undermine the conceptu-
al framework underlying corporate-criminal liability, short-circuit the 
State’s efforts at corporation regulation, and skirt the rights of individuals. 
Restructuring and targeting look superficially similar in one respect: 
they both embrace the Corporations as Persons view at the moment of con-
viction, but shift perspectives at the moment of punishment. However, with 
respect to restructuring, the shift in perspective does not look past the cor-
poration as the State’s objective of concern; both the Corporations as Per-
sons view and the Corporations as Systems view take the corporation as the 
proper object of concern. In other words, restructuring does not exploit the 
institution of corporate-criminal liability for purposes other than holding 
criminally responsible the corporation separate from its members. The State 
still takes the corporation as its object of concern, even if that means think-
ing about the corporation as a system rather than a person. 
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2! Combining Two Views of Corporations within 
the Criminal Law         
Still, restructuring interferes with the corporation’s structure. Presum-
ably, there will be cases—indeed, perhaps the vast majority of cases—where 
restructuring forces changes upon the corporation that do not reflect the 
preferences of members; after all, if members wanted their corporation to 
look that way, corporate law almost certainly gives them the tools to make it 
so. Doesn’t restructuring interfere with members’ freedom to design a cor-
poration as they see fit? Moreover, necessarily the State must look inside the 
corporation to diagnose what reforms to impose. In doing so, isn’t the crim-
inal law abandoning the Corporations as Persons view for the Corporations 
as Systems view—that is, the criminal law stops thinking of a corporation as 
a single person and starts thinking about it as a system to redesign? 
On the first point, the reason to impose restructuring is to reform a cor-
poration whose structure is corrupted. Although the corporation is reducible 
to individual inputs—even its structure could be redescribed in terms of 
contributions of individuals—it would be a mistake to think that restructur-
ing disregards the corporation as the object of the law’s concern. Indeed, a 
punishment aimed at a corporation’s structure seems a paradigmatic case of 
treating the corporation as the criminal law’s object of concern. Restructur-
ing permissibly looks inside the corporation, but not past it. In a slogan, 
looking inside the corporation does not necessarily violate corporate auton-
omy, but looking past the corporation does. 
On the second point, I take it as a virtue of restructuring that it unites 
two views of the corporation at the moment of punishment. Recall that the 
Corporations as Systems still underwrites our corporate-law practice. Thus, 
the State already expresses both views of corporations simultaneously; re-
structuring brings those views within the auspices of a single institution. 
There is no reason to think that the two views cannot exist side by side, or 
that in judging responsibility we cannot retreat from one view temporarily to 
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the other. In particular, the State is temporarily adopting the Corporations 
as Systems view in service of the criminal law’s commitment to treating 
corporations as persons. This is an extreme remedy, appropriate for recidi-
vist corporations for whom it is demonstrably impossible to conform their 
conduct to the bounds of the criminal law—which, recall all the way back to 
Chapter II, was a prerequisite of legal personhood for the purposes of crimi-
nal responsibility. Restructuring temporarily appeals to the Corporations as 
Systems view for the purpose of restoring a corporation’s eligibility for legal 
personhood. Thus, restructuring leverages Corporations as Systems view 
for the purposes of vindicating the Corporations as Persons view. 
Indeed, the idea of suspending temporarily the conception of an enti-
ty’s perception as person echoes P.F. Strawson’s observation that we re-
treat to an objective (systems) stance towards other individuals in limited 
circumstances.1 Rehabilitation—a penological justification primarily served 
for corporations by restructuring—seems like a potential situation under 
which we modify our views of personhood. To that point, the objective 
stance serves as a basis of criticism of rehabilitation in non-exceptional cas-
es: the State denies individuals the dignity and autonomy of being seen as 
free and equal persons when it instead treats them as things to be molded 
into the State’s conception of a model citizen.2 
But notice that such paternalistic concerns about rehabilitation, to the 
extent they are to be taken seriously, do not attach to corporations. As the 
Interlude explained, corporations have no freestanding moral right to be 
                                                        
1 See Peter Frederick Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 Proc. Brit. 
Acad. 1, 9 (1962) (“To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to 
see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range 
of sense, might be called treatment.”). 
2 See, e.g., Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral 
Foundation of Criminal Law 355 (2011) (“Paternalist theories of [reha-
bilitation] have long been criticized on the grounds that aiming at the moral im-
provement of offenders by making them suffer involves a failure to respect …the 
person’s moral autonomy.”) 
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seen as persons rather than as systems. The advocacy for the Corporations 
as Persons view over the Corporations as Systems view was purely pruden-
tial; the Corporations as Persons view was essential to maintaining a regula-
tory regime that was preferable to one underwritten by the Corporations as 
Systems view. We thought of corporations as systems for a long time, and 
while this made for bad regulatory policy, it was not moral error.  
Restructuring identifies a narrow context in which the criminal law can 
and should adjust its view of corporations as single persons. That is, restruc-
turing provides the opportunity to adopt temporarily the Corporations as 
Systems view in the service of criminal law, and in a manner that preserves 
the conceptual framework for corporate-criminal liability. In doing so, re-
structuring revitalizes corporate law as a means of regulating corporations. 
However, rather than retreat to a nineteenth-century conception of corpo-
rate law as a freestanding method of regulation, instead restructuring makes 
space for corporate law as a tool for improving criminal punishment. 
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